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Abstract 
 
Regional intricacies and rivalries have produced complex social conditions throughout 
the Middle East. Yet, the study of nationalism and identity has regularly been viewed 
through a uniform, often Eurocentric lens, which is not wholly applicable to the 
Palestinian identity. This thesis will explore the Palestinian identity through Western 
theory, providing a unique look into the reconstruction of said identity post-Nakba. 
 
In a geopolitical system, where rights and responsibilities fall within the parameters of 
sovereign nation states, understanding a stateless nation, namely the Palestinians, through 
existing approaches can prove to be limiting. Therefore, the author of this thesis will 
initially attempt to define how the Palestinian identity may fit into modern theory, 
providing a critical analysis of the manner in which nations are defined.  
 
Hence, the approach of this research entails dividing the Palestinian narrative into three 
nuanced stages post-Nakba; the refugee, the revolutionary and the statesman. Each stage 
was studied separately, exploring the impact of identity and nationalism theory as the 
Palestinian narrative developed. Researching the development of the identity, as it 
evolved through these stages, allows one to understand the base of the Palestinian identity 
as it’s accepted today.  
 
During the initial refugee period the Palestinians were required to look inwards. The 
construction of identity is a collective formation of those who feel a sense of belonging to 
one another, and in this case through being excluded from another group. Once this was 
		
realised, the Palestinians entered the revolutionary period, during which, Pan-Arab 
fervour began its decline. Recognising the opportunity at hand, Fatah took control of the 
PLO and began to separate themselves politically from the Arabs. Throughout the era of 
the statesman the PLO gained recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinians-by 
both the Arabs and the United Nations, initiating the PLO’s journey towards recognition 
by developing a national authority.   
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On the heels of the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948, the Palestinian nation was in a state of 
flux. The majority of Palestinians were forced to live, either under the control of either 
the Israelis in Palestine, the Egyptians in the Gaza Strip, the Jordanians in the West Bank 
or as a pauper society in refugee camps located in surrounding Arab states. When 
exploring the millions of Palestinians who live outside of historic Palestine- as in any 
exiled community, there were those who chose to identify as Palestinian, those who 
chose to assimilate to their new surroundings and those who, due to the conditions 
imposed on them, were forced to identify as a Palestinian. This thesis will focus on the 
idea that many Palestinians were forced to view themselves as Palestinians, as 
“different”, setting the structure for the identity to last through undeniable hardship. 
 
As the Palestinian/Israeli conflict remains to be one of the world’s most contentious, it 
has, for the Palestinians, become a battle merely to exist. While the Israelis are protected 
by full international rights within the state system, the Palestinians are under constant 
threat, especially as time continues to pass from the initial expulsion. For those in the 
diaspora, as well as those living within the occupied territories, what it means to be 
Palestinian is may be becoming blurred, but for many, according to London based 
Palestinian journalist Abdel Bari Atwan; “their Palestinian identity is deeply rooted, and 
they are possibly more radical when it comes to the identity than me, or my parents.”1 For 
many, this may be difficult to comprehend, considering that much of the theory on 
nationalism and identity focuses on the pertinence of a state structure in ensuring the 
viability of an identity.  
																																																								
1 Atwan, Abdel Bari, Phone Interview, Toronto, Canada. July 13th, 2017. 
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The fact that there are Palestinians, four generations removed from the Nakba, still 
attached to their Palestinian identity depending predominantly on memories and history 
of a land that was never home to over half the Palestinian population makes the question 
of Palestinian identity an important case to the study of national identity as a whole. 
Professor Iain Chambers postulates the dilemma faced by those in exile by saying; “It is 
impossible to “go home” again, for neither home nor migrant stayed the same.”2 For that 
reason, I decided to explore the Palestinian identity as it developed post-Nakba, not 
acquiescing to, but attributing the colonization of the past and the reality of the present to 
the make-up of the Palestinian identity.  
 
The first step in developing a post-colonial identity starts with what Wayne Norman 
refers to as a tabula rasa, a clean slate. When discussing the Palestinian identity with 
Bassam Abu Sharif, he was direct in claiming that “the identity of the Palestinians can be 
defined in a very accurate way, the same way we define all people of the Arab nation, 
they are Arabs.”3 While this has merit, the Nakba forced the Palestinian national identity 
to be much more complex than other Arabs. Pairing this complexity with the Arab 
failures in the 1948 war and the treatment of Palestinians by Arab governments advances 
the need for an understanding of the Palestinian identity as it exists outside the scope of 
their broader Arab identity. 
 
While I will not argue against the impact of French/British colonization, Israeli 																																																								
2 Chambers, Iain. Migrancy, Culture, Identity. London: Routledge, 1994. Pg. 74 
3 Abu Sharif, Bassam, Phone Interview, Mississauga, Canada. August 25th, 2017. 
		
			 3	
occupation and American intervention in the conflict between the Palestinians and 
Israelis I set out to explore the concept of the “Palestinian” as they initially carved their 
space out amongst their fellow Arab nations before having the opportunity to do so in the 
international arena.  
Aims and Objectives 
The core objective of this research is to critically analyse and conceptualise the 
resurgence and restructuring of Palestinian national identity between 1948-1982 by 
applying the elements of Western national theory, thereby providing an original 
contribution to our understanding of the construction of this specific identity. This thesis 
intends to explore the idea that there are situations where people are forced to acclimate 
to their surroundings and act accordingly thus creating a distinct identity, in this case, I 
will consider the story of the Palestinians coming together in the refugee camps as a 
national re-awakening. While the Palestinians may draw on a historical connection to 
their lost homeland or cultural expressions of nationhood, when studied in the scope of 
Western nationalism theory these expressions will not entirely satisfy the determinants. 
Abdel Bari Atwan’s beliefs parallel this notion, arguing that: 
The Palestinian identity is based on the intifada as it is based on the struggle, any other identity 
you want to develop based on dancing and art, that’s fine, you want to live in peace and be 
different from the norm that is fine but here is no denying that the basis of being Palestinian was 
developed when the feda’yeen (freedom fighters) began fighting for our freedom.4 
Ernest Gellner, who has been regarded as the “father of nationalism,”5 argues, all that is 
relevant in the study of nationalism is half the story.6 In a world where rights and 
																																																								
4 Atwan, 2017. op.cit 
5 Malešević, Siniša, and Mark Haugaard. Ernest Gellner and Contemporary Social Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Pg. 6 
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responsibilities of a nation are defined through the state system, people may be 
disregarded, even if they have their own history and connection to a territory. It is for that 
reason that it was essential that the Palestinians became proactive in developing their own 
socio-political identity to be able to prosper or, in this case, survive. With that said, this 
thesis is not disregarding the importance of history or memory, but attempting to define 
the Palestinian national identity through a distinctive prism, which in this case is Western 
theory.  
 
Notwithstanding Gellner’s views, the Palestinians were forced to restructure their identity 
as a people living either in exile or under occupation. This thesis will not spend much 
time focusing on the history of the Palestinians and their long-standing attachment to 
Palestine but rather will scrutinise events that transpired which forced, and later allowed, 
the Palestinians to self-author their political identity. Examining Palestinian nationalism 
through the prism of Western theory allows for an alternative approach to Palestinian 
self-understanding. Though the Palestinian people enjoy a rich culture and history that 
existed before the Nakba that continued to flourish following the events in 1948 and 
while there is vast literature signifying the pertinence of the Palestinian cultural identity, 
this thesis will complement the existing literature by examining the identity through the 
existing, albeit uniform, theory available on nationalism. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
6 Mortimer, Edward, and Ernest Gellner. "Adam's Naval: 'Primordialists' vs. 'Modernists'." 
People, Nation and State the Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999. 
31-35. Pg. 32 
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The reasoning behind the timeframe chosen, starting with the defeat of the Arab armies in 
1948, is the fact that the Palestinians lost their homes, their land and ultimately their 
sense of identity. The Palestinians entered a decade defined by historian Rashid Khalidi 
as the “lost years”;7 where the Palestinians, either in exile or living under occupation in 
the Palestinian territories, were searching for answers. This predicament forced them to 
depend on building alliances with fellow non-Palestinian Arabs. 
 
These allegiances had an adverse effect on building Palestinian identity post-Nakba due, 
in part, to the fact that while the Arab states were allies, they remained young nations 
concerned with developing their own states. In the search for answers, two prevalent 
schools of thought emerged- the first being of the Arab National Movement (Harakat al 
Qawmiyin al Arab), which became the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) in 1967 and the second being the Palestinian National Liberation Movement 
(Harakat al Tahrir al Watani al Filistini), which later became known as the popular 
Palestinian political faction Fatah. Although George Habash, one of the founders of the 
Arab National Movement, was a patriotic and revered Palestinian, he believed that the 
national movement to liberate Palestine was an Arab cause. The founders of Fatah on the 
other hand, held an affinity for other Arabs but believed that the Palestinian national 
movement must be controlled by Palestinians, which in turn, would strengthen Arab 
unity.  
 
																																																								
7 Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. 
New York : Columbia University Press, 1997. Pg. 179. 
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This research intends to examine these two pertinent paths of Palestinian identity after the 
Nakba of 1948, the ethnosymbolic, yet, politically constructed, ethnic Arab identity and 
the reconstructed Palestinian identity reborn, not on the heels of trauma, but in a call for 
liberation. The shift from a traditional ethnosymbolic identity based on the unification of 
the Arab world to an exclusive modern constructivist identity will be surveyed through 
the run-up to the six-day war in 1967, the 1968 battle of Karameh and Black September 
in 1970, Arafat’s 1974 UN speech culminating in the war in Lebanon and the Sabra and 
Shatila Massacre of 1982.  
 
These events are essential in studying the resurgence of the Palestinian identity, starting 
with the war of 1967, which dispelled the myth that “Arab unity will lead to the liberation 
of Palestine” when Israel defeated Jordan, Syria and Egypt in under a week. Further, the 
battle of Karameh in 1968 was the first military action the Palestinian Liberation Army 
took against the state of Israel since its inception in 1948, providing a major propaganda 
tool for Fatah and Yasser Arafat allowing him to gain the support needed to be elected as 
the chairman of the PLO. Furthermore, the events that took place in Jordan in September 
of 1970 reinforced the mistrust amongst the Arab nations when Jordan and the PLO 
entered into a bloody conflict. Understanding that the PLO could not be kept at bay and 
that they could not continue to withstand conflict with other Arab states, both sides began 
working towards mutual recognition. In exchange for recognition of the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab world, and later the United Nations, 
the PLO began to make concessions to their claim to the whole of Palestine. This began 
the development of Beirut as the epicentre of Palestinian politics, ultimately resulting in 
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the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the expulsion of the PLO from Blad il’ Sham (Greater 
Syria) and the subsequent massacre of the Sabra and Shatila camps.  
 
In order to organize the progress of this thesis, I have decided to divide the three-decade 
process into three separate sections. To do this, I chose the refugee, the revolutionary and 
the statesmen. Though it is understood that all three of these terms offer their own 
complexities, this thesis intends to explore how these three stages directly impact the 
Palestinian national identity, as explored through the theory offered in the Literature 
Review. The reasoning behind the use of these terms is that, in their simplest state, best 
describe the three major sections in this thesis.   
The Research Questions: 
• What events had to take place in order for the Palestinian political factions in the 
Arab world to be able to control their own narrative/cause and for the Arab, then 
later the Western world to recognise the PLO as the sole representatives of the 
Palestinian people? 
• Why is it essential to explore the Palestinian national identity through a Western 
theoretical standpoint and how does the understanding of the Palestinians through 
these theories benefit the Palestinian narrative?  
• Does the Palestinian identity, as reconstructed post-Nakba, fall within the 
parameters of Western theory available on the study of nationalism and identity? 
If yes, how? 
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Hypothesis:  
Commencing with the second question, though the Palestinian cultural and historical 
attachment to their lost homeland is essential in understanding the Palestinian narrative, 
the Palestinians are still fighting, simply to exist. While the understanding of the 
Palestinian identity through Western theory may not be relevant to those living in the 
East, it may help in allowing people in the West to be more sympathetic to the Palestinian 
cause. Moreover, it may allow people in the Western world to further comprehend the 
conflict in the Middle East and the competing accounts that define the region.  
 
The separation of the Palestinian cause from the broader Arab cause was a process of 
self-understanding, appreciating the severity of the situation at hand and finally the 
realization of the pertinence of the Palestinians coming together and controlling their own 
destiny. Only when the Arab world exhausted all their options with regards to the 
Palestinians, and ultimately the Israelis, did the Arab world begin to recognize the PLO 
as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In return, different Arab states, 
namely Egypt, were able to begin negotiating a peace settlement with Israel.  
 
With regards to the understanding of the Palestinians in the parameters of Western 
theory, I believe that the study of nationalism may be explored through different trains of 
thought. Starting with the exploration of an identity through sociological parameters, in 
which the Palestinian history, at least as Arabs, may satisfy the determinants of the 
available theory. As the identity matures, pairing the forced removal of Palestinians from 
their homeland with the fact that the end-goal of the Palestinian national movement is 
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independence in Palestine, it becomes a political study. The Palestinian political identity 
is not as clearly understood as their sociological identity. It is understood that there are a 
Palestinian people, and that many of them are attached through their different but 
similarly rooted struggles, but whether or not they may satisfy the factors tied to 
statehood is still questioned by not only cynics, but supporters of the Palestinian cause. 
The Palestinian development of national identity has set its own precedent. Though there 
are similarities with other national battles of liberation, the Palestinian story provides its 
own respective uniqueness. The Palestinian identity as it is understood pokes holes in 
nearly all theories on identity and nationalism.  
 
For that reason, it is essential to understand that much of what is available on the study of 
national identity is quite uniform and myopic whereas the reality is generally far-sighted, 
while offering a number of variables from case to case. 
Complexities of the Palestinian Identity 
The difficulty in defining the identity of a people, who are globally dispersed, living in 
refugee camps or under occupation in their homeland, presents a challenge. This is 
especially true when some, including former United States Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich, argue that the Palestinians are an “invented people”8 or, according to former 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, have never even existed.9 While this research does 
argue that the Palestinian identity is a construction, the same may be said for the Israeli 
																																																								
8 "Palestinians are an Invented People, says Newt Gingrich ." The Guardian. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 
Sept. 2013. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/10/palestinians-invented-people-newt-
gingrich>. 
9 Butt, Gerald. " BBC News. Profiles. Golda Meir." BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 June 2013. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/israel_at_50/profiles/81288.stm 
		
			 10	
identity and the double standard being presented by elected officials of the United States 
and Israeli governments poses a dangerous obstacle to peace. Zachary J Foster, in his 
article titled “What’s a Palestinian? Uncovering Cultural Complexities”10, which was a 
response to Speaker Gingrich as well as former Republican Presidential Candidate Mike 
Huckabee, who also argued that there is “no such thing as Palestinians,” provided a slight 
glimpse into the usage of the term “Palestinian” but was concluded in arguing: 
The decades of debate all beg a central question: Is Palestinian identity an invention? The answer, 
however, is self-evident—of course it is. American, Chinese, German, and Israeli identities are 
inventions too. All national identities are invented. Nations do not exist in nature; they exist only 
in our minds.11 
 
Arguing whether or not the Palestinians existed prior to the 1900’s, or whether or not the 
Jews have a legitimate right to what was known as the land of “Palestine” makes for an 
essential debate, though one which is outside of the scope of this thesis. In Foster’s 
article, he refers to a Fox News article written in response to Speaker Gingrich’s 
statement where the writer states: 
Modern-day Palestinians bristle at the implication that they were generic Arabs. Palestinians are 
culturally Arabs -- they speak Arabic and their culture is broadly shared by other Arabs who live 
in the eastern Mediterranean. But they, for the most part, identify themselves as Palestinians, just 
as the Lebanese, Jordanians and Syrians also identify themselves with a specific national 
identity.12  
 
The quote above is essential in shaping the motive behind this thesis. While history and 
culture do bring the Arabs together, politics and reality have driven them further apart 
and just as the Arab states and Israel were provided with the right to develop their own 
nation, this thesis will argue that it is necessary for the Palestinians to enjoy that same 																																																								
10 Foster, Zachary J. "What's a Palestinian?" Foreign Affairs. N.p., 11 Mar. 2015. Web. 1 Aug. 
2016. 
11 Loc.cit. 
12 "Gingrich Describes Palestinian People as 'Invented' | Fox News." Fox News. FOX News 
Network, 10 Dec. 2011. Web. 1 Aug. 2016. 
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right, namely amongst their Arab allies. With that said, once it is accepted that the 
Palestinians do exist, defining their identity faces further complexities, often shaped by 
the time and place of their “expulsion” or "flight" from historic Palestine and the country 
they currently reside in. 
 
Internally, for the approximately five million Palestinians that live within Israel, Gaza or 
the West Bank, the way in which their identity is defined regularly reflects the region as 
well, hence their nuances among Palestinians from Gaza, the West Bank or Israel (The 
latter also known to Palestinians as il dakhel (the inside), il shamal (the north) or ’48). 
This situation has forced the geographical differences amongst Palestinians to act as a 
shaper of their identity and therefore requires further analysis.   
 
This dilemma makes the Palestinian case an important one, not only for geopolitical and 
security reasons in the strife-torn Middle East, but also for the study of identity politics 
and Diaspora studies. When it comes to the study of Diaspora and exile, there are 
generally two groups of people, amongst others, receiving the majority of the attention: 
the Jews and the Palestinians. They are connected in many ways, a connection that is 
rooted much deeper than the territorial conflict over a tiny piece of land tucked into the 
centre of the Middle East. They share complex issues of identity and exile and both face 
and/or have faced a strenuous uphill battle to securing freedom, security and self-
determination.  
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The Palestinians have faced a number of setbacks in their liberation movement over the 
last century starting with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Balfour Declaration of 
1917, the crackdown of the 1936 Arab Revolt, the UN Partition Plan of 1947, the Nakba 
of 1948, the Naksa (Setback) of 1967, Black September of 1970, the massacre of Tel el-
Zaa’tar camp in Lebanon at the hands of the Syrians, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1978, the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre in 1982, the Camp Wars starting in 1984, the Intifada of 1987, the Oslo 
Agreement of 1993, the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, the Jenin Massacre of 2004, the 
Waksah (Humiliation) of 2007, Operation Cast Lead of 2008, Operation Pillar of Defence 
of 2012 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Despite all these setbacks, the ongoing 
siege in the Gaza Strip, the brutal occupation of the West Bank and the unresolved 
refugee question that has no end in sight, the Palestinian people remain steadfast in 
continuing to identify themselves as Palestinians, irrespective of their current residence.  
 
I have chosen to focus on the three different stages of the Palestinian experience: the 
refugee, the revolutionary and the statesman and how these different determinants were 
impactful in developing the base for the Palestinian identity between 1948 and 1982. 
While there are a number of political organisations who have shaped Palestinian history, 
when exploring the growth of the Palestinian identity as a separate entity amongst the 
Arab world in the early years after the Nakba, it is Fatah and PFLP who, initially, 
represented the Pan-Arab vs. the Palestinian ideologies with the PFLP representing the 
former and Fatah the latter. Though Hamas, who were founded in 1987, play an integral 
		
			 13	
role in the Palestinian question, this thesis intends to prove that the base of “what it 
means to be Palestinian” originated and developed itself through the 1950’s to the 1980’s.  
What does it mean to be Palestinian? 
While there is no shortage of stories, documented by Palestinians all over the world, there 
still exists a cynical approach to the Palestinian narrative. The Palestinian narrative is 
built on these stories, stories of exile and despair, being Palestinian has evolved into 
being lost, into being confused and conflicted. While this complex identity has fuelled a 
resistance to a half-century old military occupation, the Palestinians in the Arab world 
and further afield have continued to face constant scrutiny. The rest of this section will 
explore this scrutiny and the general account of what it means to be Palestinian.  
 
In order to proceed in exploring the events that led to a resurgence in this dichotomised, 
yet nationally unified identity it would be beneficial to explore the difficulties associated 
with identifying as a Palestinian.  
 
There are a number of methods in which this complex identity can be explored. On the 
surface, the lack of a legitimate national assembly along with the lack of a geographically 
unified state with its “population” heavily dispersed may be referenced. While the 
aforementioned are all important one does not need to look further than the national 
football team as anecdotal evidence to consider the intricacy of the Palestinian identity.  
 
On the 30th of May 2014, the Palestinian national team beat the Philippines 1-0 in the 
final of the Asian Football Challenge to qualify for the 2015 Asian Cup to be played in 
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Australia. For the first time in their history, the Palestinian national team qualified for an 
international tournament. While their qualification has political implications and was a 
symbolic victory for the Palestinian people, the makeup of the team itself provides for a 
noteworthy identity paradox. The players identify themselves as Palestinians and are 
representing the “State of Palestine”, but this is not a traditional national football team. 
They face a number of barriers amongst one another, mainly geographical: Midfielder 
Husain Abu Salah, is an Israeli citizen who speaks Hebrew, he transferred from his Israeli 
team to a team located in the West Bank in order to better represent Palestine. In defence, 
stands centre-back Omar Jarun, whose family is from Tulkarem, but he was born and 
raised in the United States and currently plays in Canada. He has never been to Palestine 
and communicates with his teammates in a southern American accent, alongside him on 
the defensive line stands Roberto Bishara; born in Chile, who doesn’t speak Arabic, or 
much English for that matter. Behind them stands Mohammad Shbair, a goalkeeper from 
Gaza, who has spent years away from home, not due to war or exile but due to his papers 
not being in order after playing a friendly match in Sudan. It is no surprise that the team 
has not seen much success on the international stage considering the language barriers 
and the fact that a number of the players cannot practice together due to travel restrictions 
placed on them by Israel.13 The players, while facing travel restrictions in addition to 
other detrimental actions by the Israeli forces, including getting shot in the feet on the 
way home from practice14, will be able to benefit and gain support from FIFA. It should 
																																																								
13 Montague, James. Thirty-One Nil: The Amazing Story of World Cup Qualification. London: 
Bloomsbury Plc., 2014. Pg. 15-16 
14 Al Jazeera English. "Shooting Renews Calls for FIFA to Kick out Israel." Al Jazeera: The 
Stream. 5 Mar. 2014. Web. 1 Nov. 2014. <http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201403052234-
0023531>. 
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further be noted that although just a football team, they are defined in terms of resistance 
against the occupation, being referred to as Muntakheb il Fada’iya (The National Team 
of the Freedom Fighters). 
 
Meanwhile, for the rest of the Palestinians, upon travel, the question of identity can be 
summed up in one statement posed by Rashid Khalidi: “Step out of line and follow 
me.”15 Many Palestinians, who have attempted to travel to Palestine, Israel or any of the 
surrounding Arab countries, tend to face severe difficulty. Even those lucky enough to 
obtain a passport, according to Khalidi, are provided with a rude awakening as to their 
identity when approaching a border crossing.16 Without a legitimate state authority and 
an identity that is constantly questioned, the shame and humiliation of being held under 
such scrutiny is no stranger to the Palestinians. While a number of Palestinians have 
successfully obtained citizenship abroad, those living in the vicinity of the conflict still 
face a number of barriers when travelling. With the lack of a state and a number of 
difficulties attached to being a Palestinian the affinity to Palestine and the Palestinians 
has been preserved by the aforementioned collection of common memory and tragedy 
that has been romanticized through culture and symbolism.  
Palestinian Cultural Identity 
When asked about cultural resistance, Edward Said had the following to say: 
 
Take the Palestinian situation as a case in point. There’s a whole assembly of cultural expression 
that has become a part of the consolidation and persistence of Palestinian identity. There’s a 
Palestinian cinema, a Palestinian theater, a Palestinian poetry, and literature in general. There’s a 
																																																								
15 Khalidi, 1997. Op.cit. Pg. 4 
16 Loc.cit. 
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Palestinian critical and political discourse. In the case of a political identity that is being 
threatened, culture is a way of fighting against extinction and obliteration.17  
 
On the other hand, when I asked Abdel Bari Atwan about the notion of cultural 
resistance, he had an opposite view on culture and identity, saying that “the Palestinians 
should use arts, and speeches. Those ideas were encouraged by the west” followed by: 
 
If 5% of the population wants to enhance the identity through the arts and through singing or 
dancing that’s fine, but the majority believe that the true identity is through intifada, fighting the 
occupation by all means. It is a fighting identity, and you are seeing that being passed on through 
generations.18 
 
While this debate is a popular one amongst scholars, Rebecca Stein and Ted Swedenburg 
argue that the Palestinian narrative did not fully embrace the concept of cultural identity 
before the Oslo years.19 Instead, according to Stein and Swedenburg Palestinian 
scholarship in the West was dominated by two paradigms, that by the nation or the 
“Marxist historiographical and/or political economic paradigm,” characterized by 
occupation, colonization and the Palestinian fight for self-determination.20  Though this 
thesis, which is attempting to define the Palestinian identity through Western theory, is 
mainly focused on the socio-economic and political factors of identity this section will 
provide a brief introduction to Palestinian cultural resistance and the challenges faced.  
 
																																																								
17 Said, Edward W., and David Barsamian. Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward 
W. Said. Cambridge MA: South End Press, 2003. Pg.159 
18 Atwan, 2017. op.cit 
19 Stein, Rebecca L., and Ted Swedenburg. “Popular Culture, Relational History, and the 
Question of Power in Palestine and Israel.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, 2004, pp. 
5–20. Pg. 1 
20 Ibid. Pg. 6 
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As argued by Joseph Massad, the pertinence of song has not been incorporated into the 
theoretical analysis of anti-colonialism and nationalism.21 As this thesis argues, the 
reality at hand is that Western national theory is dominated by factors provided and 
protected through the state structure. Almost all political movements are driven by 
expression through art, music and poetry. The Palestinian liberation movement is no 
different. Though the theory does not give much credence to cultural identity, I feel that it 
would be essential to briefly explore expressions of identity through music, literature and 
art.  
Music 
Like much of the initial pro-Palestinian expressions post-Nakba, much of nationalist 
music in the region either called for Pan-Arabism or was sung by non-Palestinians, some 
famous names include Farid al-Atrash (Syrian), Fairouz and Najah Salam (Lebanon) and 
Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab (Egypt). This can be accredited much to the fact that the 
radio stations themselves were controlled by the Egyptians, and the Nasser revolution of 
1952 provided a place for the heart of the cultural revolution.22 Similar to most political 
movements, music was used to echo the popular sentiments of the day.  
 
Similar to the political discourse, music was also used as a battlefield of nationalism 
amongst the Arabs and the Israelis. According to Nasser Al-Taee, both Arabs and Israelis 
would use music to reflect their connection to Jerusalem. One example of this, by one of 
																																																								
21 “Liberating Songs: Palestine Put to Music.” Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular 
Culture, vol. 32, no. 3, 2003, pp. 21–38. Accessed in Stein, Rebecca L., and Ted 
Swedenburg. Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture. Durham and London, Duke 
University Press, 2005. Pg. 175 
22 Ibid. Pg. 177 
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the more influential voices in the region was the work of Fairouz. Her song Zahrat al-
Mada'in (The Flower of All Cities), which was described by Al-Taee as “one of the most 
popular and dramatic Arab songs about Jerusalem,”23 echoed the Arab attachment to the 
city of Jerusalem through its importance to both the Christian and Muslim faiths referring 
to both the “old churches” and “wiping out the sorrow from the mosques.” Ending the 
ballad with the following: 
The house is ours,  
And Jerusalem is ours. 
And with our hands,  
We will bring to Jerusalem its beauty and peace.  
And to Jerusalem  
Peace is coming. 24 
This song, written by the Rahbani brothers, was performed at the Cedars Festival in 
Lebanon in the summer of 1967, and actually resulted in Fairouz being awarded the key 
to the city. While Fairouz, and the Arabs, used this time to express dismay towards the 
1967 war, Israeli songwriters used this opportunity to celebrate the capturing of 
Jerusalem. Al-Taee cites songs such as Lakh Y’rushalayim (Your Jerusalem) and 
Y’rushalayim Shel Zahav (Jerusalem of Gold) as the norm in Israeli popular music at the 
time, reflecting what Motti Regev referred to as “ideological dominance and political 
centralism with Zionist motifs.”25 Though both sides turned to music in order to develop 
their cultural identities, Israeli society made sure to censor Palestinian music. Inbal 																																																								
23 Al-Taee, Nasser. “Voices of Peace and the Legacy of Reconciliation: Popular Music, 
Nationalism, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East.” Popular Music, vol. 21, no. 01, Jan. 
2002, pp. 41–61. Pg. 44 
24 Ibid. Pg. 45 
25 Ibid. Pg. 47  
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Perelson, in his research focusing on power dynamics represented through music in 
Israel, claims: 
It is hardly necessary to mention that Arabic songs with strong social and political messages were 
never aired, not even in the special programmes for the Arab minority in Israel. These Arabic 
songs were totally marginalised by the institutions whose judgements go to make up the canon of 
Israeli popular music, and although the Arab minority in Israel did operate within its own 
institutions of canonisation, they themselves were politically and socially marginalized.26 
It was not only music that was censored, and not only the Israelis who did the censoring, 
when the Jordanians ruled over the West Bank, there was strict censorship on literature 
with any political expression. Israeli attempts at censoring Palestinian literature were not 
as successful as their attempts to ban Arabic nationalist music. Hanan Ashrawi warrants 
this to the Al Ard movement,27 which, according to Fouzi Al Asmar, Palestinian poet and 
one of the founders of the Al Ard movement “was established before the PLO, and the 
charter of the PLO contains many ideas first formulated by Al-Ard.”28 Unfortunately for 
Al Ard, the Palestinians faced tremendous difficulties in developing a Palestinian political 
body in the State of Israel.  
Literature 
Even though Israel and Jordan would actively attempt to censor Palestinian literature, 
there were still avenues in which to share nationalist poetry and literature. Either through 
the communist parties and publications in Israel or through public readings.29 The 
difficulties did not hinder the impact of Palestinian poetry, as it was, and arguably 																																																								
26 Perelson, Inbal. “Power Relations in the Israeli Popular Music System.” Popular Music, vol. 
17, no. 01, Jan. 1998, pp. 113–126. Pg. 116 
27 Ashrawi, Hanan Mikhail. “The Contemporary Palestinian Poetry of Occupation.” Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 1978, pp. 77–101. Pg.78 
28 Ginsburg, Terri. “Al-Ard: The Seed of the Palestinian struggle.” Your Middle East. Web. 29 
Apr. 2013.< www.yourmiddleeast.com/features/alard-the-seed-of-the-palestinian-
struggle_11306.> 
29 Ashrawi, 1978. Op.cit. Pg. 80 
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remains, the Palestinians strongest tool of expression. Hanan Ashrawi reiterates this idea, 
noting that:  
Poetry is the most popular and dominant genre in Palestinian literature, and the one closest to the 
people as a whole. This can be attributed, in part, to the strong oral tradition in Palestinian culture 
and the ease with which catchy expressions and verses are retained and repeated. Also, like the 
rest of the Arab nation, Palestinians are a verbal people, easily captured and moved by language, 
often swayed more by the external beauty of rhythm, music, and sound of the oral expression than 
by the internal meaning and coherence. The number of poets is expanding rapidly, each poet 
assured some amount of recognition and at the same time not checked by a solid critical current.30  
While there are many Palestinian literaries, many of which were essential in defining the 
Palestinian national experience, as this section is serving as an interlude to Palestinian 
cultural identity, I will introduce three of popular Palestinian literaries: Mahmoud 
Darwish, Edward Said and Ghassan Khanafani. Darwish, born in 1942 in the now 
demolished village of Birweh, started his career like many of the Palestinian writers who 
still lived in their homeland, writing for the communist party Rakah. 
Darwish encapsulated the Palestinian tragedy, though he was only a child at the time of 
the Nakba, he witnessed his village of Birweh destroyed by the Jewish militias. After the 
Nakba, he lived his life under Israeli military rule, harassed and imprisoned countless 
times. In the early 1970’s he left his homeland to live in exile in Beirut, only to be exiled 
once again in 1982 when the PLO was forced out of Lebanon. Though did reside in Paris, 
Darwish was then allowed to return to his homeland, where he lived under occupation in 
Ramallah, only to die in Texas. Though Darwish, in his poem titled Diary of a 
Palestinian Wound, famously proclaimed that, “my homeland is not a suitcase and I am 
not a traveler/ I am the lover and the land is the beloved,”31 Darwish never truly found a 
																																																								
30 Ibid. Pg. 84 
31 “Poetry and Imagery of Mahmoud Darwish in the Palestinian Nationalist 
Movement.” Palestinian Culture and Society, Georgetown University, Web. 
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home, as postulated by Rashid Khalidi in an obituary about Darwish, saying that he was:	
Never truly at home anywhere—whether in Beirut before 1982, or in Ramallah, Amman, or Paris 
after that—and never bound by material or personal ties, Darwish led a peripatetic existence until 
death finally found him in, of all places, Houston, Texas, where his overburdened heart finally 
gave out after a third major heart operation. In this unexpected end, in this incongruous place, 
Darwish further incarnated the peculiar and surreal ongoing odyssey of the Palestinian people.32  
Darwish was always moving, in a constant state of exile and oppression, which is 
partially the reason that his work was so popular to the Palestinian people. Darwish 
experienced the theft of his homeland, lived as an internally displaced refugee, was held 
in Israeli prisons, lived through the wars in Lebanon, lived in further exile in Paris, and 
saw what was left of his homeland slowly be taken away when living in Ramallah, 
ultimately combining nearly all the Palestinian tragedies in one experience. It is no 
surprise that Darwish was tapped to further the agenda of the PLO and was known as the 
“unofficial national poet,” 33 even though he embraced the idea of being politically 
independent.  
Darwish was always reluctant to work with the PLO, nonetheless, he would still attempt 
to support their endeavours. He, along with Edward Said, authored the 1988 Declaration 
of Principles, a document that allowed Rashid Khalidi to claim that if the Palestinians 
ever do gain their own state, we must remember Darwish as one of the founding fathers 
due to the manner in which he penned this historic declaration. Like many Palestinians, 
Darwish was never able to fulfill this dream, and was fiercely opposed to the Oslo 
Declaration of Principles signed by Arafat in 1993. He removed himself from the PLO’s 																																																																																																																																																																					
<apps.cndls.georgetown.edu/projects/palestinian-culture-and-society/exhibits/show/poetry-and-
imagery-of-mahmood-/my-country-is-not-a-suitcase.> 
32 Khalidi, Rashid. “Remembering Mahmud Darwish (1941–2008).” Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol. 38, no. 1, 2008, pp. 74–77. Pg. 75 
33 Said, Edward W. “On Mahmoud Darwish.” Grand Street, no. 48, 1994, pp. 112–115. Pg. 112 
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Executive Council and, according to Said, told Arafat to go find another people to lead in 
response to Arafat claiming that the Palestinian people are an ungrateful people.34 While 
no longer part of the PLO’s executive committee, he remained, and still remains, one of 
the central figures of the Palestinian narrative. Khalidi postulated his impact as the 
following: 
The passing of Mahmud Darwish, however, may mark the end of an era during which Palestinian 
aspirations evolved from the narrow focus on survival and steadfastness in the bitter new post-
Nakba world after 1948, and from nostalgia for a return to an imagined idyllic existence before 
that traumatic rupture, and toward an increasingly broad-minded and tolerant humanistic approach 
to a resolution of the conflict, and toward the Israelis.35  
When discussing the Palestinian narrative, for a number of people, Edward Said is the 
first name that comes to mind. He was extremely well-versed, eloquent, respected in both 
Eastern and Western circles, and essential to his integrity, he was never shy to pointing 
out the failures of the West or accepting the failures of the Arabs and Palestinians. Said’s 
work on the question of Palestine was incredibly important (as cited throughout this 
thesis), but it was his work on post-colonial studies that allowed him to be as impactful as 
he was. To encapsulate this, I will share an anecdote from his daughter Najla’s work 
titled Looking for Palestine: 
To very smart people who study a lot, Edward Said is the “father of postcolonial studies” or, as he 
told me once when he insisted I was wasting my college education by taking a course on 
postmodernism and I told him that he didn’t even know what it was: 
 
“Know what it is, Najla? I invented it!!!” 
 
I still don’t know if he was joking or serious. 
  
To others, he is the author of Orientalism, the book that everyone reads at some point in college, 
whether in history, politics, Buddhism, or literature class. He wrote it when I was four. 
 																																																								
34 Ibid. Pg. 113 35	Khalidi,	2008.	op.cit.	Pg.	76	
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As he explained once, when I pressed him to put it into simple English: “The basic concept, is 
that… historically, through literature and art, the ‘East’, as seen through a Western lens, becomes 
distorted and degraded so that anything ‘other’ than what we Westerners recognize as familiar is 
not just exotic, mysterious, and sensual but also inherently inferior.36  
 
This idea was prevalent when the British and French colonial overseers drew lines in the 
sand, ultimately dividing the Arab world in the manner they most saw fit. It was 
prevalent when the British decided to give Palestine to the Jewish people, and it remained 
prevalent in the manner in which the Palestinians have been silenced since the 1948 war. 
Important to note here, it is also prevalent when exploring the Palestinian national 
identity, which is one of the reasons why I decided to explore the identity in a way that 
may “satisfy” Western theory. Not because I feel that Eastern traditions are inferior, but 
due to the reality that the state system is the manner in which rights and responsibilities 
are defined and the Western powers are partially responsible for the difficulties faced in 
the Arab world.   
 
On Said though, to the Palestinians, he was not “the father of postcolonial studies”, but 
more so a representative of the Palestinian cause, who was “A Palestinian who was born 
in Jerusalem and was forced as a result of the 1948 catastrophe to live in exile, the same 
way as many hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.”37 Even with his popularity, and his 
accomplishments, he never wavered. Like Darwish, he represented justice for 
Palestinians, he was not impacted by attachments to any political party, nor driven by 
self-interests. As he puts it: 
																																																								
36 Said N., Op.cit. Pg. 2 
37Mattar, Philip. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005. Pg. 434.  
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My sense of belonging to the Palestinian people, my pride in their heroism, and my pain at their 
sufferings and defeats are not things people can take away from me: they are certainly more 
lasting and deeper than crude and opportunistic and the ephemeral desires of leaders.38 
 
Though Said was a world renowned scholar, dedicated to peace, his profound impact was 
seen as a threat to the Zionist entity. They jumped on any opportunity to discredit Said, 
for example, when he was in Lebanon on a family vacation in the year 2000, he was 
photographed throwing a stone towards an Israeli guardhouse. Right away, this photo was 
in newspapers all throughout the United States, the Freud Society of Vienna later 
cancelled a lecture he was slated to give39 and people called on him to be reprimanded by 
Columbia University, where he was teaching at the time. Though he called it a “symbolic 
gesture of joy” that Israel ceased their occupation in Lebanon, and Columbia argued that 
he did not intend to attack anyone and no law was broken.40 To encapsulate the pressures 
of being Edward Said, I will return to his daughter Najla, who followed up her anecdote 
on postmodernism with the following: 
 
To other people, he is a symbol of Palestinian self-determination, a champion of human rights, 
equality, and social justice. A “humanist” who “spoke truth to power”. 
 
And then still other people insist he was a terrorist, though anyone who knew him knows that’s 
kind of like calling Gandhi a terrorist.41  
  
 
Prior to the declaration of a guerrilla struggle against Israel, the Palestinians turned to the 
pen. Their voice and the expressions of many of the artists throughout the camps and the 
occupied territories created symbols that have become staples of the Palestinian identity. 																																																								
38 Loc.cit 
39 Smith, Dinitia. “A Stone's Throw Is a Freudian Slip.” The New York Times, 10 Mar. 2001, 
<www.nytimes.com/2001/03/10/arts/a-stone-s-throw-is-a-freudian-slip.html?mcubz=0.> 
40 Arenson, Karen W. Columbia Debates a Professor's 'Gesture'. The New York Times, 19 Oct. 
2000, <www.nytimes.com/2000/10/19/nyregion/columbia-debates-a-professor-s-
gesture.html?mcubz=0.> 
41 Said N., 2013. Op.cit. Pg. 3 
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Ghassan Kanafani, known for his fictional novel “Men in the Sun”, was assassinated in 
Beirut by the Israeli Mossad by means of a car bomb, killing him and his 17-year-old 
niece in 1972. When Kanafani was assassinated, the Daily Star in Lebanon described him 
as “the commando who never fired a gun. His weapon was a ballpoint pen and his arena 
newspaper pages. And he hurt the enemy more than a column of commandos.”42 Unlike 
the authors mentioned above, Kanafani had political affiliations. While he was dedicated 
to his political attachments, his writing was not bound by that allegiance. Prior to his 
assassination, during an interview with a Scandinavian radio station Kanafani claimed; 
“In my political work I defend the organization to which I belong. But in my stories I 
give my characters the freedom to express their own positions without reservation.”43 In 
doing so, Kanafani was able, through his writing, to provide insight into the complexities 
of the Palestinian identity. The Palestinians all have their own stories, their own 
tragedies, but for the nationalist, the climax of their story is based either on returning to, 
or remaining in, Palestine.  
Elias Khoury, a Lebanese writer, believes that Kanafani’s characters represented his own 
personal quarrel, being an Arab nationalist, all the while trying to reclaim a Palestinian 
identity that was lost in 1948. Khoury considers two different underlying concepts behind 
Kanafani’s work. The first was, what he calls the stories about “borderlands,”44 where the 
protagonist is stuck between “death and the desert” as they attempt to cross through the 
Arab desert lands and lines drawn in the sand. After the Arab defeat in 1967, Kanafani, 																																																								
42 Knopf-Newman, Marcy Jane. The Politics of Teaching Palestine to Americans: Addressing 
Pedagogical Strategies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Pg. 119 
43 Al-Madhoun, Rasem. “Ghassan Kanafani: The Symbol of the Palestinian 
Tragedy.” Jaddaliyya, 23 Aug. 2013,< www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6885/ghassan-
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Telling.” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 42, no. 3, 2013, pp. 85–91. Pg. 87 
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according to Khoury, embraced a “new notion of Palestine not predicated on the yearning 
for a lost past, but on a kind of social realism.”45 This awakening of the Palestinian reality 
was not something faced by only Kanafani, but by almost all Palestinians. Though 
Kanafani was only 36 years old when he was killed, he was at the crossroads of the 
Palestinian story, somewhat of a chameleon in the manner in which he was able to narrate 
the Palestinian tragedy from a number of angles. So much so that, without firing a single 
bullet, the Mossad thought it in their best interests to assassinate him.  
 
 
Art 
In the preface to Kamal Boullata’s seminal and riveting work on Palestinian Art, John 
Berger argues that: 
For a people whose identity and land have been annexed and denied for at least three generations, 
the struggle to preserve and celebrate their identity takes many forms. There is the intransigence of 
physical resistance…There is poetry which precisely re-members…And there are the visual arts, 
which because they are vivid and visual, are able to dress, to adorn, embroider, veil and disclose 
that identity…Palestinian artists, who create, each in her or his personal way, so that their 
anonymous heroic land with its ancestral olive trees may survive.46  
The olive tree remains as an integral tool of Palestinian nationalism, it is used by 
politicians, environmentalists, economists, activists, poets, artists, and writers to represent 
the longing for the land of Palestine. Before the olive tree, the Palestinians turned to the 
orange trees of Jaffa. Not to deny the pertinence of these two images, but prior to the loss 
of Palestine in 1948, it was the cactus tree that was the centre of Palestinian national art. 
Kamal Boullata argues that it was Nicola Saig’s depiction of the cactus tree, at an 
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exhibition in 1933, that birthed the notion of a “national art.”47  The cactus, sabr in 
Arabic, had a colloquial importance to the Palestinians, as the word sabr, is also a term 
used for patience. While important to the Palestinians, it was also used by the early 
Jewish settlers in their own art. They often depicted this new fruit, one that was strange to 
their native lands in Europe, reflecting on a new beginning.48 Though new to the settlers, 
the cactus tree was at the centre of Palestinian life for centuries prior.  
 
Beirut was the epicentre for Arab arts and culture. Though Palestinian art in Beirut was 
not exactly part of the cultural tradition that gave Beirut their aforementioned nickname. 
Boullata has this to say on Beirut; “Beirut was not only where Palestinian artists were 
able to re-member Palestine in their art, but it was also the place where ‘defiant memory’ 
could be born.” 49  Many Palestinian artists found their muse while in the camps of 
Lebanon, for the purposes of this research, I will introduce three Palestinian artists from 
the refugee camps, Ismail Shammout, Ibrahim Ghannam and Naji Al-Ali.  
 
Ismail Shammout was one of the many Palestinians forced out of their homes by Jewish 
settlers. His town, Lydda, was one of the more brutal evacuations where the Palestinians 
were literally forced out at gunpoint. His expulsion took him to Gaza, and later to Egypt, 
where he was involved in the anti-Colonial struggle of the time and in fact, his first art 
exhibit was an event that was inaugurated by Gamal Abdel Nasser and attended by 
Yasser Arafat. Shammout’s work was reflective of his own experiences, his portfolio is 
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mired with poor, confused figures fleeing persecution. Late in his career, at one of his 
most revered exhibits, near the exit, he left a blank canvas with a note proclaiming that 
this blank canvas is left for the next Palestinian painter who will continue the struggle.50  
 
As the director of the PLO’s art department, he was responsible for a number of political 
adverts, and magazine covers. Though he was used as a tool for certain political 
programmes, Shammout’s work transcends generations, as he reflects not only the exile, 
but the struggle to return as well. A number of his images represent the essence of the 
Palestinian struggle. The images below provide a slight insight into Shammout’s work 
and the manner in which, with his own unique style, his work represents the exile from 
their homes (top right, bottom left), the Tel el-Zaatar massacre (top-left) and the 
Palestinian revolutionary (bottom right). 
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Illustration 1: Examples of Ismail Shammout’s work51 
The next artist, Ibrahim Ghannam, is not the most “popular” Palestinian artist, he did not 
travel the world, nor did he engage with the wider artistic community. Unfortunately for 
him, his bout with polio restricted him to a wheelchair at a young age. Born in the lost 
village of Yujur, he was exiled to Tel el-Zaatar refugee camp, and later to Mar Elias 
camp after Tel el-Zaatar was razed in 1976. Ghannam’s work was tragic, unlike other 
artists, he did not set out to invigorate people with hope through his work. Instead, he 
captured memories of his lost land and a simpler time. A land that ceases to exist, and 
according to Boullata, never photographed. 52  
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Illustration 2: Examples of Ibrahim Ghannam’s work. 53 
Naji Al-Ali captured the hearts and minds of the Palestinians through his symbolic 
cartoon caricatures that he learnt to draw on the walls of the Ain el-Helwah refugee camp. 
Al-Ali used his talents to portray images of Israeli-American alliances and to raise his 
concerns with the politics of the Arab World. Though loved by many, Al-Ali’s work was 
seen as a threat and thereby resulted in his assassination in London in 1987,54 not before 
giving birth to the Handala image.55  
The child Handala is my signature, everyone asks me about him wherever I go… I drew him as a 
child who is not beautiful; his hair is like the hair of a hedgehog who uses his thorns as a weapon. 
Handala is not a fat, happy, relaxed, or pampered child. He is barefooted like the refugee camp 
children, and he is an icon that protects me from making mistakes. Even though he is rough, he 
smells of amber. His hands are clasped behind his back as a sign of rejection at a time when 
solutions are presented to us the American way.56 
 
The Handala, an image of all Palestinian and underprivileged children throughout the 
world, was born as a ten-year-old and will remain a ten-year-old. Handala is a depiction 
of Al-Ali who was ten years old when he was expelled from Palestine and he will not age 
a single day until he returns to Palestine. The Handala is present in most of Al-Ali’s 
cartoons and is seen standing in the carnage with his back turned to the world and the 
observers. Al-Ali emphasised Israel, the United States, the refugees, and the Arab world. 
To encapsulate this “Palestinian’ness” as well as his disdain, an example of each is 
provided.  
																																																								
53Ibrahim Ghannam.” The Palestine Poster Project Archives,   
<https://www.palestineposterproject.org/artist/ibrahim-ghannam> 
54 Knopf-Newman, 2011. Op.cit. Pg. 18 
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    Illustration  3: Examples of Naji al-Ali’s work57 
The above photos provide a slight insight into the messages Al-Ali depicted to the world. 
These images depict the steadfastness, the right of return, religious unity as well as the 
“fat-cats” of the Arab world and the manner in which they are controlled by the United 
States. 
 
Handala has become much more than a cartoon, but a popular image for the Palestinians. 
He is on key chains, on jewellery and is a representation of the young Palestinians 
determined struggle within Palestine and everlasting connection to the homeland of the 
Palestinian Diaspora. The Palestinians have developed a number of symbols to reinforce 
their existence, arguably the only images stronger than that of Handala or the work of 
Kanafani, were the images of the Feda’yeen, Yasser Arafat’s kuffiyeh and the Palestinian 
flag, all of which were symbols of the revolution. These symbols were insufficient in 
allowing the Palestinians to transplant themselves in the international arena, but it 
allowed for a starting point for the reinvention of Palestinian identity. Before the 
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development of symbolism, it was the reality lived by the refugees in the camps which 
allowed for Palestinian identity to shift away from Pan-Arabism and articulate what it 
meant to be Palestinian.  
The Romantic Palestinian Identity 
“Since our history is forbidden, narratives are rare; the story of origins, of home, of nation is 
underground. When it appears, it is broken, often wayward and meandering in the extreme… Thus 
Palestinian life is scattered, discontinuous, marked by the artificial and imposed arrangements of 
interrupted and confined space, by the dislocations and synchronized (sic) rhythms of disturbed 
time.” 
-Edward Said58 
 
Edward Said was arguably the most popular and influential Palestinian thinker and the 
narrative on Palestinian identity has generally reflected the romantic attachment to a lost 
homeland found in Said’s writing. While this sense of attachment is important in 
ascribing to a national memory, the attachment and autonomy of a single nation must 
mature in a manner applicable to the modern nation state. National identifiers such as an 
anthem, a flag, dress and custom are defined as a national “tool kit” by Orvar Löfgren.59 
While these identifiers were essential in the resurgence of the Palestinian identity, this 
thesis will look past the tool kit, to focus on the necessity of a people under threat coming 
together. Notwithstanding the findings of Edward Said, concluding that Palestine was an 
Arab/Islamic country by the end of the seventh century,60 Khalidi’s theory proving the 
Palestinian national consciousness through Benedict Anderson’s concept of print-
capitalism and the thousands of stories of dispersal, loss, tragedy and life by the 
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Palestinians who survived the Nakba, there is a clear problem. Irrespective of whose land 
it is, who the chosen people of God are or whose prophet ruled over the land in the 
centuries past, Palestinians were denied the inalienable human rights of their home, 
history and self-determined identity in 1948. Don Peretz wrote in an article in the United 
States Institute for Peace that the Palestinian identity is three-fold, arguing that after the 
mandate the Palestinians had to transform from being Syrian Arabs under Ottoman rule 
to Palestinians under British rule and when they started to act on this newfound identity 
they were forced to shift to an identity defined by statelessness and it was not until 1967 
that they began to accept the “refugee” tag and use it as a identifier in their struggle for 
return and self-determination.61 It was after the defeat of 1967 that the Palestinians were 
forced to accept reality, a harsh reality for the elders of the Nakba who held on to the 
notion of Pan-Arabism, coined by Edward Said was “Palestinianism”62, united with their 
Arab neighbours but isolated in their resistance against Israeli colonisation.  
 
In her ground-breaking work on the peoplehood of Palestinians, UK-based Professor 
Dina Matar stated the Palestinian problem in this manner: “there was no longer a centre 
of gravity in which to identify, and no landscape to claim, but that of the imagination.”63 
Matar, amongst others, developed her work on Palestinian identity based on stories of 
those who survived or were born with the after effects of the Nakba. Palestinian writer 
Fawaz Turki was one of the stories Matar included in her work, in which he wrote; “I just 
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know that for my own generation our last day in Palestine was the first day that we began 
to define our Palestinian identity.”64 While Turki did point to the surge of identity post-
Nakba he went on to define it through the memory of the olive trees, stone houses, land 
and sea that many Palestinians have never and will never see. 65  While their reality 
consisted of expulsion, occupation and oppression, the Palestinians, as declared by 
Yasser Arafat in the second intifada as were exemplifying il sha’b il jabareen which 
literally translates to strong ones or remnants of giants. There was a sense of hope and 
dedication along with a strengthened national consciousness. At this time the Palestinian 
identity had no viable structure to either strengthen or solidify it, but it remained evident 
and revitalised in the ghettos of the refugee camps and in the homes of the Palestinians.  
 
Home is a reflection of self, a place of comfort, familiarity and family, for the 
Palestinians, the question of home has its own complications. Professor Iain Chambers 
postulates the dilemma faced by those in exile: “It is impossible to “go home” again, for 
neither home nor migrant stayed the same.”66 In answering the question of what it means 
to be Palestinian, what stands out is the romantic attachment to a homeland that is foreign 
to many. Parents draw on childhood memories, dreams and realities, passing them down 
to their children. The symbolism of “Palestinianism” has been entrenched into the minds, 
homes and memories. It is this symbolism that has strengthened the viability of 
Palestinian identity, in turn threatening the feasibility of the Israeli occupation. Artists 
representing this tradition have been targeted, including, novelist Ghassan Khanafani who 
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was assassinated in Lebanon in 1971, and Naji al-Ali, a cartoonist, was also assassinated 
in London in 1987. Al-Ali’s character “Hanthala” has resonated for decades with all who 
claim to be Palestinian, a child who Al-Ali claims “is neither beautiful, spoiled, nor even 
well-fed. He is barefoot like many children in refugee camps,”67 acts as a constant re-
enforcement of a lost identity and lost childhood in that maturation and freedom is linked 
directly with return to the “homeland”. A Palestinian home, in New York, London, 
Moscow, Beirut, Gaza or Jerusalem will generally have the same feel, there will be a 
picture of Jerusalem, decorative plates made of mother-of-pearl, Palestinian tatreez 
(embroidery) with a Palestinian flag incorporated into one of these decorative pieces. 
Another major identifier, according to Palestinians, is their cuisine.  
 
The Palestinians have a culture defined largely though its cuisine, an attachment that has 
survived time and exile. The daughter of Edward Said, Najla, in her memoirs asked: 
“Why doesn’t anyone know what hummus is? Why do I have Arabic bread?”68 Further, 
American-Palestinian author and spoken word artist Suheir Hammad echoed this crisis 
when she noted in her biography: “When it became too cool to eat hummus, falafel, 
taboulleh and pita bread with everything, it was too late. I had already wasted years 
trying to trade my labneh sandwiches for peanut butter and jelly, which I didn’t even 
like.”69 It is difficult to quantify the importance of aged yogurt, chopped up parsley and 
crushed chickpeas to the general public, but with the likes of hummus and falafel being 																																																								
67 El Fassed, Arjan. "Naji Al-Ali: The Timeless Conscience of Palestine." The Electronic Intifada. 
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recognised by some as Israeli cuisine, it has been added to the list of cultural identifiers 
that the Palestinians have lost during the Nakba. The foods that are being stripped away 
from the Palestinians do not only hinder the culture, but the economy as well. 
Palestinians have been and continue to be an agrarian society, this has obstructed the 
history, aspirations and the livelihood of the Palestinian people. Outside of hummus and 
falafel, the most historic and significant symbol of the Palestinian culture is olive oil, 
known to have a thicker texture and distinct taste. Israeli destruction of the olive groves, 
some of which are hundreds of years old, and appropriation of the olive oil acts as both a 
theft of livelihood and of culture and identity.  
 
In a conversation with Salman Rushdie, Edward Said referred to a story in which he was 
hosting a friend for breakfast that consisted of the herb zaa’tar (thyme).  Although this 
herb is eaten throughout a number of Arab countries, his friend commented:  “It’s a sign 
of a Palestinian home that it has zaa’tar in it.”70 Said then explained to Rushdie that the 
Palestinians view anything that they do as a Palestinian identifier. Although Said’s quote 
simplifies a complex notion, it is the basis of the resurgence of the identity. The 
Palestinians are Palestinians, because they say so and choose to be. As argued by the 
likes of Brubaker71 and Guibernau72; identity is constructed, to belong or to oppose  those 
of which one shares likeness. The Palestinian identity has its own multifarious 
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characteristics, in that, the identity is not only pushed to differentiate from their 
colonisers but as well their Arab allies. 
 
It is these nostalgic memories and customs that were passed down to what was supposed 
to be the lost generation of Palestinians after the Nakba. These stories of a lost landscape 
and culture along with the heroic nature of the likes of Sheikh al-Qassam and Abdel 
Qader al-Husseini fuelled the lost generation to become the revolutionary generation that 
attempted to put the Palestinians on the map, both literally and figuratively.   
 
This research will attempt to build on these memories, the passionate attachment and the 
different national identity theories to devise an applicable model of the Palestinian 
national consciousness as it has developed post-trauma. Being that the ethnosymbolic 
history of the Palestinians elicits many parallels to their neighbours, namely those of the 
Levant, there has been an overwhelming tendency to neglect the fractures and 
fragmentations between, say a wealthy bureaucrat in Amman versus a fisherman in the 
Gaza Strip. Although the example provided prompts for socioeconomic differentiation, a 
long time before the fragmentation of Greater Syria the people mentioned above would 
differ in cuisine, language and in some cases physical make up. Further, a Christian 
family in Jerusalem would be far more similar to their Muslim neighbour than they would 
be to a Christian living in Beirut, the same goes for the Muslim Jerusalemite and a fellow 
Muslim living in Damascus or Beirut. While miniscule, the cultural differences did exist, 
it was particularly the events after 1948 that forced these regional differences to become 
national identifiers.  
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In closing, the Palestinian romantic identity can be best defined by author and founder of 
the Electronic Intifada Ali Abunimah, asserting: “Palestine exists because Palestinians 
have chosen to remember it. But memories fade and people die, and some are better at 
remembering than others. Memory is no longer enough. It is time to write history and 
time for each of us to become a historian.”73 The Palestinian identity has remained out of 
the history books and the museums, due, in part, to its resistance. As Abunimah noted, 
memory fades, thus it is important for modern contemporary Palestinian studies to 
understand the events that led up to and solidified the base of the evolving Palestinian 
identity after they lost their homeland as well as how we ought to re-conceptualise the 
manner in which Palestinian identity is studied. This thesis traces the rise and formation 
of the distinctive Palestinian identity, developing the arguments above and examining the 
construction of Palestinian identity in the 1960’s.  
 
Chapter Structure 
The thesis is organised as follows:  
Introduction. This chapter provides the aims, objectives and hypothesis of the research 
in addition to the research questions and methodology. Further, the Palestinian identity 
crisis will be explored. Highlighting the difficulties faced living in Israel and the Arab 
world and the development of a romantic attachment to Historic Palestine.  
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Chapter One: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework. This chapter sets out 
the different types of literature to be explored. Focusing on secondary data, the concepts 
of the nation and nationalism leading to the different theories of national identity are 
explored. The main classical theories of nationalism that will be used throughout the 
thesis will be those of Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. Aside from the classical 
theories, this chapter examines the different aspects of belonging and developing an 
affinity to a nation through history, self-determination and the Diaspora. When exploring 
contemporary identity, the essential theorists used are Montserrat Guibernau, Eric 
Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, Michael Billig, Wayne Norman, Craig Calhoun, Charles 
Taylor and Roger Brubaker.  Upon conveying the relevance of these theories, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion on how these directly impact and influence the trajectory of 
Palestinian identity.  
Chapter Two: Research Methodology introduces the methods that will be used, 
interviews and content analysis through written and episodic records. These methods will 
allow for a holistic approach when exploring the Palestinian narrative, including 
biographies, foreign policy, UN resolutions and first-hand accounts of the interviewees.  
Chapter Three: Zionism, Palestine and the British Mandate explores the events 
leading up to and throughout the British Mandate over Palestine. The framework will 
begin with the exploration of the French-British negotiations and the promises that were 
made to the Arab rulers. Following the negotiations, the Arab resistance in Mandatory 
Palestine as well as the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 will be presented. Though this thesis is 
focused on the events post-1948, for the reader to understand the make-up of the Middle 
East in the 20th century it is essential to provide a historic framework. The fact that the 
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Israelis and Palestinians are in conflict is well-known, the reasoning behind that conflict 
and the wider geo-political problems in the Middle East are far more complex. In attempt 
to clarify an aspect of these complexities this chapter will provide a summary of the 
break-up of Greater Syria by France and England, the rise of Zionism, and the initial rise 
of Palestinian nationalism. 
Chapter Four: Pan-Arabism. This chapter studies the growth of Pan-Arabism and the 
socio-economic reasoning behind its popularity. Further, the ideologies and actions of 
Arab nations that held a direct influence towards the Palestinian question are tested in 
order to explore whether or not the concept of Pan-Arabism was in itself a construct 
driven by political motive that may have had an adverse effect on the Palestinians and 
their quest for self-determination. 
Chapter Five: The Refugee. This chapter provides the refugee story, focusing on the 
settlement and initial treatment of the refugees in Lebanon. The “Palestinian Problem” 
was primarily viewed as a refugee problem, while some may have hoped that the 
refugees of Palestine would transition into their fellow Arab countries swiftly, this was 
far from the reality. This thesis will show that one of the major downfalls of Pan-Arabism 
and the need for a separate Palestinian identity was based on the lack of hospitality 
amongst some parties throughout the Arab wold.  This will be portrayed through 
exploring the social, economic and security issues faced by the refugees and the manner 
in which this began to create a divide amongst the Palestinians and their fellow Arabs.  
Chapter Six: The Revolution. This chapter explores the dynamics, which motivated and 
impelled the Fatah leadership, in their various styles, to move, however gradually 
towards an autonomous Palestinian revolution. Drawing on primary data as well as 
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autobiographical accounts, this chapter analyses the initial thinking of Fatah members 
and the reasoning behind the separation from the broader Arab movement. Following the 
founding of Fatah and their actions in the early 1960’s, this chapter considers the Six-Day 
War, the Battle of Karameh and the subsequent events that had a direct impact on the 
trajectory of the Palestinians.  
Chapter Seven: The Statesmen. This chapter will test the influence of the actions of 
Fatah and the Palestinians towards the United Nations and the Western World. Identity is 
a self-construct and the Palestinians exist because they choose to, while this may satisfy a 
sociological study, in the realm of politics recognition of said identity is arguably just as 
important. In the case of the Palestinians and Israelis, the concept of statehood and place 
to nurture their respective identity is the conflicting issue. Both parties may have 
formidable arguments, regardless, geopolitics and international intervention has played a 
large role in the successes and failures of each party. This chapter explores the initial 
concessions made by the PLO, in an effort to reach a peaceful solution with Israel and 
gain recognition from the United States. Much of the thesis up until this point deals with 
events in which the Palestinians were up against fellow Arabs. It is in this chapter, I 
argue, that Israel entered into the equation in an attempt to do away with the Palestinian 
entity. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations: This chapter will provide 
concluding arguments detailing the extent in which the hypothesis has been proven. At no 
point in the time period covered did the Palestinians enjoy the state structure needed to 
satisfy all the determinants of nationalism theory, but in essence, it was the lack of the 
state structure that define the unique Palestinian national identity. This was especially 
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evident in the refugee stage, evolving into the call for social action in the revolutionary 
period, which perpetuated the need for a separate Palestinian entity, concluding with the 
Palestinians coming full circle in attempt to create a state structure that wasn’t available 
to them in the earlier years. The conclusion will also address the shortcomings and the 
reasoning behind ending the story in 1982. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
1.1 The Paradox of Identity 
In their work, Suicide of the West (2006), Richard Koch and Chris Smith investigated the 
paradoxical nature of the question: ‘Who am I?’ The paradox lies in the fact that we ask 
the question as individuals, yet we can only define our existence and its meaning beyond 
our role as individuals, by reference to a group or groups.74 One’s sense of identity can be 
defined through a mixture of many different outlets, be it religious, national, economic, 
regional or simply through an affiliation to a sports team or a political party. As the world 
moves further to the right in accepting neoliberal economic principles, people have been 
forced to become more individualistic and according to Koch, this shift in individualism 
furthers the need for a collective identity.75 Since humans are generally social, the need 
for social inclusiveness is necessary to uphold the values of society.  
 
Although identity promotes collectiveness, it is driven by personal choice and for the 
most part, it is not concrete. A person may convert to another religion, cheer for another 
sports team, and/or move to a new region, many believe the only aspect of identity that 
cannot be changed is one’s ethnic identity. As Israeli historian Shlomo Sand proclaimed; 
“Identity is not a hat or an overcoat!”76 Sand claims that identity exhibits itself to the 
situation at hand, in order to fit in, or stand out. Identity can be shaped, reshaped and 
even merged, integral to this, according to Sand, are those identities that must be worn as 
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a “hat”. Religion is one example, one cannot simply be both Muslim and Christian or 
Hindu and Jewish, another example is pre-nationalist patriotism. Before the days of 
migration and immigration, people would not generally define themselves as loyal to 
more than one nation.77 Of course this has changed, hyphenation of national identity has 
become highly popular, the final institution that does not promote inclusiveness is the 
religious one. Religious identity may, similar to national identity, according to Andreas 
Wimmer, create a “blurred” boundary or identity.78 An American Jew, for example, may 
have a stronger connection to the “Jewish State” obliging them to join the Israeli Defence 
Forces or someone born and raised in the United Kingdom, instead of trying to integrate 
into their local community, might rather risk their life to defend the Muslim Ummah by 
fighting for a group such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.  
 
For the Palestinians, understanding one’s national and ethnic identity is integral in 
reaching the goal of freedom and self-determination. Consequently, it is important to note 
that history suggests that nationalism can be highly dangerous, as was seen in the first 
half of the 20th century in Europe. Due, in part, to the two World Wars, Europe spent the 
latter part of the aforementioned century promoting the “European” identity through the 
economic principles adopted by the European Union (EU).79 The EU, aided by the fall of 
the Soviet Union, has been successful in bringing an imperfect peace to the region. 
Nevertheless, this has not brought an end to nationalism in Europe, as can be seen with 
the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU. The crisis in the Ukraine has rekindled Cold-																																																								
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War anxieties and has seen a re-entrenchment of old players and attitudes. At the end of 
the day, the EU Parliament is made up of representatives from different nations and each 
respective country still has its national governing body.  
 
The decentralisation of politics combined with the idea of uniform citizenry can 
successfully mask national identity and promote multiculturalism. However, in difficult 
and trying times, people can and often do resort to stand with those “similar” to them in 
order to define and/or understand their own national identity.  For example, prior to the 
civil rights movement in the United States, the African-American community found itself 
faced with an identity crisis. They were American citizens, they were growing in the 
ranks and serving in the military, yet they were still regarded as second-class citizens by 
the state. In order to rise above the discrimination, they organised, not as Americans, but 
as African-Americans, creating a nation within a state that is still campaigning for 
equality.  
 
Similar to its southern neighbour, Canada has faced its own issues as the Quebecois 
Francophones struggle to find their place in the country. Nevertheless, the two countries 
have been able, aside from the aforementioned predicaments, to create a set of principles 
that define an identity that has been accepted by the citizens of the state. To be American 
or Canadian is to be a citizen of a state that defines one’s identity as an accepted culture 
enshrined into a mosaic that allows people to silence their national aspirations for what is 
best for society in general. A majority of states throughout the world do not have this 
luxury. The growth of independence after the Second World War has divided regional 
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ethnic groups into nation states and this has caused a number of conflicts over the past 
half century.  
1.2 The Construct of Identity  
According to Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, self-identity cannot be completely 
defined by name or genealogy. He argues that identity is expressed through commitments 
made determining what is good and/or bad, what must be done and what one chooses to 
support.80 Taylor posits that identity may be developed through a number of angles, 
namely through moral, spiritual and national determinants. What is interesting about the 
ideas proposed by Taylor is his argument that people will identify to a religion or nation 
not only to attach themselves to the spiritual view or national consciousness, but in order 
to define what is right and wrong, what is of value and what is admirable. This is an 
important view as it contradicts the idea that people choose to belong to a group based on 
similar views, rather they may identify themselves with affiliation to a group in order to 
determine their views.  
 
Similar to Taylor, Craig Calhoun argues that there are three forms in which identity may 
be determined; nationalism, ethnicity and kinship.81  While separate, these three “forms 
of social solidarity”, as referred to by Calhoun, may be used to forge communities, while 
neglecting others, the concept of kinship has allowed for multi-ethnic communities to 
flourish. Calhoun suggests that a fault of a number of writers is the fact that nationalism 
and identity is derived in a manner defined by self-interest and state building according to 
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a pre-existing bond. As nations and communities mature, an identity may be based on a 
pre-historic notion, but it evolves as a “specific form of continuing social and cultural 
reproduction”. As connections develops it is essential to explore the two levels of identity 
construction. One based on historical events and human action versus the development of 
national allegiances based on personal relations and cultural experiences.  Even a 
classical thinker such as Geertz argues that in order for a group to evolve, the identity 
must be formulated with allegiance to a civil state.82  While that resonates with the 
common Western view by putting state building and nation building into the same 
context, the concept of nation building must have an end goal of self-determination.  
 
While state building and civil society are essential to developing an everlasting identity, 
without a constant “time and place” it is difficult to ensure the viability and survival of an 
identity. This provides for the essentialness of developing symbols and national traditions 
for a group of people to rally around. Michael Billig, the author of Banal Nationalism, 
speaks of ordinary and hot nationalism and the symbolism of a society going on with its 
regular business versus one that is struggling for change. He references Roger 
Rogowski’s definition of nationalism, which argued that nationalism is when a nation is 
striving for unity and independence. With that said, nationalism is the process of allowing 
a national group to flourish into a nation-state.83 Central to the national movement are the 
national symbols and national traditions that may remain dormant, only to be recognised 
and/or celebrated in times of commemoration or, in the case of the Palestinians, when 
threatened.  																																																								
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Eric Hobsbawm, in his essay “The Invention of Tradition” alluded to the fact that both 
Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, regardless of their history in the holy land, only began 
developing national traditions at the end of the First World War.84 While this concept is 
relevant to the research, the problem lies in the double standard being applied by 
lawmakers and opinion makers in the Western world and Israel. As noted in the 
preceding introduction, the likes of Newt Gingrich and Israeli lawmakers have alluded to 
the Palestinians being an “invented people”, disregarding the fact that the same can be 
argued when describing both the state of Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, being 
that the land of historic Palestine has always been a home to many cultures and religions, 
including, but not limited to, Arabs, Jews, Assyrians, Druze and Germans, there were a 
number of languages and cultures spoken and/or practised in the region. It was at this 
time that both the Jewish settlers and the Arab inhabitants began to see the importance of 
language and as portrayed by Hobsbawm, “inventing traditions”. Billig refers to a quote 
by Yasser Arafat in 1993, in which he says, “The Palestinian state is within our grasp. 
Soon the Palestinian flag will fly on the walls, the minarets and the cathedrals of 
Jerusalem.”85 Billig cites that this view of Arafat, the concept of flagging nationalism is a 
means to an end. The Palestinian flag is the most central symbol of Palestinian 
nationalism and has been referred to by Arafat and others as a representation of resistance 
and solidarity, but the end goal is for Palestinian nationalism to become banal. 86 
Nationalism in free states has become dormant, only to be reignited in times such as 
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international sporting tournaments, national holidays and commemoration. Arafat dreamt 
for the Palestinian flag to wave freely in Jerusalem, but in the same token, in the end, 
Arafat’s dream was for the national flag to be just that, a national flag, not a symbol of 
resistance. Once the Palestinians are given a sense of normality and a sense of 
independence, they will no longer need to constantly portray the existence of their nation, 
thus allowing an identity to further develop into a nationality backed by a state entity.  
 
Nationalism scholar, Montserrat Guibernau, in her work Belonging, illustrates that self-
identity is a construct and that one may shape his/her own identity through choosing to 
belong to a group or being excluded from or choosing to reject the identity of another, 
more dominant group.87 Over one’s life they may construct and re-construct this self-
identity, it is no different for the Palestinians. In time of accommodation the Palestinians 
found both a sense of belonging and a sense of exclusion in their new surroundings. The 
state of Israel did provide citizenship to those who remained, but they were excluded 
from being full members of the state. The surrounding Arab countries did provide refuge 
for those expelled and they did send their armies to fight in defence of Palestine in 1948, 
but the Palestinian refugees were not completely welcomed into their new place of 
residence.  
 
It is understood that many factors of identity may be fluid and ever changing but for the 
purpose of this research, inclusion and commonality bringing forth a national political 
movement will be central. A surge of this identity may remain dormant for decades, even 																																																								
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centuries, until it is threatened. The Arabs of Palestine may have been comfortable 
defining themselves as Arabs, remaining enclosed, differing from others, not by national 
identity, but through location (Jerusalemite, Jaffawi, Akkawi, Gazan, et cetera). Similar 
to many other nations throughout the colonised world, it was not until faced by external 
threats was there a need for the definition of said identity.  
 
American sociologists Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper provide a number of uses of 
the conceptual term ‘identity’.88 They argue that, first; identity is viewed as a basis of 
social action, which opposes universal self-interest for a particular self-understanding. 
Next, it is understood as a phenomenon to understand sameness and collectivity. Further, 
it is seen as a core aspect of self-development and self-understanding through building a 
foundational connection to others. Finally, the last two determinants describe the post-
modern reality a number of oppressed communities, in that; identity is a means of protest, 
social action and the differentiation of one from the other coming forth as the product of 
competing narratives.89 These conceptual analyses, in the manner scholars understand 
identity will provide a foundation to explore the development of identity and the goals 
behind developing or resurging an identity.  
 
Guibernau furthers this argument claiming that people who find themselves facing social 
difficulties will be encouraged to identify themselves with those who share the same 
commitment to achieving a political objective, regarding them as “friends” against a 
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common “enemy”90. There is a sense of commitment amongst fellow nationals portrayed 
through congregation, the celebration or commemoration of a number of symbols and/or 
rituals and an emotional attachment- longing for something that once was.91 In this time 
of confusion, the Palestinians did just that. In his influential piece, Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality Eric Hobsbawm allotted to the 
notion of collectivity through uniting people against others, the concept of “us vs. 
them.” 92  The Palestinians aligned themselves with their fellow Arabs to impose a 
collective will on the new state of Israel while the new Arab states leveraged the 
Palestinian struggle, not only to gain the adoration of their own population and hide their 
own inadequacies but also to strengthen a vast Arab republic. This led to the construction 
of Pan-Arabism, which did last nearly two decades, but the same theories of belonging 
and uniting people against others worked against the political idea of Pan-Arabism to be 
reconstructed once again into a new sense of Palestinian nationalism. With the creation of 
the PLO and the rise of Yasser Arafat the Palestinians developed, their own “imagined 
community”93, connecting people that either live under occupation, in refugee camps or 
further afield. This distinction of an autonomous Palestinian identity, separate from the 
Arab collective is what Max Weber would describe as social closure94. Although there 
are clear parallels between the Arabs in Palestine and those from other Arab regions, the 
Palestinians formulated a familiarity that forced Palestinians to view the rest as similar, 
but “foreign”. This thesis will parallel the two constructed identities and the events that 																																																								
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propelled them, both against the state of Israel and against one another. Prior to that, the 
rest of this chapter will explore the ranging theories of national identity and nationalism. 
1.3 Nations and Nationalism 
According to British political theorist David Miller: “If we could persuade people to 
discard ideas of nationality and to regard themselves simply as members of the human 
race, perhaps with cultural affiliations to a particular group but nothing more than this, 
there would be a freer and more peaceful place.” 95  Currently, there isn’t a widely 
accepted answer to the question, what is a nation? The term “nation” originated from the 
Latin word “natio”, and until the twentieth century was reserved for human groups with 
similar customs and groups of students from foreign countries. 96 Throughout time, the 
term has had one constant in that it defines groups with common origins, however, 
French historian Marc Bloch may have had it right when he noted; “to the great despair 
of historians, men fail to change their vocabulary every time they change their 
customs.”97 The changed customs have evolved to contain a number of determinants 
leading to a number of definitions. It is understood that the term “nation” has evolved 
over time without resulting in a social theory to bring the term into the twentieth century. 
Israeli academic Shlomo Sand credits this to the fact that nations were perceived to be a 
natural almost immortal idea that had existed since the beginning of time.98 
 
The idea of a nation has grown to be limited, viewed as a people within an area or a 
border. The issue is that states are not always concrete and may again dismiss the notion 																																																								
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of nations and nationalities being natural as seen in the fifties in Korea when it was 
divided into North Korea and South Korea. The same applies to the Sudan, which in 2011 
was divided into South Sudan and North Sudan. On a larger scale, the people of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia went from being Soviet or Yugoslavian to identifying 
themselves by their new-found state whether it be Croatian, Serbian, Russian, or 
Ukrainian to name a few--the Ukrainians more recently exhibiting further divisions under 
pressure from within and outside their country.   
 
Nations, over the twentieth century, were given identities through the creation of states 
and autonomous self-governance, as defined by John Stuart Mill:  
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united amongst themselves 
by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others - which make them 
cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same 
government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, 
exclusively.99  
 
The quote above poses one of the core problems the Palestinians have faced in their fight 
for their self-determination and independence. Being that the Palestinians are divided, 
geographically and ideologically, there is not a central government or voice that 
represents all the people, the PLO had this responsibility for a short while until Fatah and 
the PA monopolised it. The concept of statehood and UN membership has monopolised 
international relations and without these privileges, one’s identity will constantly be in 
question. Helena Schulz, in her work on Palestinian identity, argues that in part, 
Palestinian identity is in question due to the fact that they are constantly re-identifying 
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themselves100. What started as a national liberation struggle to retrieve Historic Palestine 
in its entirety has become a diplomatic process begging for Israel to allow the 
Palestinians to live on 22% of their land. Regardless of the situation, the concept of 
resistance against the occupiers has been an important facet of this identity, although 
Schulz is correct in that the fact that the Palestinians are constantly reconstructing their 
identity, this thesis will argue that the basis of this identity was reconstructed, not only to 
rival the newly formed state of Israel but be a distinct member in the family of Arab 
states.  
 
The major factor, which is agreed upon by theorists on nationality and nations, is that the 
concepts of nations, nationalism and identity are ever evolving and highly complex. The 
creation of states on post-colonial borders dividing ethnic communities, the creation of 
multicultural immigrant-based states in the West and the growth of migration have all 
played a role in adding further confusion. The growth of differences amongst people has 
forced legal bodies to produce laws defining the importance of respecting the ever-
growing number of allegiances.  
 
When an average person voices their perception of a nation, it is regularly motivated by a 
stereotype of sort. It may be a positive stereotype, such as when referring to German 
engineering or French wine, but for the most part, stereotypes come attached with 
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negative connotations.101 Nations often find it difficult to overcome these clichés and 
persuade the general population to understand the complexity of their respective nations. 
Stereotypes, as trivial as they may be, are integral in people’s perception of nations. It is 
difficult for people, according to Simon Anholt,102 to worry about approximately two 
hundred countries, and billions of people thus have become dependent on short 
summaries and news clippings of nations until the time comes where they develop 
interest and/or plan to travel to the nation in question. The rest of this chapter will explore 
the theories of national identity and the construct of the modern identity.  
1.3.1 Classical Nationalism 
Influential to the subject of national studies are the works of Ernest Gellner, his student 
Anthony Smith, Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Their works, though seminal, are 
driven by a euro-centric view that may not be completely applicable to the Palestinian 
case. The starting point for classical nationalism studies is the concept of primordialism, 
which is generally associated with Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Although Shils and 
Geertz can both be defined as primordialists their findings can be both be said to be 
unique and original. Shils speaks of collectivities that tend to remain isolated103 , as 
families, tribes and villages do. This collectiveness and isolation is based on common 
biological characteristics, common territory104 and common language.105 On the other 
hand, while Geertz does include race, language and region he also adds religion and 
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customs.106 These determinants may have similar grounds, but the Geertz definition in 
itself allows for more of a transnational approach to the studies of nationalism. Further, 
Geertz warns that, the primordial ties and the exclusion of others due to the politicisation 
of said ties is a general initialiser for conflict,107  as was shown by Hitler and Nazi 
Germany. The foremost criticism of primordial thought is rooted in practicality, as 
Walker Connor notes, primordialism is primitive, somewhat tribal, thus will begin to fade 
away as the world continues to modernise108. In contrast, Roger Brubaker argues, that 
primordialism should not be ignored in lieu of modern society due to the naturalising 
nature of primordialists. In that, reverting to the natural ethnic community may be 
naturalised due to geopolitical circumstances109, as practiced by the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) in an attempt to “reclaim” the Islamic Caliphate or the state of Israel’s 
Zionist movement to reclaim the Jewish Homeland. 
 
Conversely, another classical theory, similar to primordialism is that of perennialism, 
political scientist Daniele Conversi defines perennialists as those who believe that the 
nation has stood the test of time and will continue to do so, whether relevant or not in the 
modern day.110 Anthony Smith further defines perennialism through two lenses, the first 
being; continuous perennialism which describes nations that have continued to exist over 
time and recurrent perennialism, which insists that nations may come and go but the 																																																								
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broad concept of the nation is a phenomenon that will remain. 111  Once again, the 
Palestinian resurgence was not based on an eternal history, the religious ties to Jerusalem 
have perennial ties dating back to the Prophet Muhammad and Jesus Christ but until 
threatened, the religious institutions remained inclusive to the Jews, Muslims and 
Christians of Palestine. Comparatively, the Zionists and the Jews of Europe enacted the 
theory of perennialism to sell their connection to the land of Biblical Palestine. These 
theories, while important to the development of national studies, will not be used to 
conceptualise the resurgence of the Palestinian identity. Being that the identity was a 
strategic response to the geo-political makeup of the region, where those who led the 
resistance developed their arguments, not on a historic connection but as a return to a 
home that was lost only a decade before.  
 
The next theory is ethnosymbolism, provided by Anthony Smith who notes that although 
constructed to fit the modern day, nationality is developed on an initial social connection 
of ethno-symbolism. He originally defined the five fundamental features of national 
identity as: 
1) A historic territory, or homeland 
2) Common myths and historical memories 
3) A common, mass public culture 
4) Common legal rights and duties for all members   
5) A common economy with territorial mobility for members112 
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The initial problem with this definition, as critiqued by Smith himself, is that this 
definition is directed towards Western style nations. Smith argues that the “Western 
experience has exerted a powerful, indeed the leading, influence on our conception of the 
unit we call the nation.”113 After a number of criticisms, namely that of Walker Connor 
who argued that, especially in pre-modern times, it is difficult to quantify the scope of a 
‘mass culture’ within a nation.114 Smith modified his definition in 2002 redefining a 
nation as “a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and 
memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.”115 Although Smith 
provided a variation of his original definition, namely omitting the concept of “mass 
culture”, the “common economy” and “common laws and customs” replacing it with 
“common legal rights and duties for all members”, it is evident that Smith’s definition 
continues to fit into the rhetoric of the modern Western-style nation defined by state 
boundaries and state institutions.   
 
When exploring the Palestinian identity, the aspects of a common memory and common 
history are important, providing for a romantic attachment to the land of one’s ancestors. 
Nonetheless, the Palestinian resurgence was not based on a longstanding attachment or 
historical narrative, it was based on opposing the colonisation of Palestine, the ethnic 
cleansing and expulsion of the Palestinians and the return, not to a “national home” as 
Lord Balfour declared for the Jewish people but return to one’s literal birth place and 																																																								
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family home. This shows that the resurgence of the Palestinian identity in the 1950’s falls 
out of the frame when compared to most nationalist theories and/or examples. The likes 
of Scotland, Ireland, Catalonia nationalist movements matured over long periods of time, 
the Palestinians were forced out of their homes and forced into the homes of their 
neighbours. While the neighbours were similar, they developed their own national traits, 
reminding the Palestinians that they were in fact outsiders.  
 
As for the concept of common economy and legal rights, it was not until the Oslo 
agreement of 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority that the Palestinians 
began developing any semblance of an autonomous economy, albeit under occupation. 
The use of Smith’s definition may apply to the common vernacular and the religious 
traditions of the Arab world at large but in the case of the Palestinian resurgence, less 
than a decade removed from the Nakba, the return to territory and the memory were not 
idealised in the manner in which nations symbolise national history. They were recalled, 
not as history or memory but a recent event that, regardless of what the history of the land 
is or was, has forced a population into refugee camps, oppression and exile. 
 
The fiercest critic of Anthony Smith and the concepts of ethno-symbolism and 
primordialism can be attributed to Ernest Gellner and his work Nations and Nationalism. 
In response to Smith, Gellner likens his theory of nationalism to that of the naval.116 He 
notes that the naval may have had an importance at some point in time, but due to the 
process of evolution the naval no longer holds function. He equates this to the natural 
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ethnic and cultural community, regardless of a historical claim- it is irrelevant in this day 
and age. Gellner accepts the criticism that his modernist theory only tells half the story,117 
but argues, that due to the nation-state makeup and the stage humanity has reached, half 
the story is enough.  
 
Gellner’s constructivist approach does not give recognition to a nation due to common 
memory and myth, or to Max Weber’s idea that the state is attributed to the central 
organisation that holds a monopoly of force in the region.118 Rather, Gellner suggests that 
the core of the modern nation-state is the social division of labour.119 Given that the rise 
of nationalism, according to Gellner, came along with the rise of industrialism, the 
preindustrial agrarian society did not hold the necessary functions to mature into a 
modern nation state.  
 
Being that agrarian society was inherently clustered, the scope of labour and education 
was specific, allowing little room for individual growth. The vertical nature of agrarian 
society impeded the progression of state-structure and societal cohesion, thus preventing 
the rise of nationalism. Although these types of societies have been around for centuries 
and there may be common ethnosymbolic ties amongst a number of communities, 
Gellner asserts that due to their inward nature they lack a binding central authority. The 
agrarian class was generally made up of illiterate labourers led by a chief-like figurehead 
atop a hierarchical structure of governance who controlled the order, wisdom and 
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violence in “low cultured society”.120 Gellner’s argument states that in order for these 
scattered communities to become a nation, they must progress into a modern “high 
culture society” that differs from the primitiveness of culture in agrarian society,121 this is 
achieved through the process of industrialisation. Gellner’s theory, while seminal and 
widely regarded, is riddled with a colonial perspective, in that, society must mirror the 
“civilised” Western style state system in order to be recognised as a nation. In his 1983 
work titled Muslim Society Gellner uses Israel as an example of need for a civilised 
society. He argues that Zionism and the Jewish Agency were successful in transforming 
parts of the Jewry into an agrarian society, organising the division of labour amongst the 
different Jewish settlements, thus being able to withstand Arab opposition. While it is 
understood that the development of labour structure has allowed Israel to flourish as a 
state,122 but he neglects the fact that it was their military domination and the geopolitical 
nature of the post-war world that allowed them to successfully create a state in Palestine.  
 
In his fundamental work Orientalism, Edward Said summarised Arthur James Balfour’s 
June 1910 speech to the House of Commons about Egypt as follows: “England knows 
Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-
government; England confirms this by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians… Egypt 
requires, indeed insists upon, British Occupation.”123 Those who were colonised were 
viewed as primitive societies, generally divided into a number of clusters (tribes, villages, 
communities) allowing the colonisers (British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Portuguese, 																																																								
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Jewish) to occupy the land and shape it into what Gellner viewed as a “high-culture” fit 
for nationhood. This constructivist approach was practised once again by the same 
British, and French, governments in 1916 when what was then greater Syria was carved 
up into four different nations and the British promised a national home for the Jews in 
Palestine.  
 
Israeli academic Nurit Peled-Elhanan argues that this negative orientalist depiction of the 
Palestinian people is still ongoing in Israeli society. In her work, researching Israeli 
textbooks she finds the Palestinians portrayed as; "The Arab with a camel, in an Ali Baba 
dress. They describe them as vile and deviant and criminal… The only representation is 
as refugees, primitive farmers and terrorists. You never see a Palestinian child or doctor 
or teacher or engineer or modern farmer."124 It is this type of portrayal of the Palestinians 
that has impeded their progress in gaining independence and when tested against 
Gellner’s theory, the type of portrayal that allows cynics to question the nature of their 
identity and existence.  
 
In closing, when exploring Gellner, it is essential to take the balance of world power into 
consideration. The development of the state and the construction of society entail the 
division of labour and Gellner’s theory postulates this important transition. However, 
when speaking of Palestine and Israel, it is essential to understand the influence of the 
United States and Western Europe in supporting the state, allowing them to conquer and 
flourish. While the plan for a Jewish home was conducted to near perfection, it was not 																																																								
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developed solely due to their being a “high culture”, a lot of their success was predicated 
on geopolitical order. In his 1988 book Plough, Sword and Book Gellner argues that it is 
pre-modern society that was controlled by the sword and modern societies are controlled 
by the plough or industry,125 when speaking of Israel, while they are technologically 
advanced, their nation was developed by the sword and the manner in which Palestinians 
are forced to live in the West Bank and Gaza prove that they have yet to relinquish the 
sword.    
 
1.3.2 Contemporary Nationalism 
The difficulty in applying the classical theories is due to the scarcity of accounting for the 
impact of political influence in their respective models. Guibernau, who is from a 
stateless nation, stressed that with this omission it is difficult to create a universal 
definition. Guibernau contends that it is essential to differentiate between the nation and 
the state, in that, nations without a state face a number of difficulties in gaining political 
autonomy and cultural recognition.126 Smith’s definition, both the original and amended 
version, can be broadened when divided into two different sections; the aspect including 
memory, myth and culture may be applied to most nations throughout the world. Even 
nations who do not have political and legal institutions may have cultural and ethnic 
features that may define their national identity.127 These three features will leverage the 
national identities of people in more complex situations such as the French-Canadians, 
the Catalans in Spain and the Palestinians in Israel to name a few. These features, albeit 																																																								
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integral for those who remain underrepresented, may act as a catalyst for conflict, where 
one party may oppress another. 
Guibernau does not completely discredit the approach of Smith when summarising what, 
in her opinion, entails a national identity. According to Guibernau, national identity 
encapsulates five dimensions128; starting with the psychological dimension, which argues 
that national identity starts with a unity or closeness of a group of people. This founding 
moment of national consciousness may remain dormant for years, even centuries when 
said nation is confronted with a threat against their way of life, territory, culture or 
sovereignty. This kinship, be it of ancestral or constructed nature, generates a feeling of 
an extended family and a responsibility towards one another, similar to Anderson’s 
imagined communities. Guibernau’s next dimension, cultural, falls in line with Smith’s 
cultural concepts of values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages and 
practices. She does add that in order for fellow-nationals to be connected, a vernacular 
language is the key factor as a staple of the nation. Following the cultural dimension, 
Guibernau points to the historical connection a people may share. A shared history allows 
a nation to gain self-esteem in either celebrating or commemorating the achievements 
and/or tragedies their ancestors have passed down.  
 
The fourth dimension of national identity according to Guibernau is territorial, arguing 
that, traditionally, people have defined their space within the local village or community 
they belong to. Being that the nation, and more so the state, acts to bring these 
communities together individuals must depend on education and the transfer of 																																																								
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knowledge to understand the nation as a whole. Returning to Benedict Anderson’s theory 
of imagined communities 129 , this transfer of knowledge through print media and 
education has allowed people to envisage a homeland and nation consisting of places 
they have never seen and people that they have never met. The final dimension, which 
chiefly differentiates Guibernau from Smith, is the political dimension. Guibernau 
contends that nowadays, in order for a nation to survive and progress they must aspire 
towards the homogenisation of the language and culture and provide a uniform citizenry 
under the nation-state structure. Although national identity is attributed to an ethnic 
origin, as supported by Anthony Smith, Guibernau states that turning the nation into a 
nation-state is a multidimensional process resulting in the creation of power. She defines 
this process as:  
The consolidation of territorial units by bureaucratic absolutist states that for the first time were able 
to hold the monopoly of the means of violence inside their territory; the transformation of frontiers 
delimiting different states in clearly fixed borders; the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a new class 
especially receptive to the ideas of the Enlightenment; and the new role of monarchs and rulers 
which was characterized (sic) by a fundamental change in the relation between rulers and ruled.130 
 
The underlying difference between Smith and Guibernau’s work is the fact that she does 
differentiate between the nation and the state. She does set out a set of strategies a state 
must employ to ensure a uniform identity that include symbolism, rituals, common 
image, history and culture in one territory while also addressing the pertinence of civil, 
legal and political rights, the creation of common enemies, consolidated media and 
education. Guibernau, who is from the autonomous Catalan region in Spain, has spent her 
career focusing on Western stateless nations, will provide parallels between the 																																																								
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construction of identity as she has seen in her homeland and the Palestinian process. 
While the psychological, cultural and territorial aspects of identity has been discussed 
thoroughly, it is the politicisation that makes each identity unique and in some cases, 
pertinent. The Palestinian identity in a broader Arab or Syrian “state” was not a major 
point of discussion, as it was not threatened. It was understood amongst the citizens of 
historic Palestine that there was a connection amongst citizens, but not until the 
community was dispersed and their identity was under threat of being ethnically cleansed 
was there a revival of national consciousness.  
 
A share of the identity of a nation is dependent on the direction the leadership takes in 
defining that identity. According to Horowitz, those who are successful in shaping the 
trajectory are “ethnic entrepreneurs”131 who promote ethnicity in a divided society to 
people waiting and hoping to be led. Wayne Norman calls this the “reconfiguring” and 
“remoralising” of a nation. 132 Norman, a modernist, argues that once there is a shift from 
the question of identity to the nation itself there will be a shift in the character and 
context of the identity. This creates heroes, rivals and traditions to progress the identity 
into modern day. Norman alludes to this reconfiguration as a process the state takes to 
ensure its population accepts the state entity, he also notes that this process may be used 
as a political tool to reach an end-goal, be it autonomy under the present state or a 
national liberation movement. On the other hand, remoralising the identity is the process 
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of changing the content of the identity, this may include, but is not limited to, the rights 
and responsibilities of the nationals, the vision of the state or the perception of the heroes 
and achievements of the nation and its nationals. Additionally, Norman provides three 
avenues in which an entity begins its progression towards a nation or nation state. 
Starting with nationalising the identity, which is the transformation of the identity, 
whether religious, ethnic or regional into a new modern identity. Second, the 
assimilationist option, when the state converts, either willingly or forcefully, the identity 
of a minority in order to have them assimilate into a multi-ethnic or ethnocratic society. 
Finally, a post-colonial shift in which the nation recommences with a tabula rasa in 
attempting to create a pan-state identity after state boundaries are rewritten by the 
colonial overseers.  
 
The resurgence of the Palestinian identity post-Nakba can be highly attributed to the 
leaders that influenced the cause. This ranges from Arab leaders to Palestinian leaders. 
While the Palestinians were attempting to transform their identity in order to represent 
the situation at hand, the Arab leaders were attempting to assimilate the Palestinians into 
the Pan-Arab cause, while at the same time treating them as second-class citizens in their 
own country. Though many Palestinians were attracted to the concept of Pan-Arabism 
and the idea of uniting under the Arab nation, the leadership of Fatah sought to develop 
their own identity, which forced Pan-Arabists, President Nasser included, to vilify them 
in an attempt to silence them. The third determinant provided by Norman, the post-
colonial shift, is the basis of the resurgence of the identity. Colonisation is a slow process 
that leaves the colonised nation in shock and shambles, not until the shackles of 
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colonisation are loosened can a people develop a clean slate in order to reshape and 
redefine their identity. Before progressing in resistance, the colonised must overcome the 
attempts of forced assimilation into their new surroundings. Norman’s theory, as it 
provides the pertinence of leadership and the process in reconfiguration of identity is 
suitable in developing a model that can be applied to the resurgent stage of Palestinian 
identity. While incomplete, by combining his theory of reconfiguring and remoralising 
identity with the politicisation of a national consciousness an applicable model is 
provided in order to explore the revival of a nation. With regards to the question of the 
Palestinian national identity, the abovementioned theory can help in clarifying the shifts 
in identity proposed in the introduction. The general perception of the Palestinians, 
outside of the refugee stage, was heavily based on the direction of the leadership or 
guerrillas. In response to the refugee years, in which the Palestinian problem was viewed 
as a refugee problem, the revolution was launched in order to shift that view. When the 
leadership felt that the revolutionary stage peaked, they once again shifted their focus to 
be viewed as statesmen, in doing so, constantly shifting the international perception of 
the Palestinians.  
 
The necessity of a model developed in this manner is essential, not only to Palestinians, 
but to all stateless nations. There are currently 193 UN member-states in the world, 
whereas the number of languages, according to Gellner is approximately nearly 8,000. 
This makes for, what Gellner refers to as 8,000 “potential nations”133, if that is brought 
into modernity, he claims that there may be 800 recognised nations on earth. That is one 
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nation for every ten potential nations, if put against the state, .025 of all potential nations 
achieve membership into the glorious league of recognised nations.  There is no way to 
gauge the exact number of stateless nations, the Underrepresented Nations and People 
Organisation that started in The Hague in 1991 currently has 46 members134, but this does 
not include some of the more popular movements such as the Scottish, Western Saharan 
or Palestinian movements. Nevertheless, this phenomenon of nationless states or national 
liberation movements can be attested to the irredentist practices of annexation of land and 
the construct of national borders.  
 
American political scientist, Thomas Ambrosio, defines irredentism as the annexation of 
a territory inhabited by their co-nationals.135 Irredentism saw rampant growth throughout 
the 20th century, due to the process of decolonisation and again at the end of the cold war 
through the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The effects of this practice are 
still highly relevant, resulting in a number of ethnic conflicts. Horowitz refers to the 
“artificiality” of the borders forced on the Asian and African region, resulting in a 
number of ethnic groups being split among two or more infant states136. The reversal of 
this process is a lengthy one and has taken shape through either succession or annexation 
attempts. Being that annexation is generally a bloody process, Horowitz states that the 
reversal of the artificiality of borders will progress through an aided succession 
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movement.137 However practiced, the irredentist claim manifests itself into a national 
movement that counters the Western drawn, post-colonial make up.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The construction of the Palestinian identity has been discussed by a number of scholars, 
both contemporary and traditional. The seminal piece on the Palestinian identity titled 
“Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness” written by 
Rashid Khalidi focused on the development of the Palestinian identity in the mandate 
period and in lieu of the conflicting narrative with “others”. Khalidi argues that the 
unique nature of the Palestinian identity can only be fully understood when studied in 
reference to other, generally competing, narratives. He recalls Stuart Hall, who argues 
that identity is “the relationship between you and the other,” as well as Edward Said who 
denotes to the imperativeness of an alter ego to ensure the maintenance and development 
of a culture done through the “interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from 
‘us’.”138 This concept, derived from Hobsbawm’s notion of “us vs. them”139, carries 
leverage in the exploration of conflicting identities, but in the case of Khalidi’s work, 
which is focused on the construction of the identity in the Ottoman and British Mandate 
period, this theory may have an adverse effect in proving his theory. He notes the fact 
that the Palestinians have never achieved independence in their homeland, thus could not 
have possibly determined their national identity, a modernist stance equating the nation to 
the state. Further, while the Palestinian discourse is normally discussed and 																																																								
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or/represented by the “other”, in this case being Israel, the Palestinian identity was not 
created, nor has it survived being based on its alter ego but in spite of the difficulties 
Israel has provided. While the notion that the Palestinian identity is explored in respect to 
“others” does have leverage, this thesis is attempting to discuss this identity not as it 
pertains to their “alter-ego” Israel but to their similar cousins, the other Arab nations.  
 
Khalidi does argue, in the preface to the work, that the study of nationalism and national 
identity does pose problems for the Palestinian question, arguing that while there is a vast 
amount of literature, the works are not applicable to the Palestinian identity. He begins by 
critiquing Gellner’s theory, indicating that regardless of the fact that the Palestinians have 
not “coincided in time and place”140 , they do deserve a close examination as their 
national narrative draws a number of parallels to other similar national movements. 
While it is a fact that the Palestinians, as mentioned above by Khalidi, have never 
achieved independence in their homeland, it should be noted that the concept of time and 
place is vast, fitting for an anthropological study of the people who resided in 
Palestine/Israel throughout history, not so much when exploring the resurgence of 
identity and identities in the region post World War Two. He also draws on the concept 
of invented tradition 141  based on ancient material, as discussed by Eric Hobsbawm. 
Khalidi goes to the extent of critiquing the modernist views of the traditionalist Smith, 
whose ethnosymbolic theory constitutes nationalism to a historic connection, citing an 
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article in which Smith admitted that the nation, in modernity, is a process of 
construction.142  
 
The most important theory to Khalidi’s work, and the basis of his research, is the work of 
Anderson, referencing the concept of “print-capitalism.”143  Anderson centres national 
consciousness on the vernacular used throughout society, arguing that in order to unify a 
nation, communication is key and monopolising a language is done through controlling 
print media. 144  Khalidi argues, that, aside from the institutions evident in Mandated 
Palestine and the clear division of labour and society, the print media available 
throughout Palestine and the Arab world provided for a unified national consciousness. 
While Khalidi does refer to Anderson’s work in his research on Palestinian nationalism, 
he notes in an article written in 1991 in the Oxford Journals that the problem facing the 
Arabs and the Palestinians is that the Arab nations have been neglected from the 
comparative analysis in the study of the broader social science and history, referring to 
the aforementioned Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson.145 He attributes this partly 
to the nature in which nationalism is studied on linguistic lines, separating the Turks and 
the Arabs for example, while their national stories hold many similarities and 
dependencies.146  
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While part of the blame lands on the shoulders of the Arabs, and in the case of this 
research, the Palestinians, for not exploring their own identity and their own national 
aspirations, the imperial nature of Zionism was evident during the Nakba when Jewish 
forces not only appropriated the Palestinians’ land and homes but nearly 80,000 books 
and manuscripts.147 These manuscripts were appropriated and kept in Israel’s national 
libraries, erasing the history and reflections of over a million Palestinians. Regardless of 
this loss, the Palestinians were complacent post-Nakba in configuring their own identity 
in a manner applicable to the academic discourse. This can be attested to a number of 
factors and issues they faced in addition to the fact that they do not have a constant time 
and place to develop an institutionalised identity. Nevertheless, while a historic 
attachment is integral and the Palestinians do face many difficulties, it was and is 
imperative to their struggle for statehood to develop a national identity that will not only 
separate them from Israel, but from the Arab world as well. The next two chapters will 
layout the research methods as well as the historical framework before using the theories 
provided in this chapter to directly analyse and assess the resurgence of the Palestinian 
identity in the 1960’s. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
 
This thesis intends to explore the resurgence of the Palestinian national identity post-
Nakba through the scope of Western national theory. After the Nakba, the Palestinians 
found themselves living as refugees in countries surrounding their lost homeland, or 
living under the control of the governments of Egypt, Israel or Jordan. There has been 
considerable work undertaken on the topics of identity and nationalism without much 
focus on the Palestinian issue, this may be attributed to a plethora of reasons, while that is 
not the main focus of this research, the lack of attention is troubling to the Palestinian 
narrative. When researching Palestinian identity after the Nakba, the general discourse is 
generally mired with emotional attachment and creative expression. While personal 
stories and expressions are essential in order to ensure the survival of the identity, it is 
beneficial, considering the lack of a state to project this identity, to explore the identity as 
it fits within the parameters of theory on identity and nationalism. 
 
In order to more fully understand the Palestinian national story through Western theory, it 
is helpful to engage with the subject as dispassionately and objectively as possible. Every 
Palestinian’s story is different and some may find themselves “more attached” to the core 
of the struggles. Regardless, in order to develop an applicable model, it is essential to 
understand the reality faced by the Palestinians in the timeframe explored, 
notwithstanding personal or political attachments. Prior to introducing the methodology, 
it is pertinent to explore the reality at hand and the manner in which the reality is 
understood. In social sciences, each observer may view the reality differently, especially 
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when exploring a topic as polarising as this. While it is essential to remain objective, 
being that the development of identity is a very personal, yet communal, awakening, I 
will be depending on personal stories, some of which may be clouded.  Finally, due to the 
complexity of the Palestinian case, there will be a varied understanding of the reality, not 
only due to Israel and the West, but amongst Palestinians as well.  
2.1 Ontology and Epistemology  
Research, as defined by Noble Prize winner Albert Szent-Gyorgyi is to “see what 
everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else has thought.”148 There are two 
processes in developing a research strategy: the first is developing the research methods, 
which according to PM Kasi are “the means, the instruments or the tools a particular 
investigator chooses to accumulate the information required to answer his research 
question.”149 Once the researcher develops his or her methods, the researcher must decide 
“the manner or the approach the investigator adopts in answering his/her research 
question.”150 This process is defined as the research methodology, the starting point of 
the methodology is to understand the ontology and epistemology of the study.   
 
The ontology of a study is the reality at hand and understanding this reality through 
events and the social state of affairs. On the other hand, the epistemology describes how a 
researcher can extrapolate knowledge that will assist how they may define the reality.151 
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Norman Blaikie argues that there are six ontological and six epistemological 
assumptions, which are, starting with the ontology: 
• Shallow Realist- considers the study of a phenomenon exists independently of us, 
that the factors effecting this phenomenon are external and the challenge is to 
explore these factors.  
• Conceptual Realist- The idea that reality is separate from human understanding, 
not a creation of any individual or community. 
• Cautious Realist- Being that reality is an independent phenomenon, humans are 
not capable of understanding it, thus must be vigilant in their research approach. 
• Depth Realist- Reality consists of three domains- starting with empirical, which 
is defined by what can be observed. Secondly, the actual domain which exists 
independently from the examiner and finally the real domain which are not 
available to be explored. 
• Idealist- Reality is created by the human mind; society is manifested by the 
actions of the community effected. This idea may work in a myriad of ways, 
reality may directly affect the social make up, or possibly hinder the development 
of society providing for a number of perspectives for the researcher. 
• Subtle Realist- Much exists outside of the scope of social science, due to the 
purpose and assumptions of researchers, what we know is not exactly certain but 
rather a human construction.152  
 
As for the epistemology, the six assumptions are as follows: 
• Empiricism- Knowledge, which is produced through research is an accurate 
representation of society. 
• Rationalism- To gain knowledge, one must explore human thought and apply it 
to reality in order to explore its consequences. 
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• Falsificationism- Knowledge is derived through constant trial and error. We as 
humans are not capable of directly understanding reality thus we must constantly 
define and redefine it through research.  
• Neo-Liberalism- The way things are affect the manner in which we derive 
knowledge of reality. In order to further understand, research is to explore how 
the structures that exist affect reality rather than exploring the external options.  
• Constructionism- Knowledge comes from necessity; people make sense of 
reality through their everyday experiences. Due to the fact that life and society is 
ever-changing and society does not depend on evidence and theory, social 
sciences must adapt, rather than use uniform approaches.  
• Conventionalism- Theory is man-made, thus does not completely represent 
reality, to argue which theory or idea works best is based on judgement and 
reality, not evidence.153  
 
Based on these assumptions, provided by Blaikie, this research will take on an 
idealist/constructionism approach to understand the social development and later political 
realisation of the Palestinian national identity.  
2.2 Justification for Use of Idealist/Constructivist Philosophy  
The ontology of this study is defined by the idea that the lack of understanding of the 
Palestinian identity is due to the reality faced by their population as well as the perception 
that Palestinians are reluctant to forgo elements of their past in order to define their 
future. Blaikie argues that the idealist approach can take on a number of forms, including 
the idea that “there is a reality that exists independently of socially constructed 
realities,” 154  the social construct of the time makes the State the arena for social 
responsibility and independence, a privilege that the Palestinians did not enjoy. This 
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misunderstanding forced the Palestinians to create their own reality; resulting in 
constructionist epistemology. Due to the fact that the Palestinians, fall outside of the state 
parameters, this research attempts to take an alternative approach in defining Palestinian 
identity as it exists within the scope of national theory. This approach explores the events 
in a manner that will develop an alternative view to the many seminal works exploring 
the question of Palestine and the Palestinians.  
2.3 Research Strategy 
The Palestinian narrative is highly dependent on decisions made by the PLO, Israel and 
the West, constantly evolving in order to satisfy the reality. Regardless of current events 
and current evolution, the basis of the contemporary Palestinian identity finds its roots in 
the expulsion of their population as a result of the Nakba and the events that followed. It 
is for that reason that this thesis is divided into three different sections; the refugee, the 
guerrilla and the statesman.  
 
Each case will be explored separately, providing its own conclusions before the findings 
are merged in order to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses. These three 
sections mark specific periods in the evolution of Palestinian identity. Starting with the 
refugee, it was when faced with the dire restraints of the refugee camps and the 
controlling manner of their host governments that the Palestinians began to develop a 
social identity separate from their Arab brethren. Following the refugee period is the 
guerrilla stage, representing the realisation of the Palestinian social identity and the initial 
development of the political identity, partially due to the failures of the Arab armies in 
the 1967 war. The final stage, the statesman, explores the political evolution of the PLO 
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and the impact on the Palestinian national identity. These three cases will be explored 
within the realm of the theory and supported by the methodology. 
2.4 Research Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative study, using a thematic approach to explore change and 
developments of a group over a set time period, in this case, the Palestinians between 
1948 and 1982. A thematic approach “enables scholars, observers, or practitioners to use 
a wide variety of types of information in a systematic manner that increases their 
accuracy or sensitivity in understanding and interpreting observations about people, 
events, situations and organizations.”155 This research draws on a number of resources, 
which include primary and secondary data in addition to an empirical focus on practical 
issues. While the majority of the information is derived from secondary data, the 
following primary data is used in order to support the available secondary data: 
• Interviews: The purpose of interviews is to provide a human context to the history. 
The Palestinian struggle has gone on for decades, and we are far removed from the 
time period covered in this thesis. Irving Seidman, whose work focuses on using 
interviews for qualitative research argues that researchers may examine documents, 
explore history, and conduct experiments, but in order to understand the people 
involved interviews provide a “necessary, if not always completely sufficient, avenue 
of inquiry.”156 Further, the interview method may provide information, or in this case 
anecdotes, that are not readily available. Additionally, interviewing is not only the 
simplest option, but may add clarity to certain questions that may arise in the 																																																								
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research.157 Though interviews do add relevant information, depending on human 
emotion or memory they may produce a clouded or bias recollection of events. The 
interviews were conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of University of 
East Anglia (UEA) with approval from UEA’s research ethics panel.  
 
Interviews were conducted with seven prominent people, representing four 
experiences: refugees, Pan-Arabists, the PFLP and Fatah. Those interviewed are: 
o Bassam Abu Sharif- Sharif is one of the more influential Palestinian voices, 
recognized internationally. He provides insight into the history of the 
Palestinian people, their relationship with other Arabs and, as one of Yasser 
Arafat’s closest advisors, he provides an essential viewpoint into the events 
that transpired. It should be noted that he himself was the victim of a terrorist 
attack in the form of a letter bomb which resulted in his partial blindness.  
o Ambassador Afif Safieh- As Former Ambassador to important states such as 
the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and the United States and long-
time member of the PLO, Ambassador Safieh was an essential voice in the 
political wing of the PLO.  
o Abdel Bari Atwan- Atwan, a journalist based in London, was editor-in-chief 
of the Al-Quds al Arabi newspaper from 1989 until 2013, perhaps best known 
for his 1996 interview with Osama Bin Laden. Currently, he is the founder 
and editor and chief of the Raialyoum electronic daily news site. Atwan, 
whilst not affiliated with any Palestinian political programme, provides an 
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outsider perspective into the importance of the Palestinian resistance in 
defining the identity. 
o Issam Yamani- Yamani, a long-time activist and son of PFLP co-founder Abu 
Maher al-Yamani, provides insight on the PFLP’s Pan-Arabism views as well 
as his own experiences as a refugee in Lebanon. 
o Professor Atif Kubursi- Kubursi is a distinguished economist, son of one of 
the founders of the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) and staunch Pan-
Arabist. I discussed with him the downfalls of Pan-Arabism and the economic 
principles of the Pan-Arab idea. 
o Dr. Farid Ayad- Ayad, two-time President of the Canadian Arab Federation 
and Palestine House (both located in the Toronto, Canada area), discussed his 
experiences as a refugee in Lebanon and his views on the notion of Pan-
Arabism. 
o Yusri Shami- Shami, Palestinian refugee and founder of Palestinian rap group 
Katibe 5 residing in London, discusses his identity crisis growing up in 
Lebanon, and now living and working in London.  
• United Nations Resolutions, Newspaper Publications and Foreign Policy: The use of 
these “written records” is an example of content analysis, which the researcher may 
use through “taking a verbal, non-quantitative document and transform(ing) it into 
quantitative data.”158  Being that this research is covering a long span of time, a 
running record of data and material collected over time,159 will be used. For the 
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benefit of the researcher, with the use of the Internet, the United Nations has 
developed an online collection of all UN resolutions and texts pertaining to “The 
Question of Palestine”160 on one website.  
 
Although it is not exactly the most popular source of media, in the years covered in 
this thesis print media was one of the most essential sources of information. Although 
there is not a running record or gathered information pertinent to the Palestinian 
question, the New York Times (NYT) has archived all their publications ranging back 
to their inception in 1851. The use of one of the major papers, in one of the more 
populated Western cities will allow the researcher to understand the initial and 
ongoing perception of the Palestinians throughout their conflict. While the NYT may 
have a certain bias, or misunderstanding, especially during the time period covered in 
this thesis, these misconceptions will be noted in understanding perception of the 
Palestinian people over time.  
 
Similar to the UN Resolutions, through surveying the shift in foreign policy papers 
one may identify trends found in non-quantitative documents and apply them in a 
manner which may be quantified.161 In this case, the use of terminology and the 
manner in which the Palestinians are viewed by the United States in particular may be 
applied to the reasoning behind the ebbs and flows in the Palestinian struggle.  The 
reason United States foreign policy was singled out is due to their political strength, 
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their use of the veto to protect Israel in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
and their central position in the Middle East Peace Process. 
 
• Biographical Research: In any historical research, the records of the people will 
provide evidence that may prove or disprove a number of notions. It is for this reason 
that available records of those who were either a part of, or worked with, the 
Palestinian revolution will be used. This type of written record is defined as episodic 
records which are records that are developed over time, in a “more casual, personal, 
and accidental manner.” 162 These types of records will allow the researcher to further 
understand the day-to-day situations as well as the personalities of the leaders 
involved. In the case of the Palestinian question, Yasser Arafat did not leave us with a 
written autobiography in order to better understand his actions and motives. Thus, 
there will be a major benefit to explore the views of some of his closer confidants.  
2.4 Shortcomings in the Research 
The complexities of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict offer a number of shortcomings and 
biases with how either group is portrayed and/or perceived. These aversions have 
provided the Palestinians with a multitude of difficulties when battling for public opinion 
and although they have made a number of advances there is still a lack of objectivity 
when discussing the Palestinians. People maybe apprehensive when discussing the 
Palestinians due to the sensitivity of the topic and the fear of being portrayed as “anti-
Semitic”. Regardless of the definition of Semitic people, which includes Arabs, the term 
Semite has become linked exclusively to Jewish people and being anti-Israel or pro-
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Palestinian will put someone at risk of being labelled “anti-Jewish [anti-Semitic]”. This 
sensitivity and “political correctness” leading to the closing down of debate has had 
major consequences on the discourse in the Western world and parts of the Arab world as 
well.  
 
Once the political complexities are overcome and the narrative is explored through 
Western theory further difficulties arise as the Palestinian narrative developed in a 
manner predicated on Eastern traditions. It is essential to declare that though this research 
is attempting to develop the Palestinian identity in the framework of Western theory, it 
does not attempt to discredit the Eastern oratory narratives. Regardless of these factors, in 
addition to the orientalist views towards the Eastern world, the Palestinians have become 
an integral aspect of political discussions and before there was a peace process the 
Palestinians had to work tirelessly to develop a national identity, separate from the Arab 
world and accepted by the international community.  
 
With regards to the available information, being that the timeframe of the research covers 
a period spanning over decades in the past, a lot of those who played an integral role have 
passed away without, for the most part, documenting their personal narrative. Further, as 
discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the records developed by the Palestinians, 
were lost and/or stolen in the myriad of wars and migration. The act of stealing 
Palestinian records was not unique to the Nakba, but was repeated in other conflicts as 
noted by Edward Said in a 2001 article for the New Left Review when he described the 
“Judiazation” of East Jerusalem and the theft of “invaluable records, land deeds, maps, 
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which Israel has simply stolen, as it did PLO archives from Beirut in 1982.”163  
My intention is not to add to the long list of works that explore the reasoning and the 
trajectory of the Palestine/Israel conflict. My focus is two-fold; first, to define the 
Palestinian national identity in a manner applicable to Western theory, rather than the 
traditional method used, which focuses on a history of a place that unfortunately does not 
exist as it was remembered. The lessons of history, memory, and trauma are essential for 
the inward dialogue amongst Palestinians as well as for those who have an interest in the 
region but there are a number of ways in which national identity can be explored, lost in 
much of the Palestinian narrative is the theoretical approach. Second, the thesis seeks to 
explore the Palestinians amongst their peers, the Arabs, rather than their enemies. The 
Palestinians and Israelis are obviously connected, throughout history and in modern day, 
but this thesis is attempting to carve out the Palestinian national identity as it fits amongst 
the Arab world.  
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Chapter 3: Historical Framework: The Creation of the State of Israel and the 
Palestinian Problem 
Palestinians also have this curious feeling that they are the inheritors of the monotheistic religions 
and that prophets and gods needed to express themselves directly or through envoys in Palestine.  
 
Palestinians feel that they are the custodians of all those messages that took birth in our land. If 
you ask me that’s a hell of a burden. On that, I like to quote the Swiss proverb during the 
Napoleonic era which said “happy people have no history”, we on the other hand are burdened 
with thousands of years of history so that I wouldn’t wave away by saying that it is a romantic 
feeling, but it is part of the memory.164  
 
This chapter serves to explore the different decisions and events that resulted in the UN 
Partition Plan of 1947, the Arab-Israeli War and the creation of the state of Israel. Both 
the Jews and the Arabs worked tirelessly throughout this period to gain international 
support for their independence, with history as the judge, it is clear which plan has seen 
more success.   
 
The enduring nature of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict has not brought the Palestinians 
any closer towards the attainment of independence. This can be attributed to a number of 
factors, which include, internal divisions, the exhorting influence of the Zionist 
movement in the Western world, and the fact that the Palestinians are simply not as 
advanced technologically, economically or militarily. The Mandate Period provided the 
Palestinians with a number of complications throughout the thirty-year British occupation 
and it should have come as no surprise that the period ended with the creation of the State 
of Israel while the Palestinians were left looking at who to blame. What is especially 
interesting is that these internal divisions, in their simplest form, are still evident. In 
addition, the creation of the refugee problem has added another dimension.  																																																								
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The past century has seen the Middle East overwhelmed with conflict, confusion and 
destruction. One can point to a number of events, triggers and/or interests that has led to 
the series of occupations, wars, embargos and encounters over the lands that stretch from 
the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. While, what is often referred to as the cradle 
of civilisation, from Cairo to Jerusalem, Damascus to Baghdad, Mecca to Medina has 
held geopolitical importance since biblical times. The current state of affairs can largely 
be attributed to the old age competition between the French and British empires of the 
early 20th century. Before discussing the French and British empires, however, it is 
necessary to introduce the father of Zionism, Theodor Herzl. 
3.1 Herzl’s Plan 
Theodor Herzl’s pamphlet “The Jewish State”, published in Vienna in 1896 has been 
lauded as a visionary guide to creating a state. Herzl’s plan covered immigration, 
economics and urban planning while concentrating on the importance of the development 
of the Hebrew language and a political and legal system enshrined into a constitution. 
The reason behind the pamphlet stemmed from the clear discrimination in a number of 
countries against Jewish communities. For the purpose of this research, there will be a 
brief look, not into the Jewish Question or the reason behind the idea of a Jewish 
homeland but the plan he laid out and how it has impacted the Palestinian identity 
problem. Herzl divided his plan into three sections: The Jewish Company, The Local 
Groups and the Society of Jews.  
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Prior to introducing the plan, Herzl posed an interesting question, a section named 
“Palestine or Argentine?” If the state of Israel is meant to act as the third temple and the 
land of East Jerusalem, Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Nablus, all of which are in the currently 
occupied Palestinian Territories, are essential to the identity of Israel, why is it that the 
location of the natural state of the Jewish people was a question, as put forth by Herzl, of 
“who would take us?” 165  Further, Herzl himself defined the Jewish Question, as a 
national question166, the goal of Zionism, according to the “Father of Zionism”, was to 
create a national home for the Jewish people, not a Jewish state. This brings into question 
the aspirations of the current Israeli administration’s settlements policy that has been 
justified due to its pertinence to the “Jewish State”. Afif Safieh believes that there it more 
than the Jewish history that led the colonizers to decide on Palestine, theorizing: 
Forget not, the centrality of Palestine and the cross-section of three continents, Asia, Africa and 
Europe, which was the world until the discovery of the Americas, Australia and the easier access 
of China, Japan and the rest which happened after the 17th century. Palestine has been central; 
Palestine was also seen as indispensable by any emerging power in the world.  Because of its geo-
centrality it was the arena of dispute for Babylonia and Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt and the 
emergence of the Greek nation represented by Alexander the great, needed a foothold in Palestine, 
the Roman empire as well.167 
 
Herzl’s plan thoroughly detailed the various issues of creating a new homeland. On 
immigration, labourers would migrate to the new state first to cultivate the land before 
the middle class would come in to add the further pillars of society. He spoke of the 
occupation in a scientific manner that consisted of research of the land’s minerals and 
resources168. In hindsight, the fact that Herzl’s prophecies are being remembered as that, 
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rather than another ideology is that it came to fruition. A number of events had to occur 
for his pamphlet to be enshrined into history and to quote Herzl “antagonism is essential 
to man’s greatest effort.”169 Further, Herzl was clearly a romantic, he believed in creating 
a Jewish utopia that would not oppress others, an idealist would believe that those who 
were oppressed would never persecute others. Finally, this romantic utopia, according to 
Herzl, would end all the world’s problems and the Jewish state would be free of enemies. 
History has shown that the overarching conflict in the Middle East has acted as the root 
cause of a number of the world’s problems since the creation of Israel in 1948.   
3.2 A Land Without a People for a People Without a Land 
Long before the conflict with the Jews, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine faced a different 
beast, the Ottoman Empire which controlled much of the Arab world for centuries. When 
asked about the Ottoman influence on the Palestinian identity, Bassam Abu Sharif 
claims: 
The identity of the Palestinians can be defined in a very accurate way, the same way we define all 
people of the Arab nation, they are Arabs. In fact, all the Arab nations were under ottoman 
occupation, it abused the flag of Islam to put all these nations under an occupation that was very 
despotic, very brutal and kept all other nations underdeveloped. Even those who were developed were 
forced to retreat back to dark ages with regards culture, progress, production and construction. The 
Palestinians, simply put, happened to live in Palestine and Palestine was not defined by the ottoman 
occupation, in fact, Palestine has been a subject of invasion so many times through history and it has 
remained Palestine.170  
 
Though the Ottoman occupation did not have a direct impact on the Palestinian’s Arab 
identity, the occupation played a large role in the later European colonisation of 
Palestine. Starting in 1858, the Ottoman Empire enforced a land law forcing peasants 
who lived in and cultivated land for centuries to register their land for the first time.171 
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Many peasants failed to register their respective lands due to fears of taxation and 
conscription172 leading to upper class members of society to purchase large areas as 
investments. Ownership of the land was no longer guaranteed through traditional 
cultivation at the turn of the century. Jewish colonisation agencies seized the opportunity 
to acquire large amounts of land. Although displeased, the peasants populating Palestine 
at the time were able to continue living in and cultivating the land under Arab ownership, 
the issues and conflicts began when Jewish investors began purchasing the land and 
removing the tenants.173 
 
The mantra was instilled into Jewish colonisation agencies as outlined by land expert Dr. 
Arthur Ruppin: 
  “Land is the most necessary thing for our establishing roots in Palestine. Since there are hardly any 
more arable unsettled lands in Palestine, we are bound in each case of the purchase of land and its 
settlement to remove the fellahin (peasants/farmers) who cultivated the land so far, both owners of the 
land and tenants.”174  
 
The agencies were set in place after settlers and authors began informing European Jewry 
that Palestine was in fact inhabited and not the “land without a people for a people 
without a land” as suggested by Zionist propaganda.  
 
The first Jewish purchase of agricultural land in Palestine was the city of Petah Tiqvah in 
1878, 175  not without conflict though. As Jewish people settled into Petah Tiqvah, 
conflicts arose, forcing the Ottomans to arrest many Arab fellahin. The attacks continued 
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as the fellahin from the neighbouring town of Yahudiyya, outraged because those who 
sold the land, sold more land than they owned, vented their anger. 176  This pattern 
continued over the next decade in the villages of Gedera, Rehovot, Nes Ziyyona and 
Hadera.177 This period, known as the first Aliyah (Jewish return to Israel) saw 25,000 
eastern European immigrants settle in Palestine.178 
 
This wave of immigrants was the first step in the Zionist project to create a Jewish state 
in Palestine. A few years after Herzl’s pamphlet saw the coming together of the First 
Zionist Congress to create the World Zionist Association and establish the Jewish 
National Fund, referred to as the Jewish Company in Herzl’s pamphlet, whose sole 
responsibility was to buy land in Palestine for Jewish use. Soon after the creation of the 
fund the second Aliyah saw 40,000 immigrants arrive in Palestine.179 The first wave of 
immigrants still allowed the Arabs to lease back some of the land and take up hard labour 
whereas the second Aliyah, starting in 1904, came to Palestine with a stricter approach 
and a “conquest of labour” to replace Arab workers with Jewish ones.180 This brought 
along a much more aggressive ideology with the immigrants who began forcefully 
expelling the Arabs.  Regardless of the Jewish settlement, Palestine and much of the Arab 
world was still under Ottoman rule, and due to the censorship of the Arab’s, Sharif 
Hussain of Mecca though the best path to independence would be through supporting the 
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dissolving of the Ottoman empire. Bassam Abu Sharif described this decision with the 
following: 
Since the Arab’s were not allowed to establish any political party or movement, nor to express 
themselves or call for their freedoms, they were forced to create societies. It was a popular 
movement around the region to develop Arab societies, who were recruiting, organizing, and 
calling for the freedom and unity of the Arab nation. These were the slogans that were picked by 
Sharif Hussain of Mecca, who was in contact with McMahon, the British representative 
controlling the middle east from Cairo. Who promised him that if the Arabs would fight the Turks 
and kick them out, the British would help them create a united Arab nation, with the king of Arabs 
being Hussain and his sons distributed as the governors of the liberated areas. At one point, that 
was the agreement, and that point covered the first bullet shot by Hussain who was not leading his 
family or the people of the Hijaz but all the Arabic societies who gathered with recruits, 
volunteers, fighters, and leaders to form one united Arab army.181  
 
3.3 The French/British Influence 
On October 24th, 1915, British High Commissioner to Egypt Sir Henry McMahon wrote a 
letter agreeing with Sharif Hussein of Mecca declaring British support for an independent 
Arab world in exchange for Arab support in battle with the Ottomans and the Germans.182 
McMahon pledged that the British would support Arab independence in all the regions 
prescribed by Sharif Hussein except for the following: the districts of Mersin and 
Alexandretta, and the part of Syria lying west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, 
which makes up modern day Lebanon. These modifications were offered to ensure the 
acceptance of their French allies. 
 
There has been a lengthy debate as to whether or not this included Palestine into the 
regions of “Arab independence”. While throughout the British were purposely vague in 
their wording, Arab nationalist George Antonious argues that the British did not in fact 
omit Palestine from the discussion, arguing that the regions McMahon requested to be 																																																								
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omitted was the Vilayet of Beirut (west of the Vilayet of Aleppo) as well as what stood 
west of the Vilayets of Homs, Hama and Damascus. Antonious contends that there was 
no “Vilayet” of Homs, Hama and Damascus, instead it was all the Vilayet of Syria and 
that what lies west of those three northern Syria cities were the Sanjaq of Lebanon and 
the Vilayet of Beirut, both of which were of interest to the French. Finally, if Sir 
McMahon intended to include Palestine in the omission, than why did he fail to include 
the Sanjaq of Jerusalem, which includes Gaza, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beersheba, the 
Negev and a number of cities throughout the modern territory of the West Bank?183  
 
Regardless of the omissions, nearly a month after McMahon’s declaration, on November 
23rd, 1915, the British government informed French diplomat Francois Georges-Picot of 
the declaration, to which he replied: “To promise the Arabs a large state is to throw dust 
in their eyes, such a state will never materialise. You cannot transform a myriad of tribes 
into a viable whole.”184 Days after the meeting with the French, the British began to 
backtrack on their declaration to the Arabs arguing that the Arabs would not be able to 
claim the land regardless. A British diplomat who took part in the meeting with Georges-
Picot did not hesitate to echo the Frenchman’s statement calling the Arab state an 
“absurdity”, referring to the Arabs as a “heap of scattered tribes with no cohesion and no 
organisation.”185 By December Georges-Picot came to a conclusion that the only British 
intention is to deceive the Arabs. It is of relevance to note that the French Prime Minister, 
when directing Georges-Picot on the negotiations, told him to secede Jerusalem, as it is a 																																																								
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“country of little value.”186 Nevertheless, the British and the French continued with their 
negotiations. 
 
Georges-Picot returned to England with his new proposal which the British rejected. 
Instead the British turned to another young, up and coming civil servant, who was seen as 
an expert on the region, Mark Sykes. During his travels throughout the Ottoman Empire, 
Sykes neglected the Arab national consciousness and ignored it during his negotiations 
with Georges-Picot. The Frenchman was happy to come to agreement with Sykes, 
considering that he would not even acknowledge Hussein’s demands. The negotiations 
moved swiftly and the two parties came to an agreement subsequently known as the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement.187 The agreement divided the region as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 1: Provided by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)188 																																																								
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The final agreement gave the French what they vied for from the outset- modern day 
Lebanon, Syria and parts of Iraq while the British were given the rest of Iraq, Jordan and 
the south of Palestine into Egypt while the Vilayet of Jerusalem was left under shared 
control. Left out of the equation was the Arabs, this acted as a major setback to their 
national aspirations. Though not exactly pertinent to Palestine, Bassam Abu Sharif shares 
an anecdote that represents the carelessness of the French and British when handling the 
region:  
One of the painful points, one night they were sipping wine and became tipsy, and the map which 
they were studying was left with two lines to mark the borders between Lebanon and Syria. There 
was a part of the map undefined, until now the part of the map, called Wadi Khaled, has 400,000 
Arabs who up until 1994 were not recognized as Lebanese or Syrians. No identity, they are Arabs, 
but no passports.189  
   
Two weeks after the Agreement was signed, British foreign minister Arthur Balfour 
provided the details to United States President Woodrow Wilson’s foreign advisor, 
Edward House. House’s response was furious, arguing that they are leading the region 
into a “breeding place for war,”190 which turned out to be true. The same year, Arthur 
Balfour invited Chaim Wiezmann to his home. Before this dinner, Balfour was 
considered to be anti-Semitic for his support of a bill in 1905, which restricted Jewish 
immigration to England, however by the end of the dinner Weizmann’s had persuaded 
Balfour to feel sympathetic to the Zionist cause. To the extent where, soon after the 
dinner, he declared to his cabinet that he was a Zionist.191 When Weizmann was advised 
of the details of the partition of Greater Syria he too was disturbed, letting Balfour and 																																																								
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Prime Minister Lloyd George know that allowing the French to control a part of the 
country would hinder the chances of a Jewish State. The agreement did not come into 
effect until after the end of World War One and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but that 
did not stop Balfour from making a declaration on November 2nd, 1917, which stated: 
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in 
any other country.192 
 
Unlike the British declaration to Sharif Hussein, the British kept their promise and acted 
on it from the onset of their Mandate of Palestine. 
3.4 Resistance 
In the early years under British rule the Arabs of Palestine were in a daze as to the reality 
of the events taking place having gone from occupation under the Ottomans to 
occupation under the British, who brought with them thousands of Jewish settlers. The 
resistance began to take form, but calls for non-violent procedures were predominantly 
met with a violent response from both the British and Zionists,193 namely from Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky and his followers. 
 
In the mid-1920s the Arabs of Palestine began to understand that in order to resist the 
Jewish settler population they must resist British colonisation and vice-versa. Military 
organisation and recruitment began under the tutelage of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian 
born sheikh who took refuge in Palestine after being sentenced to death due to his 
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leadership against the French occupation. Al-Qassam did not begin rallying his troops 
until the mid-1930s but the talk of resistance and independence continued to flourish 
amongst the Palestinians.   
 
Up until September 23rd, 1928, the British still believed that their plan to install a Jewish 
national home in Palestine remained a viable option that would not lead to war. Until 
Edward Keith-Roach, the District Commissioner of Jerusalem, Constable Douglas Duff 
joined the Pasha of Jerusalem at the Islamic court, which happened to overlook the 
Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall. Keith-Roach, not understanding the veracity of his 
comments remarked to the Pasha that it was the first time he noticed the screen erected 
adjacent to the wall separating men and women during prayers. The sheikhs demanded 
the screen be dismantled,194 a demand that was violently carried out by the next morning 
by constable Duff after the beadle present dismissed the request to remove it the 
afternoon before.  
 
The British were dedicated to maintaining the status quo of the holy sites in Palestine, 
which included furnishing, and the Waqf, who owned the wall, made it a point that 
nothing be added, even chairs.195 Their reasoning behind this was that chairs might turn 
into a wooden bench, which will turn into a stone bench, which will turn into a wall, 
finally resulting in a synagogue being built on the Temple Mount. This event, that may 
have been avoided, or may have just been another note in the long list of disturbances in 
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Jerusalem at the time, led to a public affairs operation by the Jewish and Arab camps 
leading to a bloody summer.   
 
After months of campaigning with the Arabs claiming that Jewish attempts in purchasing 
the wall will lead to the Arabs of Palestine being driven out of their country and the Jews 
claiming that there is no Jewish national home without the Wall. A string of 
demonstrations and violence beginning August 14th 1929 led Harry Charles Luke, the 
deputy commissioner of Palestine, to organise the first Arab-Jewish peace summit on 
August 22nd, 1929.196 He managed to bring together a number of influential Zionists and 
Arabs, highlighted by Yitzhak Ben-Zvi representing the Zionists and Jamal Al-Husseini 
representing the latter.  
 
The meeting was unsuccessful, there was no ceasefire agreed to, not even a simple 
declaration that the two parties met. The meeting was held on a Thursday, all that came 
from it was an agreement to meet the following Monday. The events of the next morning, 
Friday August 23rd, 1929, nullified that agreement.197 That morning saw thousands of 
Arabs marching towards the Temple Mount with sticks and knives, claiming to be a 
measure of self-defence in case the Jews attack.  
 
History has shown that this was not in fact the reason, the tensions over the holy sites had 
climaxed. There was a string of attacks in Jerusalem and more notably in Hebron. The 
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fighting claimed 133 Jewish and 116 Arab lives with many more on both sides injured.198 
Interestingly, Hebron, home to both Jews and Arabs for hundreds of years was a peaceful 
place up until the aggressive Jewish immigration, this was shown in the number of Jews 
who were saved from the clashes that day due to them being protected in Arab 
households. According to the Zionist archives,199 435 Jews were protected in 28 Arab 
houses making up two thirds of the Jewish population at the time. In order to appease 
Jewish supporters, this increase of violence was portrayed as a religious quarrel targeting 
the Jews, becoming the main topic of discussion the World Zionist Conference that year. 
When asked to sign a petition condemning the Arab riots, the founding father of 
psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud refused, stating:  
I do not think Palestine could ever become a Jewish state, nor that the Christian and Islamic 
worlds would ever be prepared to have their holy places under Jewish care. It would have been 
more sensible to me to establish a Jewish homeland on a less historically-burdened land. But I 
know such a rational viewpoint would never gain the enthusiasm of the masses and the financial 
support of the wealthy. I concede with sorrow that the baseless fanaticism of our people is in part 
to be blamed for the awakening of Arab distrust. I can raise no sympathy at all for the misdirected 
piety which transforms a piece of a Herodian wall into a national relic, thereby offending the 
feelings of the natives.200  
 
The Jews blamed the British for the attacks as well, the Arabs remained irked over the 
issues at the wall and the accusations that they mutilated Jewish bodies after killing them 
leading to the exhumation of 20 graves, inconsequentially.201 Although it would hasten 
his relationship with the Jews in Palestine High Commissioner Chancellor, upon his 
return to Palestine after the events, did not view the incident as an attack against Judaism. 
As the two sides continued arguing, the High Commissioner came to the conclusion that 																																																								
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the Balfour Declaration was unfair to the Arabs and acted as an impediment to the British 
Empire’s interests in the region. 
 
Due to the escalating tensions, the British set up the Hope-Simpson commission202 to 
investigate the issues of immigration, land and settlements. The commission’s findings 
resulted in the 1930 Passfield White Paper,203 the first major victory for the Arabs. The 
white paper claimed that the Balfour Declaration must be interpreted in a manner that 
supports not only the Jew’s plea for national home but also the Arab’s plea for 
independence. The main issue touched upon was immigration, in which, the report 
concluded that immigration should be parallel to economic growth and that both the 
Arabs and Jews should benefit from immigration, meaning that Arabs should be included 
in the immigration to Palestine.  
 
Although the resolution was thoroughly discussed in the cabinet and later passed, to the 
pleasure of the British commission in Palestine, it never came to fruition. Weizmann 
worked his diplomatic magic in England and was successful in having it revoked. For the 
Arabs, this was the first step they made in gaining independence. The riots demonstrated 
to the British that, what was once a peaceful region turned violent was directly linked to 
the Zionist endeavours and immigration to the country. The Arabs took issues into their 
own hands and marched, drawing the lesson that armed conflict had led, for the first time, 
to some positive progress for them. 
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The conflict did not end there. The Zionist programme was in full force. While many 
events led to distrust and frustration, the call for violence may have been attributed to a 
dropped barrel. In October of 1935,204 a barrel labelled cement fell and broke at the port 
of Jaffa revealing its content of guns, grenades and ammunition.  
 
The Palestinians now understood the importance of including armed struggle in their 
myriad of strategies to force pressure on the British. It was at this point Al-Qassam led 
his men to Northern Palestine. The al-Qassam revolt was short-lived as he was killed in 
the Ya’bad Forest on November 20th, 1935,205 but the Palestinians gained a martyr and 
heroic symbol. It should be noted that al-Qassam has been used as a signifier of 
resistance for the Palestinians as seen with the military wing of Hamas going by the name 
“The al-Qassam Brigades”. Further, during the Intifada of 1987 in the second 
communiqué of the Intifada, the people resisting were named the “Grandsons of al-
Qassam.”206 
 
There were a number of memorials across the country, from Jerusalem to Haifa, which 
thousands of people attended. Forty days after his death,207 there was a demonstration 
held in Haifa. Three months later in Jaffa two farmers were killed by a Zionist in their 
olive grove leading to a riot in the city. 
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These events led to the call for a general strike on April 20th, 1936208, which was 
supported by the Palestinian political factions the next day. The powers formulated a 
policy of civil resistance and non-cooperation.  
 
In retrospect, the revolt was damaging to the economy and psyche of the people, but the 
Palestinian identity was strengthened during this revolt. It was at this time that the 
kuffiyeh, the Palestinian headscarf made famous by Yasser Arafat, became a symbol of 
Palestinian resistance. The norm at the time was that the Palestinian upper class would 
don a tarboosh while the poor working class would wear the kuffiyeh. As nationalist 
fervour grew, the upper class men were forced to trade in their tarboosh to join the 
masses.209 In similar fashion to the legacy of al-Qassam, the kuffiyeh has withstood the 
test of time and has become the leading Palestinian symbol.  
 
The rival political parties; Al Hizb il Arabi, Hizb al-Difa’, Hizb al-Istiqlal, Al-Kutla, Al-
Islah and Mu’tamar Al-Shabab came together on April 25th, 1936210 and created the Arab 
Higher Committee leading to a continued general strike and a tax revolt to be started on 
May 15th, 1936.211 In the ongoing demonstrations people were killed and arrested, homes 
were demolished and property was confiscated.  
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In September 1936, under Fawz Ed Din Qawuji, the armed groups came together creating 
a unified armed resistance, which at its peak had between 5000-8000 people.212 The 
Palestinians, who have been occupied by the Ottomans and now the British have, for the 
first time, come together to create a unified leadership organisation and military.  
 
The next two years were extremely eventful, the resistance fighters seized a number of 
cities, only to be met with collective punishment by the British authorities, in which they 
would raid whole neighbourhoods as a response. By 1938, the number of British troops in 
Palestine increased from 2,500 to 25,000. Many were killed, by the end of the uprising 
over 5000 people were killed and 10% of the adult male population was imprisoned.213 In 
the collective punishment raids, whole communities were demolished forcing thousands 
to be homeless.  
 
In addition to the bereavements, the revolt obliged the British to pay attention and find a 
solution to the problems in Palestine that would appease the Arabs. This led to the White 
Paper of 1939, dismissing the 1937 Peel Commission calling for the partition of Palestine 
that was vehemently opposed and added fuel to the revolt. Further, the White Paper 
called for limits to Jewish immigration and land purchase, promised a central government 
in 5 years that would be two-thirds Arab and independence within ten years.214 This 
proposal was not only a result of the impending war with Germany, but to the Palestinian 
awakening that took place over the prior decade.  
																																																								
212 Ibid. Pg. 83 
213 Ibid. Pg. 85 
214 Khalidi 2006, op.cit. Pg.114 
		
			 104	
 
In May of 1939, the White Paper as rejected. The reason the rejection was directed at the 
remaining Palestinian guerrilla groups who claimed that they would want all of Palestine 
and not a country ruled by the elites and the British appointed leaders,215 referring to the 
Husseini and Nashashibi clans.  
 
3.5 1945-1948 
After the Second World War the victors came together to create the United Nations, a 
body put in place to prevent a third world war. The United Nations was created on 
October 24th, 1945 with ratification from the United States, Soviet Union, France, United 
Kingdom and China as permanent members of the UN Security Council with the right of 
veto.216 In 1947, the British informed the United Nations that they planned to withdraw 
from Palestine leading to the adoption of UN Resolution 181;217 which Bassam Abu 
Sharif argues “passed by force through the US coercing the banana republics of Central 
and Latin America to support it, passed by a slim margin.”218 
 
When the partition plan was agreed upon the Jews owned less than 7% of the land219 
while making up a third of the population. The Jewish population of Palestine grew 
dramatically throughout the first half of the century but was still heavily outnumbered by 																																																								
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the Arab population. Although the Jews only made up 33% of the population occupying 
7% of the land the United Nations partition plan divided the land 55% to 45% in favour 
of the Jewish population while Jerusalem and Bethlehem would be under UN control.  
After dividing the land, the UN member states failed to implement it, no state was willing 
to provide troops following their losses in the Second World War and ongoing 
commitments in Germany and Japan .220  
 
Soon after the announcement of the partition, the Jewish community began forcefully 
expelling the indigenous Palestinian population from both the 55% promised to the Jews 
and the 45% promised to the Arabs.221 By February of 1948, the Arab-Israeli War started 
when Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and other Arab countries sent 
volunteers to protect their Arab brethren222. By the time war started, the United States 
showed that they had already come to the conclusion that the partition plan was a failure 
and proposed a cease-fire and a five year trusteeship plan which were rejected by both the 
Zionist leaders and the Palestinians223. It was around this time the Zionist Military put 
forth Plan Dalet, a plan to occupy as much Palestinian land as possible before the British 
withdrawal224. 
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Plan Dalet began with Operation Nachshon, a plan put in place to remove the Palestinians 
from the western points of Jerusalem freeing up the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.225 
The Zionists had a strategy to begin Jewish settlements in heavily populated Palestinian 
areas but faced issues of providing supplies to these settlements due to the roadblock by 
the Palestinians. The Zionists also feared that the Jewish settlers might assimilate into the 
society and forget the Zionist plan being that they were mainly Orthodox and Mizrahi, 
both of whom never showed full commitment to the Zionist plan.226 This was the first act 
of Plan Dalet taken by the Hagana, a Jewish military force. The operation was a difficult 
one for the Jewish forces due to the determined forces of Abd al-Qadir al-Husaini, the 
head of the Palestinian resistance, who came to the rescue of the Palestinian villages on 
the Jaffa-Jerusalem road. This opposition came to a halt on April 9th when many villages 
around Jerusalem fell to Jewish forces and Abd al-Qadir al-Husaini was killed. The 
people were distraught by the death of Husaini making the capture of Jerusalem a swift 
one.227 The indiscriminatory raiding of villages by the Hagana, Lehi, in addition to the 
Irgun, who was headed by Menachem Begin, future Prime Minister of Israel,228 came as a 
shock to the British and was too much to handle for the Arabs. 
 
On April 9th, the village of Deir Yassin was attacked by Jewish forces entering the village 
firing indiscriminately into houses and slaughtering and humiliating the whole population 
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in a calculated attack designed to terrorise the Arab population.229 The recollection of 
Fahim Zaydan, who was twelve years old at the time provides the unfortunate reality: 
“They took us out one after the other; shot an old man and when one of his daughters 
cried, she was shot too. They called my brother Muhammad, and shot him in front of us, 
and when my mother yelled, bending over him- carrying my little sister Hudra in her 
hands, still breastfeeding her- they shot her too.”230 
 
For many reasons, April 9th, 1948 marked the beginning of the end for the Palestinians. 
Villages were being uprooted an hour at a time. Plan Dalet was in full force leading to 
Haifa, Acre, Baysan, Safad, Jerusalem and Jaffa. The coastal ethnic cleansing of 
Palestinians lasted approximately a month and a half, and although Jaffa put up fierce 
resistance it was captured by May 13th making way for the end of the British Mandate on 
May 14th. As soon as the British Mandate ended Israel declared independence, a state 
promptly recognised by the President of the United States Harry S. Truman. As soon as 
Israel declared independence they were attacked by the Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.  The fighting continued until armistice agreements were reached 
between Israel and the neighbouring, former Greater Syrian states, Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan giving the Jordanians control of the West Bank and Egypt the Gaza Strip. The 
Arab involvement will be discussed in further detail in a later chapter, but it should be 
noted that the Jordanian offensive did not extend past the West Bank borders and Egypt’s 
involvement was feeble.  
 
The war ended with approximately 700,000 Palestinians expelled and the land of 
Palestine divided amongst Israel, Trans-Jordan and Egypt. The Palestinians were forced 
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into expulsion creating the Palestinian Diaspora. Although the partition plan of 1947 only 
offered the Jews 55% of the land, by the time of the armistice agreement of 1949, they 
were able to occupy 78% of the land. 
 
Figure 2: Provided by PASSIA231 
3.6 The New Palestinian Reality 
The 1948 Arab-Israeli war had two outcomes, first, in the eyes of the colonisers; a rise 
from the ashes of Auschwitz to a sense of freedom, safety and independence. Next, as 																																																								
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seen in the eyes of the colonised was the shock of forceful expulsion and the 
dispossession of life in its entirety. Thus, as put forth by Palestinian academic Edward 
Said, comes the crossroads of the Palestinian identity in which he states: “The 
Palestinians are a people who move a lot, who are always carrying bags from one place to 
another. This gives us a further sense of identity.”232 Ironically, while the dispossessed 
were generally within 100 kilometres of their homeland, this sense of closeness, while at 
arm’s length, seasoned into an ongoing sense of tragedy evoked by the torturous reality 
of dispossession and the forbidden right of return.  
 
According to the United Nations, 900,000 Palestinians were dispossessed in 1948, some 
remaining within Palestine in the Gaza Strip and West Bank while the rest were forced to 
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Within a year, the United Nations called for the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees through resolution 194 and set up the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency-233 a temporary agency set up to curtail the Palestinian refugee 
problem. Although UNRWA does an admirable job the Palestinians were forced into the 
shameful being of becoming, as Noam Chomsky words it, a “Schnorrer Society;”234 a 
Yiddish term describing a society forced to live on charity. The concept of Karameh, 
Arabic for dignity,235 has, throughout time, been an essential determinant in the makeup 																																																								
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of the Arab psyche. Contrary to popular belief, as addressed by former UNRWA 
Commissioner-General John Davis, the Palestinians do not prefer charity rather than 
working for a living.236 The exact losses will never be quantified, but this population who 
once lived on vast agricultural lands, in a vibrant society have been belittled to living on 
7 cents a day of charity.237 The refugees may not have had money or a home, but they did 
hold on to the hope that they would soon be returning to their homeland, not knowing 
that those who remained were not much better off.  
 
While Chairman of the Zionist Organisation in Palestine, David Ben-Gurion promised the 
following: “We will treat our Arab and non-Jewish neighbors as if they were Jews, but 
make every effort to ensure that they preserve their characteristics, their Arab culture, 
their Arab religion, their Arab way of life, while doing our utmost… gradually to raise 
their standard of living.”238 After the establishment of the state of Israel, nearly 170,000 
Arabs remained in occupied Palestine, if broken down by the different “Arab religions”, 
as Ben-Gurion attested, would amount to 120,000 Muslims, 35,000 Christians and 15,000 
Druze. According to the former Mayor of Nazareth, in 1948, the average Arab village 
was 16,500 dunums, by 1974- this was down to 5000 dunums to each village (Per capita 
went from 16 dunums per head to one dunum per head in the same time period). 
Although Israel lauds itself as the only democracy in the Middle East, empowering the 
Arab minority by allowing them to stand for election in the Knesset, the reality is that the 
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Arab-Israelis have been allowed to live, but not live equally. Starting in 1949, the Arab 
population faced martial law for 18 years. 239  Although martial law has been lifted, 
Adalah, 240  the legal centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, posits that there are 
currently 50 Israeli laws that discriminate against the Arab minority. These laws and 
practices deny Arabs in Israel equal employment, access to adequate water and 
electricity, education as well as cultural and religious freedoms.241 
 
This reality of expulsion, dispossession and discrimination left the Palestinians with no 
sense of belonging and a revolting sense of confusion. Afif Safieh defines this tragedy 
claiming that; “Palestinians have become the Jews of the Jews and we never wanted them 
to become the Palestinians of the Palestinians.”242 The Palestinian people were cut off 
from the world, their homes, families and with this, themselves. This situation ushered in, 
what Palestinian intellectual Ibrahim Abu-Lughod referred to as the “politics of 
accommodation”.243 With the population forced to living as refugees in surrounding Arab 
countries, or living under Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian occupation the Palestinians 
were forced to assimilate to their new surroundings. In the decade following the Nakba, 
the Palestinian national consciousness was silenced and their sense of national identity 
lost.   
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As noted beforehand by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, the Palestinian people were in the process 
of acclimatising to their new surroundings, struggling to belong. Although, disregarding 
those who now live in the state of Israel, the refugees found themselves in a country that 
shares the same language, albeit a different dialect, the same culture, the same food and 
generally the same religion, even with all these similarities the Palestinians were 
dissatisfied with their new surroundings.  
Bassam Abu Sharif, who made it clear that to him the Palestinian identity will always be 
an Arab identity, argues that the Nakba in fact made the Palestinian identity more 
focused, the only difference is that for the Palestinians, their national identity has become 
a political identity claiming:  
Now we are moving to another angle, when you talk about 1948 this is another angle of looking at 
the term identity. In this case the identity is not the identity which is defined by Webster’s. In this 
case it has a certain political meaning, not a meaning driven by roots, the political meaning is that 
the Palestinians have never enjoyed independence as promised by the victors of the world war and 
the mandatory part of the UN which Great Britain represented…This led to a catastrophe to the 
Palestinians on all levels, political, human, social, they turned the Palestinians into refugees and 
put them into refugee camps….With all these catastrophes, and all this suffering, the Palestinians 
did not lose their identity. What happened in 1948 did not erase the identity of the Palestinians, not 
at all, it actually concentrated their identity more than anything. Arabs of Palestine, the identity is 
Arabs of Palestine.244  
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Chapter 4: Pan-Arabism and the Palestinians 
In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser and the group of officers had their revolution and started a 
completely different line which is the Pan-Arab line calling for the liberation of Palestine, in Syria 
too, in Iraq too. In these countries the change was due to the realization of certain officers who 
participated in the so-called Arab experience in 1948 and saw with their own eyes the treason of 
their kings and rulers of the time. They revolted in order to change the political line and liberate 
Palestine. Once more, even though there were political repercussions and repercussions on the 
identity, here, it was the dislodging of the Palestinians and turning them into refugees in Arab 
countries. It never wavered the fact that we are Palestinian Arabs.245  
 
According to a report released by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Human Affairs more Palestinians were killed by Israel in 2014 than at any time since 
1967.246 While the Palestinians remain cynical, they hoped that 2015 would not bring 
similar pains to the year that passed. Unfortunately for them this optimism was short 
lived as on January 2nd, 2015 Zaki al-Hobi, 16, was killed in Rafah trying to cross the 
Gaza-Sinai border. Israeli forces were not responsible for the death of al-Hobi; the first 
Palestinian to be killed in 2015 lost his life at the hands of an Egyptian soldier.247 While 
Egypt denied responsibility, the issue at hand was not so much in the validity of the claim 
but in the idea that the Palestinians and Egyptians, fellow Arabs, have endured decades of 
mistrust. The 2014 Gaza war was catastrophic for the Palestinians being one of the 
largest assaults Israeli forces have undertaken against the besieged strip. While it is 
understood that the war was between Israel and Hamas, the destruction the Palestinians 
faced can be partially attributed to the negative positions taken by the Egyptian 
government.  
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Egypt, once the leaders of the Arab world and drivers of Pan-Arabism under President 
Sisi, have continued to contribute to the collective punishment of nearly 2 million 
Palestinians in Gaza. During the war, there were a number of efforts by Egyptians to 
support those in Gaza, only to be turned away at the border by Egyptian border security. 
According to Salma Said, an Egyptian activist who attempted to bring medical supplies 
into the strip before being turned away, “They do not want Egyptians to show support for 
Palestinians. They want to make sure that this siege and this isolation continues.”248 From 
January 1st, 2015 until the end of May 2015, the border between Gaza and Egypt was 
open for only 5 days249 and by the anniversary of the conflict on July 8th, 2015, not one of 
12,580 houses that were destroyed in the conflict has been rebuilt.250 While Israel is 
complicit, it is Egypt’s role in denying the Gaza strip of resources and necessities that has 
grown to be more unsettling to the Palestinians.  
 
This has served, in part, to impede more fruitful bilateral relations. Egyptians may point 
to the tension in the Sinai or Hamas’ affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood251 while the 
Palestinians might point to the above-mentioned events and the rule of President Sisi. In 
actuality, the wariness between the two parties is not a new phenomenon, neither is the 
mistrust amongst many Arab countries. The resentment by Arab governments towards 
one another may be justified, a country like Lebanon has had to home hundreds of 
thousands of refugees, both Palestinian and Syrian, has faced decades of occupation by 																																																								
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both Israel and Syria and a civil war that may flare up again at any moment. Whether or 
not the resentment is justified, the Palestinians faced tumultuous times, at the hands of 
Israel, their fellow Arabs and their own personal mismanagement of affairs. While 
modern national divisions exist, during the first half of the 20th century there was constant 
discussion about uniting the Arab world in response to the colonial pressures that sought 
to divide the region.  
 
This chapter sets out to demonstrate that, while the concept of Pan-Arabism has historical 
leverage as well as economic, cultural and security benefits it has not seen much success 
since late Egyptian President Nasser. Palestinian mistrust towards Arab governments is 
not a new phenomenon but one that began developing soon after the Nakba and is an 
essential component of determining Palestinian identity. 
4.1 Pan-Arabism: Historical Overview 
The Ottoman Empire reigned over large parts of the Middle East and North Africa for 
nearly seven centuries. By the end of the 17th century, the cities of Mecca, Medina, 
Jerusalem, Cairo, Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli, Baghdad and Damascus were under Turkish 
rule. While the populations of these cities were majority Muslim, thus similar to the 
Turks in the sense that they were all part of the Muslim Ummah, the territory between the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf was, and still is, dominated by the Arabic language 
and religious diversity. This is due, in part, to the administrative structure and strategy of 
the Ottomans via the sense of autonomy given to the Vilayets mentioned in Chapter 3. 
This domination of Arabic stems back, arguably, to the father of the Arab nation himself, 
the Prophet Muhammad. The deliverance of Islam and its growth, particularly within the 
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timeframe of the first two caliphates (632-1031), saw the language of the Hijaz (Modern-
day Saudi Arabia) and the Arabic religion spread as far east as Kabul (Modern-day 
Afghanistan) and as far west and north as Andalucía (Modern-day Spain). 
It was during the 1800s, within the Ottoman administration that the concept of modern 
Arabism began to develop. E. G. H. Joffé, in his article titled “Arab Nationalism and 
Palestine”252 published in 1983, referenced three different loyalties that were essential in 
developing consciousness in the Arab and Muslim world: the Ummah, which defines the 
Muslim World, the Watan, the homeland, referencing a patriotic and/or territorial 
connection and the Quam, the tribe or family, in relation to language and ethnicity.253 The 
manner in which Joffé has differentiated between loyalties is essential in this thesis as it 
breaks down the three different loyalties in the region and their influence on Palestinian 
identity. According to a survey conducted by Professor Shibley Telhami with the 
University of Maryland and Zogby International for the Saban Centre at Brookings only 
22% of Palestinians in Israel identify Palestinian as their most important identity, 36% as 
Arab and 19% as Muslim. Furthermore, over half of the Christian respondents identify 
themselves as Arab first with only 9% who identify as Christian and 15% as Palestinian. 
On the other hand, 34% of the Muslim respondents identify as Arab first, Muslim second 
at 27% and finally Palestinian at 24%.254 Of course this survey has its own shortcomings, 
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based on territory and history, but this shows that the differentiation between the Ummah, 
Quam and Watan still exists in certain Arab/Palestinian societies.  
 
While the Ummah was generally connected under the caliphate, there were stirrings of 
nationalism beginning to brew in Egypt, led, in part by, Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, better 
known as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897). Al-Afghani led this movement until he 
was exiled from Egypt to India for his national aspirations, only to end up in Paris. While 
in Paris, after gaining a better understanding of the manner in which Europe has 
developed its nation-state system he began an organisation named Urwah al-Wuthqa 
(The Indissoluble Bond).255 It was here that al-Afghani shifted from being Watani, as was 
the case in Egypt, to understanding the importance of Muslim unity.  
Al-Afghani believed that Islam needed to not only be a cultural tool but a political 
ideology to confront European expansion. While there was a Pan-Islamic society under 
the Ottomans and the Ummah was naturally multicultural, he called for the return to the 
original purity of Islam, in essence, an Arabic Islam.256  This notion, which may be 
attributed to Smith’s concept of recurrent perennialism; in which a nation may come and 
go but the core, in this case, reverting the Muslim Ummah to its Arab roots, in al-
Afghani’s views will strengthen the nation itself. While it is viewed as a reversion, the 
reversion in itself is a reconstruction in order to face the internal and external threats at 
hand. Although this idea may in fact strengthen the Ummah, its classical mandate faces 
difficulty in defining who exactly fits within it. The paradox at hand is that the concept of 																																																								
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the Ummah was initially meant to be broad and all-encompassing, but the rise of 
nationalism and the multi-ethnic, multi-faith nature of the region make it difficult to 
apply this theory, and or ideology, to the broader Arab-speaking world. The questions 
surrounding Anderson’s theory pertaining to vernacular is essential here, did the Ummah 
constitute an overarching religious affiliation or did it simply extend to Arabic speaking 
peoples across the empire? At this time, the Ummah itself was not under Arab control, 
allowing the Arab roots of Islam to be used as a tool to separate the Quam from the 
Ummah. 
With that said, Islam provided a unifying tool in the Arab world, for Christians and 
Muslims alike. One leader in Pan-Arab thought at the time was Lebanese born 
Muhammad Rashid Rida. Rida, in his periodical Al-Manar viewed the revival of Islamic 
unity as a task driven by Arab history, arguing that: “The basis of this union is Islam 
itself, and Islam is none other than the book of God Almighty, and the Sunna of his 
Prophet- prayer and peace be upon Him. Both are in Arabic. No one can understand them 
properly unless he understands their noble language.”257 The importance of Rida’s work 
lies in the fact that, while Muslim, the history of Islam was projected as an Arab history, 
this inclusivity allowed for both Muslims and Christians to join under a glorified Arab 
history.   
Moreover, another founding father of contemporary Arab nationalism and a major 
influence on PFLP founder George Habash was Qustantin Zuraiq. Qustantin, originally 
from Damascus, was a professor at the American University of Beirut and although 
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Christian viewed the Prophet Muhammad as a “national hero”258 citing the importance of 
the Prophets’ capability to unite a number of tribes spanning across a vast land under one 
eastern language. Qustantin viewed Zionism as a threat, not only to Palestine, but the 
whole Arab world and the only manner that Palestine may be liberated was through the 
strengthening of Arab unity.259 He advanced the view that Palestine was lost not due to 
the failure of the Arab people, but a failure of Arab regimes. This idea remained 
prevalent amongst both the PFLP and Fatah for the decade that followed the Nakba. 
Additionally, Sati al-Husri, although a Muslim, argued for Arab unity rather than Islamic 
unity. While Qustantin praised Islamic history, al-Husri viewed Islam and Arabism as 
two separate but important factions. He did agree with the concept that Islam can be used 
as a basis for Arab nationalism but due to Islam’s broad nature, in the sense that it spread 
amongst a number of ethnicities, similar to Christianity, it should not be used to 
complement nationalism.260 Al-Husri further explains nationalism in a manner integral to 
the case at hand. He defines the nation through four determinants, two being common 
language and common history, which is usual to the definition of nationalism. What 
differs with al-Husri’s definition is the addition of political stability, which can only be 
fulfilled through territorial patriotism and loyalty. This encompasses the ethnic factors of 
a nation, but also takes into account the political influence. With regard to the ideologies 
of Pan-Arabism, this allows one to differ between the Quam and the Watan, with the 
former representing the people of a broader nation and the latter those who are connected 																																																								
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through its pledge to a distinct homeland.  
This difference amongst the two played a vital role in the development of nations and 
nationalism in the Arab world. While there is a long history exploring the surge of 
nationalism in the region, for the purpose of this research, it is the events post World War 
One that are most pertinent. When applied to the theories of nationalism, one can argue 
for the Ummah, Watan and Quam but it is partially this irredentism that has repressed the 
advancement of the Arab nation. At the end of the First World War, the Ummah lost its 
control of the Orient, the Watan was colonised and lines in the sand drawn by the British 
and the French were dividing the Quam. At this time the tide was changing in the Arab 
world and the first thought was to unite, as Arabs, against their colonial occupiers. As 
discussed in the historical framework, it was at this time that the British began to make 
empty promises to Sharif Husain of Mecca. Nevertheless, whichever way they are 
examined or theorised, all three concepts explored may be applied to the share of 
classical theories. 
Starting with Anthony Smith’s definition developed on the premise of ethnosymbolism: 
“a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a 
common public culture and common laws and customs.”261 The Ummah, when defined 
under the parameters of the caliphate, arguably contain all of Smith’s determinants of a 
nation, with the Quran and Sharia law defining the universal laws and customs. When 
examining the Quam, things may get a little trickier when exploring the legal and cultural 
factors. While all Arabic countries do share a language, the customs within society may 
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differ drastically when comparing, for example, Morocco, Lebanon and Yemen. Further, 
while the region is predominantly Muslim, local authorities, then and now, implement 
certain Islamic law more rigorously than others whose society may be multi-faith or 
secular. Finally, regardless of the functionality of the theory, until the Western world as 
well as the “rich” Arab states cease their control over the whole region it will be difficult 
to exactly define where the Arab or Palestinian identity will cement itself. The apolitical 
nature of Smith’s theory will continue to benefit history and the initial development of 
nations but is unsatisfactory when applied to the modern day. The other classical view on 
nationalism provided by Ernest Gellner, which may be viewed as modern, also disregards 
political consequence, as it defines the nation based on development and conforming to 
the Western state system. 
 
Ernest Gellner argues that one who controls the division of labour controls society and 
hence the nation. As Gellner has claimed, all he is interested in is “half the story”,262 as 
the world becomes more and more industrial a society must develop accordingly. 
Gellner’s theory is seminal, but not uniform, when it comes to the Arab world, 
realistically it is difficult to place where the story starts.  When speaking of the West, it is 
easy to start the story at The Concert of Europe or completely disregard the colonisation 
of North America to create the American nations, but the same cannot be said for the 
Arab world. Since most countries have only experienced half a century, give or take, of 
independence during which time the United States has intervened and controlled the 
trajectory of growth in the Arab world it may be argued that the Arab national story has 
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yet to begin. Finally, the concept of the division of labour allows the ruler, whether or not 
they are representative of the people, to justify their control of the “nation” in question. 
When the Ottomans controlled the whole Arab world, they controlled the division of 
labour and people were Ottoman Citizens but the national identity of the people was 
constantly in question, the same goes for the Arab citizens of Israel, while some may 
claim that they are Israeli a number will define themselves as Arab and/or Palestinian- 
Saban’s aforementioned lecture finds that only 12% of the Arab/Palestinians surveyed 
identified as Israeli first. 
 
Although Gellner’s theory is highly predicated on the Western state system and has been 
criticised throughout most of this thesis, it does hold influence, this influence will be 
explored further later in this chapter when analysing Pan-Arabism under Nasser. That is 
not to say that the Ummah or the Quam, do not hold leverage, as Arabs are connected, 
ethnically, spiritually and politically, the make-up of the region presently is driven by 
divisions, rather than similarities. While there were a number of thinkers, actors and 
developments in Arab nationalism, Rashid Khalidi, referencing Hobsbawm, argues that 
the concept in itself is an invented tradition. Khalidi states that:  
“The idea was widespread throughout the "Arab world" (itself a concept born of the rise of Arab 
nationalism) that anyone who spoke Arabic, looked back on the history of the Arabs with pride, 
and considered himself or herself to be an Arab was one, and that this sense of shared identity 
should in some measure find political expression.”263  
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The gap between political reality and idealism is substantial, the leading governments of 
Arab countries to do what is best for their national interest, sometimes at the expense of 
their Arab neighbours.  
 
Before exploring the concept of the Watan, which is arguably the most important of the 
three to the Palestinian cause it is essential to survey the concept of the Quam in further 
detail. Before the Palestinians began their liberation process there were a number of 
prevalent ideologies that had direct impact on the Palestinian cause throughout the 
Mandate Period and the years following the Nakba. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, 
although many Arabs believed in the idea of the Quam, their governments made life very 
difficult for the Palestinians since the Nakba. This unsurprisingly hindered the sincerity 
of the concept.  
 
The period explored in this chapter, focusing on the rise of Pan-Arabism leading to the 
next chapter discerning the refugee problem encapsulated what Abu-Lughod referred to 
as the first stage of Palestinian nationalism; “The politics of accommodation”. The 
Palestinians spent a decade adapting to their new surroundings and harsh reality, in the 
process, losing their national consciousness and identity. By ways of making the 
Palestinian conflict an Arab one, the idea that the Palestinians must identify as Arabs 
first, thus do not have, nor need, a national home or identity was strengthened.  
 
Contemporary thought provides for the notion that identity, at least in the modern day, is 
generally a construct. Guibernau contends that one will construct his or her own identity 
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by being excluded from or rejecting the collectiveness of identity from a more dominant 
group.  In this case, the more dominant group was the Arabs, be it the Egyptians, 
Jordanians or Syrians. All three countries played major roles in shaping the Palestinian 
narrative post-1948. It is understandable that there would be dominance geopolitically, as 
the Palestinians did not have an organisation that would be able to speak for them at that 
moment.  
 
After the unilateral declaration of independence by Israel on the 15th of May 1948, 
months into the war, the UN made one last effort to salvage a peace between the 
Palestinians and Israel led by French war hero, Count Folke Bernadotte. The plan laid out 
was a revival of the 1947 partition of Palestine, with concessions made by both sides. For 
Arab recognition of the Jewish state, the Arabs would receive the West Bank, Gaza and 
the Negev while Israel would retain Galilee leaving Jerusalem under an international 
mandate.264 In hindsight, if the Palestinians knew what the end-result would have been, 
they may have been more inclined to accept this offer. The trouble with Bernadotte’s plan 
was not only the annexation of Arab land by the Jewish state, but the request that the 
Arab land be annexed to the newly founded Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.265 Israel 
disapproved of the plan, as did Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia leaving 
Jordan to be the only one to consider it.266 The plan did not come to fruition and the day 
after the proposal was submitted Jewish extremists in Jerusalem assassinated Bernadotte, 
as well as UN observer Colonel Andre Serot who incidentally rode with Bernadotte in 																																																								
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order to thank him for saving his wife from a Nazi concentration camp. 267  In 
contradiction to the Bernadotte plan, just days before he was assassinated, the Arab 
League was drawing up its own plan for a unilateral declaration of independence.  
 
Soon after the creation of the State of Israel, the Arab League passed a resolution to 
create an All-Palestine Government (Hukumat ‘Umum Filastin),268 named to disregard 
the partition of Palestine. Tasked with creating the government was the leader of the Arab 
Higher Committee, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini. On September 22nd, 1948 they released the 
following statement: “The residents of Palestine, by virtue of their right to self-
determination, and in accordance with the decisions of the Arab League, have decided to 
declare the whole of Palestine… an independent state.”269 The new government was 
attempting to organise a national council in Gaza while in the West Bank King Abdullah 
of Jordan was rallying Palestinian nobles to oppose the Egyptian influenced All-Palestine 
Government in order to create a rival government. Whereas Israel was consolidating her 
position by appropriating as much land as possible, a Palestinian Government was set up, 
under the directive of the League of Arab States and ultimately the Egyptians in Gaza 
while at the same time a Palestinian Congress was established, under the directive of 
King Abdullah, in the West Bank.270 Both the government and the congress were set up 
as tools that would allow Egypt and Jordan to control what was left of Arab-Palestine 
with support from some Palestinian elites and feudalists. 																																																								
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Within the year of both symbolic meetings, Israel signed an Armistice Agreement with 
Egypt (February 24th, 1949), Lebanon (March 23rd, 1949), Jordan (April 3rd, 1949) and 
Syria (July 20th, 1949). 271  Jordan successfully annexed the West Bank, Egypt 
successfully annexed the Gaza Strip and the next 15-years were dominated by attempts at 
Arab unity and political football with the question of Palestine. 
4.2 Contemporary Pan-Arabism: The Syrian Social National Party, Baath and 
Nasser 
In 2004, Palestinian author Said K. Aburish published a biography about late Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser titled The Last Arab.272 The title references the popular 
sentiment towards Nasser throughout the region, while there may have been flare-ups 
under Nasser’s rule and things were not always stable, there remained a belief that Nasser 
truly believed in himself as an Arab, before being an Egyptian. This thesis has spent a lot 
of time highlighting the perils that accompanied Pan-Arabism, but politics aside, when 
exploring Pan-Arabism, as a theory, it provides for a number of benefits to the Arab 
world and the Palestinians. Prior to surveying the plight of the Palestinians in the face of 
the Arab world, this section will analyse three dominant trains of thoughts prevalent in 
the contemporary Pan-Arab discussion; the policies of the Syrian Social National Party, 
the Baath and Nasserism. 
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4.2.1 The Syrian Social National Party 
Antun Saadeh founded the Syrian National Party in 1932, changing the name in 1947 to 
SSNP to comprise the concept of “social nationalism”.273 After the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the colonisation of the region by France and Great Britain, by way of the 
Sykes-Picot agreement, Saadeh called for the reunification of the Syrian homeland 
through geographical unity. This allowed him to extend the Syrian state to encompass not 
only Greater Syria (Modern day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine and a part of 
Turkey) into his nation but the Island of Cyprus, the Sinai Peninsula and Iraq as well.274 
His nation, while majority Arab was not directly connected to the neighbouring Arab 
states, as, according to Saadeh, the Syrian people are not Arab, but are comprised of the 
Canaanites, Phoenicians, Acadians, Amorites, Hittites, Assyrians and the Babylonians.275 
When discounting the inclusion of Cyprus into the SSNP’s “national boundaries”, it may 
be argued, due to the recent division of Greater Syria, that the grounds of Saadeh’s view 
had plausibility as well as authenticity. Regardless of the events at hand and the 
importance of creating a “Jewish State”, before multiculturalism became a staple of the 
Americas, Syria enjoyed its own version of multiculturalism, albeit with Arabic as the 
chief language and Islam as the predominant religion.  
 
Although the premise of the SSNP was to revert to the pre-colonial landscape allowing 
the reunification of Greater Syria, in common with almost all national movements, its 
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agenda was a political one. Irrespective of their national history, a history that Saadeh 
spent his time in exile (1938-1947) uncovering, penning a collection of articles 
explaining Syria’s historic literature and archaeology,276  his hopes were not without 
motive. His fascistic ideology, with the general idea that the Syrian bloodline is all-
powerful, a very Volkish type attitude,277  made for a party that has not seen much 
political success since the end of the World War. While not the most pragmatic, Saadeh 
was a Syrian nationalist and the views he held, he argues were original, as stated in a 
1935 speech: “On this occasion I declare that the system (nizam) of the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party is not a Hitlerite or a Fascist system, but that it is purely a Syrian 
system, which does not stand on unprofitable imitation, but on basic originality, which is 
one of the characteristics of our people.” 278 When it comes to the Palestinian cause, 
while the SSNP has always held a staunch opposition to Zionism their ideology has 
forced them to act as a barrier to an independent Palestinian identity. Palestine, or 
Southern Syria, was a problem, not for the Arab world or the Palestinian people but for 
the Syrian nation. This was not an attack on the Palestinian people but a genuine call to 
reunite the Syrian nation. Even while this study was being conducted, when discussing 
Palestinian identity with members of the SSNP, the initial opinion was on analysing the 
united Syrian nation rather than focusing on an independent Palestinian nation.   
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Saadeh presented two approaches to the Palestinian question, one being generalist and the 
other isolationist. 279  The generalist approach placed the responsibility of liberating 
Palestine on the shoulders of all Arab states with the latter considering the issue to be one 
that must be resolved by the Palestinians themselves. Obviously, Saadeh’s approach 
differed from the aforementioned, providing that the Arab world may support the Syrians 
in liberating Palestine, to be a part of Greater Syria, as long as they do not interfere with 
the national will of all of Syria and that the future of Palestine would legally be 
determined by Damascus.280 Saadeh’s claim, which came within only two decades of 
Sykes-Picot was naturally popular amongst those of Greater Syria. Although the claim 
and attachment to Greater Syria is still prominent in Syria and Lebanon, the Palestinians 
grew to be steadfast in wanting to control their own destiny. 
 
To reiterate, Saadeh and the SSNP were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, something 
Saadeh echoed to the crowd when he returned to an independent Lebanon in 1947, 
appealing to his supporters: 
Our struggle is continuing and you must never allow yourselves to forget that Palestine is part of 
Syria. This southern wing remains, as you know, mortally threatened. The Social Nationalists are 
determined to save Palestine from Jewish designs and their collaborators…Saving Palestine is the 
most Lebanese of enterprises, just as it is a core matter for hinterland Syria, as well as, of course, a 
core matter for the Palestinians. The Jewish threat to Palestine is a threat to the whole of Syria, a 
threat to all its entities.281 
 
The Palestinians remain sceptical of views such as these, not due to the authenticity of the 
call but due to the reality at hand. Soon after Saadeh celebrated Lebanon’s independence, 
Syria celebrated theirs. It remains that these parties who call for a Pan-Arab nation or in 																																																								
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this case a Pan-Syrian nation, do so with the luxury of independence and self-
determination. It was at this time another political party who called for a Greater Syria 
began its growth, a party that history has shown itself to be more successful and powerful 
than the SSNP. 
4.2.2 The Baath Party 
Founded in 1940 by Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, the Baath party’s ideology 
promoted the abolishment of the Arab states in order to develop one Pan-Arab state 
reflecting the direct conditions of diversity in Syria.282 The socialist system carved out a 
permanent role for minorities as Arabs, with Islam serving their culture. While both the 
Baath and the SSNP recruited their membership from the same pool and generally agreed 
on most issues, both developed on secular and social beliefs, there was an evident split on 
the concept of the Arab nation and the Syrian nation. Further, the SSNP was not active, 
nor willing, to accommodate the Sunni Muslim community, even though they made up 
the majority of the people in the region. Saadeh argued that Islam was a manifestation of 
Christianity283 and what he called “Muhammadanism”284 while, in comparison, Aflaq 
echoed the sentiments of Qustantin, referring to the prophet as a national hero. The 
argument that Islam was the overarching culture for all Arabs regardless of creed was 
ever important given the Sunni majority of Syria. Saadeh’s views may have 
disenfranchised the Muslim population, causing for the lack of substantial growth 
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initially for the SSNP. On the other hand, the Baath were able to ride the popularity of 
Nasser in Egypt in the late 1950s to gain a stranglehold on Syrian and Iraqi politics.  
The Baath influence on the Palestinian question began gaining leverage after their 1963 
revolution in Syria. Most prevalent through their involvement, as will be discussed later 
in this and subsequent chapters, in the 1967 war, their role in Black September of 1970 
and the 1976 Tel el Zaa’tar Camp Massacre.  
4.2.3 Nasserism 
Since their 1967 conquest, the state of Israel has made it a strategic and security priority 
to gain control of water and energy resources as well as security barriers from their 
neighbouring territories.285 It is the management and mismanagement of securing these 
resources that contributed to the rise and fall of Pan-Arabism. As a result, it also shaped 
the rise of President Gamal Abdel Nasser as well as what would ultimately be his demise 
as “King of the Arabs”. In spite of the numerous political ideologies, parties and figures 
that dominated the Arab world at the time, none were more popular, polarising and 
powerful as President Nasser. Prior to assuming the Presidency of Egypt, Nasser served 
as a young military officer fighting in the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. In 1959, Nasser 
penned a recollection of the events that led up to the 1952 Egyptian revolution. In 
reference to the Arab-Israeli war, Nasser stated: “When the Palestine crisis loomed on the 
horizon I was firmly convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign 
territory. Nor was it inspired by sentiment. It was a duty imposed by self-defence.” 286 It 
is this attachment to fellow Arabs and the idea that, according to Nasser, “Rafah was not 																																																								
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the last boundary of our country”287, that fuelled the Arab fighters who rushed to defend a 
territory they had never before seen. Nasser defined this enthusiasm as follows: 
The Arab nations entered the Palestine war with the same degree of enthusiasm. They all shared the 
same feelings and knew quite well the limits of their security. They came out the war with the same 
bitterness and frustration. Every one of them was thus exposed, in its own country, to the same 
factors and was governed by the same forces, that caused their defeat and made them bow their 
heads low with shame and humiliation.288 
 
According to Farid Ayad, former President of the Canadian Arab Federation, the 
weapons provided to the Egyptian soldiers would backfire and explode in their hands.289 
Bassam Abu Sharif also credits the uprisings in the Middle East, namely Egypt, to the 
1948 war, stating: 
Anyways, due to 1948 there were repercussions in several Arab countries. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and the group of officers had their revolution and started a completely different line which 
is the Pan-Arab line calling for the liberation of Palestine, in Syria too, in Iraq too. In these 
countries the change was due to the realization of certain officers who participated in the so-called 
Arab experience in 1948 and saw with their own eyes the treason of their kings and rulers of the 
time. They revolted in order to change the political line and liberate Palestine.290  
 
 While the Arab world, outside of Palestine, was slowly gaining separate independence, it 
was a quasi-independence controlled and defined by the colonial supremacy of the British 
and the French.  
 
It would be useful to return to Gellner’s concept of high versus low-cultured societies. A 
country still bound by its colonial overseers will find tremendous difficulty in developing 
itself into a high-society. Nasser understood this and his handling of the Suez Canal was 
Egypt’s first step towards maturing as a country that by Gellner’s standards should be 
welcome into the league of powerful nations. Nasser’s actions were not well received by 																																																								
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the United Kingdom, France and Israel, all of whom had economic/strategic interests and 
therefore colluded.291 Dr. Ayad described Nasser’s plan as follows: 
From the moment he became President of Egypt he made it his job to rid the Arab world from 
European colonization (sic). He drove the British backed King Faruq from Egypt then supported the 
Algerians in their revolution against the French occupiers. But it was when Nasser drove the British 
troops out of Egypt and nationalized (sic) the Suez Canal that the Arab dream began to come into 
fruition.292 
 
Nasser’s nationalisation of the canal came after the World Bank’s withdrawal, at the 
request of the United States, of a $200 million loan to fund the development of the high 
dam in the Nile in order to support Egypt’s growing population. When Gellner spoke of 
the development of a high culture, he stressed the importance of industrialisation of a 
nation in order for it to develop. According to this theory, the nationalisation of the Canal 
and the building of the high dam in Aswan was an attempt by Nasser to help assert 
Egypt’s status as an independent nation with its own unimpeded high culture. 
 
The Western world has generally been highly successful in imposing its interests on the 
Middle East, to the extent that there was a widespread understanding that the Arabs were 
not able to control their own political destiny, as explained in the first chapter of this 
thesis. The Arabs were portrayed as tribal men, hot-blooded, generally positioned next to 
a camel or herd of sheep and as Said summarised Balfour’s 1910 speech, “England 
knows Egypt…England knows that Egypt can’t have self-government.” In Nasser, the 
states of the West had met their match, in an Arab statesman. Samy Sharaf, Nasser’s 
Information Secretary in a 2006 BBC documentary described him as: “A politician, a real 
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politician, and a politician with a view, a political, economic, social view, a global 
view.”293 Traits not expected of an Arab leader.  
 
When Anthony Eden, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, who was soon to be Prime Minister, 
met Nasser in Cairo in 1955, his approach may have weakened relations between the two 
countries. Eden arrived in Cairo to attempt to persuade Nasser, one of the founders of the 
non-aligned movement, to join the Baghdad Pact against the Soviet Union. Nasser was 
displeased, not only at the request to betray his allies who agreed to remain neutral in the 
Cold War when Egypt’s real extraterritorial threat was not the Soviets who were 
thousands of miles away, but Israel, who share a border with Egypt. What shocked Eden, 
according to his wife, was the fact that Nasser felt insulted that he was not informed that 
it was a black-tie engagement and that it was set in the grandeur of the British 
Embassy.294 Nasser was a statesman, a leader of not only a country, but of a people and 
an ideology and although he was the recognised President of Egypt, Conservative MPs in 
the UK would reference him as “Colonel Nasser”, or when portrayed in a less-polite 
manner, as “Dictator Nasser”.295 Not only was Nasser disrespected as the leader of a 
sovereign state, his country was also belittled when it attempted to become self-sufficient 
by nationalising the Suez Canal. Britain, France and Israel, unbeknownst to the United 
States, colluded in an effort to re-occupy Egypt because of the nationalisation. The three 
powers were obliged to withdraw on US instructions following threats of Soviet 
involvement resulting in victory for Nasser. Egypt’s stance in the Suez Crisis propelled 																																																								
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Nasser to king-like standing in the Arab world and more importantly as a man who was 
to be taken seriously in the Western world.  
 
Pan-Arab fervour was at an all-time high, for it was coming off a victory rather than a 
reactionary idea in response to a national setback. Soon after the crisis, after years of 
Syrian pressure, Egypt agreed to a political union, creating the United Arab Republic 
(UAR).296 Although it was intellectuals, such as Husri, who initially drove the concept of 
Arab Unity, they greeted the union with scepticism, citing economic, cultural and 
geographical boundaries.297 While the intellectuals were not far off, being that the UAR 
only lasted three years and the Arab Federation (between Iraq and Jordan) dissolved after 
six months, culture and economics were not the decisive factor; cultural similarities were 
outweighed by the idea of power and politics, with Nasser’s popularity and personality 
playing a key role and resisting any form of Syrian control over Egypt. Nasser made it 
very clear that in order for him to agree to the unity government the Syrian military 
would have to reduce their political influence and all political parties would have to 
dissolve,298 a very troubling idea in a part of the world where the military generally holds 
supreme power. Further, to add to the problems faced by the UAR, the agreement made 
Nasser the President of both Egypt and Syria, the latter a country he knew very little 
about and had never visited.299 The union of Egypt and Syria faced a plethora of reasons 
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as to why it would not work, but due to ethnic and cultural similarities there was some 
justification behind attempting the union.  
 
Elie Podeh refers to the wave of Pan-Arabism as the “Zeitgeist of the period”.300 The idea 
that Pan-Arabism was an ideology developed only to reflect the time at hand is 
disingenuous. This type of Pan-Arabism, responding to the colonial borders brought forth 
by the French and English was a political construct to fend off imperial interests, but Pan-
Arabism as an ideology is driven by a natural bond. National identity can be dependent 
on a number of variables such as genealogy, locality, tribe, clan, religion, nationality or 
state citizenship301 and being that the creation of the nations in the Arab world is a 
political and colonial phenomenon the same may be attributed to this attempt at Pan-
Arabism.302 The Arab nation, whether it spreads from Yemen to Morocco or  is defined 
by the Levant and/or North Africa shares numerous similarities. The nation can be seen 
as a named community with a historic territory, a common language with a common 
religion where Sharia is believed to outdo the law of the land. The Arabs are connected, 
not only due to colonial pressures but also because they share a similar language and a 
central religion, it is a natural inclination to which the Arabs find themselves intertwined. 
In classical thought, defining an identity or a nation was much simpler than it is 
nowadays. This is another example where similar vernacular, as explained by Benedict 
Anderson, may connect people across national boundaries or may actually be the root that 
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defines a national community. The politicisation of nationhood as well as the influence of 
geopolitics has made a number of the classical theories outdated in the modern discourse.  
 
The two theories provided above, by Gellner and Smith, are classical in nature as was the 
practice of Pan-Arabism at the time. While the nation-state model has become less of a 
modern phenomenon and more a permanent solution. The classical theories as well as the 
classical connections have developed into ideologies that cannot adequately address the 
scope of contemporary developments. Despite their internal strife, the Arabs are still 
connected and do have the makings of a nation but geopolitics and the political interest of 
each respective nation has pushed the Arabs farther and farther apart. All the parties 
mentioned above, the SSNP, the Baath and the Nasserists may have been sincere but all 
decision-making tends to be motivated by the mixed interests of the decision makers. 
That which was once an alliance between the Baath and Nasser became a political rivalry 
that shaped the initial divisions in the region. 
 
Dr. Atif Kubursi, a senior economics professor at McMaster University and long-time 
Pan-Arabist, argued that, to understand the internal downfall of the Arabs, one not need 
look further than a botched agreement pertaining to the Jordan River. In 1959, Israel 
announced plans to construct the National Water Carrier (NWC) in order to divert the 
water from the Jordan River to the Naqab desert.303 According to the Syrians, if Israel 
was able to carry out their plans for the river it would allow them to absorb 4 million 
immigrants, they would separate the Arab east from the Arab west and strengthen what 
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they believed to be a Zionist irredentist policy of establishing a Jewish state that extends 
from the Euphrates to the Nile.304 Nasser believed that 1963 would be the year that the 
Arabs would take a stand against Israel- instead of taking a military stand they would 
defeat Israel by taking a united stand against the NWC,305 similar to his nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal. 
 
As Israel began to develop their NWC project, the Arab Defence Council held a meeting 
on June 10th, 1961 to develop their own technical plan to divert the water through 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. In addition, all member states agreed to set up a Joint Arab 
Command to act as a defence organisation in the event that the diversion plan led to a 
military confrontation with Israel. As the Arabs spent years discussing how and when 
they were going to carry out the diversion, Israel completed their NWC plans. Dr. 
Kubursi blamed constant internal troubles for the lack of action. During this period, the 
UAR dissolved and the Baathist parties in Iraq and Syria overthrew their respective 
governments and took control of the state. He also argues that, although the battle for the 
Jordan River fits in the scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict, coupling it with the goal of 
liberating Palestine does not do justice to the Palestinians.306 If the Arabs were to succeed 
it would have been a major development both socially and economically but Arab leaders 
put personal interests before regional interests. While this is partially a result of post-
colonial influence and the Arab nation-state system that is still very much in its infancy, 
the Palestinian cause has remained a political tool for most leaders, even when they have 
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done very little to directly support the Palestinians.  The issue of the River Jordan, if 
successful, would not have solved the refugee problem nor liberated Palestine, but its 
failure set the table for the manner in which the next half-century unfolded.  
 
To put this failure into perspective, between 2009 and 2014, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu the Israeli settler population grew by 23%, due to 
350,000 illegal settlers sanctioned by the state of Israel. In comparison, in the same time 
period, the general population of Israel grew by only 9.6%.307 The settlements, which 
forced Secretary of State John Kerry, former Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Olmert and 
Ehud Barak, as well as former Israeli Justice Minister Tzipi Livni to liken the manner in 
which Israel treats the Palestinians in the West Bank to apartheid South Africa,308 have 
caused a number of problems for both the Palestinians and the Israelis. Aside from the 
extremist price tag attacks, which are attacks carried out by extreme Israeli settlers 
against Palestinians and Israeli Security Forces as an act of revenge against those who 
oppose the illegal settlement activity, the settlements have created a major water shortage 
for the Palestinian population, both in the West Bank and Gaza. The reality that faces 
Palestinians is that although the Gaza Strip borders the Mediterranean Sea and the West 
Bank lies west of the Jordan River, both populations face a water crisis.309 Even though 
much of the West Bank is governed under the Palestinian National Authority, Israel’s 
national water company; Mekorot, still operates more than 40 wells in the West Bank and 																																																								
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controls who does and does not receive water,310 drying out many Palestinian taps, even 
those that live on water sources. Regardless of this failure, and those to follow, the 
rational approach for the Palestinians was to lean on the Arab world, hoping for some 
sense of unity that would strengthen them enough to liberate Palestine.  
 
The stage explained above is what Abu-Lughod defined as the politics of rejection. 
Nasser led the Arab world’s initial rejection of the creation of the state of Israel as well as 
other measures of Western imperialism.  
4.3 The Politics of Palestinian Rejection 
While the Pan-Arab identity, as explored, does have merit, theoretical and logical, the 
politicisation of identity and the fact that the Palestinians remained stateless, necessitated 
the Palestinian struggle to liberate their own homeland. This brings forth the third phase 
of Abu-Lughod’s three-stage approach: the politics of revolution and hope. 
 
As the plan to counter Israel’s NWC faltered, Nasser and the Arab League took one more 
step in which to provide the Palestinians with a sense of entitlement. In 1963 they 
appointed Ahmed al-Shuqayri as the representative of the Palestinians. This led to the 
1964 creation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, of which Shuqayri was made 
chairman. In his memoirs he disclosed that “the biggest mistake in my forty years of 
public life lay in my joining up with the kings and presidents in the four years that ended 
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with the six-day war.”311 The only country that allowed the PLO to conduct elections in 
their territory was Egypt, so Shuqayri instead decided to appoint representatives that 
would convene on the Palestinian National Council. According to Shuqayri; “All 
Palestinians were natural members of the PLO.” Unfortunately for the Palestinians and 
Shuqayri, this membership of all Palestinians was symbolic, Shuqayri acted under 
supervision by Nasser and by the time of the first Palestinian Conference in Jerusalem in 
May 1964, of the 225 representatives 65% were from Jordan with over 20% having 
served in the Jordanian Government.312 While the Palestinians finally had their own 
entity, which both major players in the region supported, the involvement of Jordan and 
Egypt was detrimental to one group in particular.  
 
Afif Safieh shared this notion, when asked about the PLO he defined it as “an idea and 
institution, the idea being our sense of identity and our quest for independence and 
sovereignty with the idea being stronger than the institution,” following that up with “I’m 
more comfortable representing the idea rather than the institution.” Even the idea of the 
PLO being a fighting force, was, according to Abdel Bari Atwan, in itself not a factor. 
Arguing that;  
When the PLO started, the PLO was a classical army, similar to the Arab armies so it did not 
actually revive their hope. It was the fighting identity that started after 1967, the real identity 
started to grow after the guerrilla movements, the Fatah movement, the PFLP movement, those 
young feda’yeen sacrificed their lives allowing the identity to begin to regain its strength once 
again.313 
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The group which actively opposed the creation of the PLO at the time, was Fatah. When 
Shuqayri met with Abu-Iyad, one of the founders of Fatah, in 1964 the latter made it clear 
that any “organization (sic) set up from above will be inoperable if it does not rest on an 
active (popular) base.”314 This resentment motivated Fatah, laying the groundwork for the 
most important players in the Palestinian story, as well as the reconstruction of 
Palestinian national identity.  
4.3.1 Fatah 
The first and most important of these objectives has been to restore a sense of national identity. 
This was presented by Fateh as a prerequisite to any advancement of the Palestinian cause, even 
before it initiated armed action. The second has been to place the Palestinians on the international 
political map.315  
In contemporary times, the popular Palestinian faction Fatah is viewed as a friend to the 
West and the party who will make the most concessions needed to bring about a two-state 
solution with Israel. What has become a recognised party representing a state, at least on 
paper, led by older men wearing suits and ties has come a long way from its roots. The 
leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu-Mazen, has sworn that under his 
presidency there will be no third intifada, additionally, he claimed that cities such as 
Haifa and his own hometown of Safad are not actually part of Palestine. Abu-Mazen, in 
his attempts to secure a state on 22% of historic Palestine, has reversed the policies, 
which founded Fatah. Unfortunately for him, as well as Israel, irrespective of the changes 
in policy, the initial days of Fatah created a mind-set and defined a people in a manner 
that still lives amongst Palestinians.  																																																								
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When Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu-Jihad, another one of the founders of Fatah 
was asked about the original goal of Fatah, aside from liberating Palestine, he noted: 
We believed, Arafat and me that it was only by military actions that we could fix the Palestinian 
identity. That was our slogan. What did we mean? We were convinced that our first task was to 
prove to the Arab regimes and the world that we Palestinians still existed and that our problem could 
not be swept under the carpet.316 
 
This idea was developed long before the Arab failure in 1967. Yasser Arafat and Abu-
Jihad held their displeasure with the Arab regimes due to the 1948 defeat, not due to the 
fact that the Arabs lost the war, but to the betrayal they experienced at the hands of Arab 
regimes during the war. Abu-Jihad came from the town of Ramleh, just south of Tel 
Aviv, as he recalls his painful memories, the story goes, similar to many Palestinians’ 
stories of expulsion. Vital in his series of events is that his town was put on alert once the 
main Arab city to the north, Jaffa, fell the Israelis would attack the towns of Ramleh and 
Lod. They were in fact correct, but when they arrived, the Jordanians who were there to 
protect them retreated without a fight, leaving the residents with no army nor the 
weaponry needed to defend themselves.317 Abu-Jihad, like many Palestinians, will never 
forget these events and they served as a motivation, not only to liberate Palestine but to 
ensure that the Arab regimes would not continue to interfere in their affairs. 
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Arafat on the other hand, had a different experience from Abu-Jihad. Arafat was not born 
in Palestine, nor was he living in Palestine at the time of the war but he did sneak in to 
join the fight, even though people told him he was too small, young and naïve to fight a 
real war. According to Arafat, the Arabs could have defeated the Israeli army if it was not 
for the deception played by the Arab regimes to appease British overseers. Arafat noted 
three major issues during the war, the first being the fact that the Arab soldiers that were 
in Palestine would not advance without orders from the top, even when there was the 
threat of Israelis approaching, in fact, there were instances when they would retreat rather 
than stand and fight. The second issue was the thirty-day truce called on June 10th, 1948, 
only 25 days into the fighting. Arafat defined this truce as “the real beginning of our 
tragedy,”318 claiming that although the Israelis had control of some parts of the country it 
was still their country, they may have declared a state at that time, but it was not 
established. During the truce, the Israelis were able to recruit volunteers as well as 
receive the weaponry needed to fight while the Arabs did not receive anything, although 
they accepted the truce under Western pressure.  What was the main betrayal, to Arafat, 
and all Palestinians fighting, was that when the armies of the Arab League arrived to 
Palestine, their first action was to disarm all Palestinian fighters, Arafat included.319 The 
Arabs literally took the fight for Palestine away from the Palestinians, leaving them 
helpless and defenceless as the Arab armies were either armed with faulty weaponry, as 
Nasser was, or were ordered to retreat as many Jordanian soldiers were. 
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After the war, Arafat and others were left disheartened; they felt betrayed by their Arab 
brethren and there was no indication that the Palestinian leadership would call for a battle 
against the newly formed Jewish state. So much so that he applied for a visa to continue 
his studies in the United States, while waiting for the visa, he decided that it was not time 
to run away, but time to organise those who had the will to fight against Israel.  
 
With national boundaries becoming a new phenomenon paired with the collective 
“ethnic” failure as Arabs the Palestinians were forced to develop, what Calhoun named 
“forms of social solidarity”.  He refers to three manners in which a person can forge a 
social group. The first two are national and ethnic, both of which may have come under 
scrutiny by Arafat and others who were likeminded. The third manner suggested by 
Calhoun was that of kinship; the manufacturing of a community based on similar goals 
and views. The example given in the theoretical framework was a multicultural society 
living in a democracy but for this case, it would be better to explore this kinship in 
relation to a guerrilla or revolutionary movement. The Arabs and the Palestinians at this 
time, before Nasser’s free officers’ movement, were left with no option but to develop 
communities and allegiances dedicated to ridding the region of the despotic leaders and 
colonial occupiers. Arguably, one of the top people in recent history in forming 
allegiances was Yasser Arafat.  
 
Upon returning to his birthplace of Cairo to continue his studies Arafat decided to join 
the Egyptian Union of Students (EUS). Although Arafat concurrently joined the 
Federation of Palestinian Students (FPS), his joining to the EUS strengthens the kinship 
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factor of Calhoun’s theory. The EUS was a political body aimed at agitating the Egyptian 
government for their failure in Palestine, but more importantly their pandering to the 
West.320 In this situation, the government’s actions were viewed as anti-Egyptian, but at 
the same time anti-Palestinian thus forging an allegiance amongst these groups. What 
drove the Pan-Arab idea in this particular case was the fact that amongst the two groups, 
Palestinians and Egyptians that is, the common denominator was that they were Arab.  
Further, he was actively supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, which he fought 
alongside in Palestine. The Brotherhood was another organisation that was dominated by 
Egyptians while being sympathetic towards the liberation of Palestine.321 A young man at 
the time, Arafat aligned himself with anyone who shared his passion towards liberating 
Palestine, be it if he had to identify as a Muslim, an Egyptian or as a Palestinian. While 
with the brotherhood, Arafat met Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu-Iyad who, along with 
the aforementioned Abu-Jihad, made up the nucleus that dominated Fatah and the PLO 
until their respective deaths. 
 
There is much to be said about the 1950s and early 1960s but for the most part, the 
Palestinians were forced into acquiescence during this period. There was a sense of 
disorientation amongst all Palestinians regardless of their personal situation. Aside from 
minor resistance by Palestinian militants not much was done to retain Palestine for the 
Palestinians. On March 3rd, 1965, the Pan-Arab cause to liberate Palestine was fatally 
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undermined. The President of newly liberated Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, was in Jericho 
where he declared the following: 
As for the policy of the "whole or nothing", it brought us to the defeat in Palestine and reduced us to 
the sad situation we are struggling with today…In Palestine, on the contrary, the Arabs pushed away 
the compromise solutions. They refused the division and the clauses of the White Paper. They 
regretted it then…it is thus essential that the commander has the freedom of manoeuvre, is able to 
take any type of initiative, and should have some qualities of sincerity, probity, devotion, and 
perspicacity.322  
 
For the first time in a public speech an Arab leader just recognised Israel’s right to exist 
and urged the Palestinians to accept only a part of their national home. In 1965, Tunisia 
was alone in voicing this opinion; two years later the rest of the Arab world began 
echoing the same opinion when they ended up on the wrong side of the six-day war, 
providing opportunity for the Palestinians to slowly carve out space and develop their 
own identity separate from the broader Arab nation. The next chapter will explore the 
initial determinants of this resurrected Palestinian identity. 
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Chapter 5: The Refugee Problem 
They were treated as slaves in the camps by Arab regimes. They were put under intelligence 
control, army control, security control, prevented from any political action, from any political 
expression, from any political organization, though this was happening to the Palestinians it has 
never touched their determination to return to their homeland in Palestine of liberating their homes 
again, of going back to Palestine in order to bring Palestine back to the Arab world.323  
 
The previous chapter explored the notion of Pan-Arabism, and how it pertains to different 
theories of nationalism and identity. While the Arabs, at least those of al-Sham are 
naturally connected through different national determinants ranging from a common 
history, common religion and common language, the politicisation of the flourishing 
identities of the region made these prior connections extraneous. Although the 
superfluous nature of this connection was brought to the forefront after the Arab defeat in 
1967, it was initialised through the treatment of the Palestinian refugees in the Arab states 
neighbouring Israel. This chapter sets out to explain the impact of the Palestinian 
refugees on the resurgence of the Palestinian national identity and how they set the tone 
for the rise of the Palestinian guerrilla factions.   
 
Helene Lindholm Schulz defines the Palestinian identity through two central poles; to 
“suffer” and to “struggle.”324 The vast majority of Palestinians suffered during the 1948 
catastrophe, forcing them to live under the purview of the Egyptians, Israelis or 
Jordanians with the rest attempting to carve out space in the surrounding newly 
independent states of Lebanon and Syria. To reiterate, Abu-Lughod’s defines Palestinian 
nationalism through three stages, consisting of the politics of accommodation, the politics 
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of rejection, and the politics of revolution and hope.325 As explained earlier, the politics 
of accommodation focuses on the preliminary resettlement of Palestinians and the need to 
overcome the initial shock of the Nakba. This process was followed up with the politics 
of rejection, targeting imperialism and Western colonisation, encapsulating the tone of 
Pan-Arabism set by President Nasser.  
 
The final stage, the politics of revolution and hope found roots, and were driven through 
the Palestinian struggle to liberate their lost homeland. Throughout this thesis, I have 
come to understand Abu-Lughod’s third stage as a three-pronged concept; the refugee, 
the Fida’i and the statesmen. Perhaps, the most popular aspect of the revolution came by 
ways of armed resistance, symbolised by the guerrilla fighter, or the Fida’i. By contrast, 
the most prevalent in this day in age is that of the “statesman”, which commenced under 
the reigns of Yasser Arafat and passed on to Mahmoud Abbas after Arafat’s death in 
2004. This chapter will evaluate the preliminary aspect of this stage, which those who 
revived the Palestinian national consciousness through their survival, existence, and 
memory; the refugees. 
5.1 Refugees and International Law 
The UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) defines a 
refugee as follows: 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well- founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is out- side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
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owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.326 
 
While the policies of the international community on refugees are extremely troublesome, 
from the Western world to the Arab world, terminology used to identify certain groups 
shows the damaging effects. On August 27th, 2015, the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) released a news story titled; “'Refugee' or 'migrant' - Which is 
right?”327 They defined refugees as “persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution” and 
migrants as those who “choose to move…mainly to improve their lives”. This difference 
is major, but those who are drowning in the Mediterranean are said to be causing a 
“migrant crisis” in that they are choosing to flee from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and so on. 
The statistics provided by UNHCR account for refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, 
Ukraine and many others, but neglect one of the world’s largest and tenured refugee 
populations, the Palestinians.  
 
This modern-day rhetoric is not the only time the Palestinians have been isolated and 
neglected when discussing refugees. Returning to the 1951 Convention on the Refugee, 
the introductory note states that: 
The Convention also does not apply to those refugees who benefit from the protection or assistance 
of a United Nations agency other than UNHCR, such as refugees from Palestine who fall under the 
auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA).328 
 
The Palestinians were not involved in the convention due to the creation of UNRWA, a 
body responsible for all Palestinian refugees living in Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, 																																																								
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Lebanon and Syria. The problem this creates is that while UNRWA is an organisation 
tasked with supporting refugees, it does not define who is a refugee and was not 
developed as a legal tool in which to supplement the rights of Palestinian refugees. 
Between November 1948 and December 1949 there were three major, albeit non-binding, 
resolutions pertaining to the “Palestine refugee” problem.  Starting with United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 212 (III) Assistance to Palestine Refugees of 
November 1948: 
WHEREAS the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate 
urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 
1948, part Three, states that "action must be taken to determine the necessary measures (of relief) 
and to provide for their implementation" and that "the choice is between saving the lives of many 
thousands of people now or permitting them to die''329 
 
This was followed up by UNGA Resolution 302 (IV) Assistance to Palestine Refugees of 
December 1949, which with chapter 7 established UNRWA: 
7. Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East: 
(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; 
(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures 
to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief 
and works projects is no longer available.330 
While UNRWA was essential to address the Palestinian refugee problem, a mandate that 
required its own institute due to the size of the Palestinian refugee problem, UNRWA‘s 																																																								
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involvement acted as a double-edged sword. According to Issam Yamani, Palestinian 
activist, son of Abu-Maher, one of the founders of the PFLP: 
The sheltering of the Palestinian refugees by UNRWA has contributed to strengthening the 
Palestinian Identity due to the fact that the Palestinian refugees in the camps were put together in 
isolation. They were cut off from all social surroundings, forcing them to depend on one another. 
The camps also succeeded in creating a Palestinian identity, bringing together Palestinians who 
used to identify themselves by their towns and villages, forming a unified Palestinian identity.331 
 
The Palestinians, similar to most Arabs, identified themselves by their towns and 
villages. This practice did not cease during the expulsion from Palestine, as many villages 
were uprooted entirely, thus forcing the inhabitants to travel together. Initially, when 
camps were developed, they took form in quarters named after villages in Palestine,332 
generally in similar geographical proximity as the villages they left behind. The 
Palestinian camps were not invitingly set up out of a sense of goodwill towards 
Palestinians by the Lebanese and Syrians, but were forced upon both countries based on 
where the refugees settled. For example, Shatila camp, just outside of Beirut, was started 
when a Palestinian named Abed Bisher bought a small plot of land and a number of tents 
from the Shatila family.333 Soon after the creation of UNRWA, they leased the land from 
the Lebanese government for 99 years.334 While the development of these camps did 
benefit Palestinian identity, in that the collective “Palestinian” community remained 
intact, and the camps through providing food and services were successful in minimally 
aiding the Palestinians, the treatment of the Palestinians in the refugee camps had a 
negative effect on Pan-Arabism.  																																																								
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While UNRWA projected this refugee problem to extend at least a century, the 
governments of Syria and Lebanon viewed the refugee crisis to be a short-term one. This 
influenced the lifestyle and the location of the camps. Nahr-il Bared camp, for example, 
is located in East Lebanon in the city of Tripoli, this location was not planned, rather it 
was developed due to the Syrian government closing their borders to the refugees.335 
Once the camps were developed, for the first time, the Greater Syrian region began 
developing national differences. Although, nothing changed culturally or ethnically, 
political, economic and sectarian differences highlighted real differences between those 
involved. According to Yamani:  
It was the services provided by UNRWA (Separate schools, health system and aid) forced the 
Palestinians to view themselves as different from the other Arabs. The differences between the 
Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians were strengthened by the isolation of the Palestinians and the 
services provided to them by UNRWA.336   
 
Farid Ayad, who grew up just outside the Burj al-Barajneh camp recalls this realisation 
when he was six years old. Before being admitted into school, he was forced to shave his 
head, as were all Palestinian students, due to lice.337 Although it was done for health and 
sanitation reasons, this was one of the initial identifiers. The genetic make-up of 
Palestinians and Lebanese would not allow one to differentiate amongst the two, but due 
to this development, even at a young age, one could tell who belonged and who did not. 
Liisa Maalki, professor of anthropology, when writing about the Hutus of Rwanda argues 
that becoming a refugee is not based solely on the crossing of a border. She argues that 
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“refugeeness” is a process which develops over time.338  The initial expulsion of the 
Palestinians made them refugees, but for the elders, this sense of “otherness” was created 
by their new living situation and the shame of living on rations, while for the younger 
generation it was insinuated through the simple identifiers such as hair or clothing that 
Ayad and Yamani suggested.    
 
Another identifier, which became a symbol of the Palestinian refugee, was the roof put 
atop the “homes” of the Palestinians in the camps. The Lebanese government was 
initially extremely strict on development restrictions in the camps. The Palestinians were 
not allowed to build a roof on their home due to the symbolism of a permanent structure- 
people were dragged out of their home when bathing when running water was noticed, 
even the sound of construction would attract the attention of the police.339  Due to the 
laws surrounding the development of the roof, the Palestinians used zinc sheets as 
shelter.340 The concept of the zinc roof became a symbol of the Palestinian refugee as 
immortalized by Serene Husni’s short film Zinco which has been screened around the 
world. When asked about the symbol during an interview for the Boston Palestine Film 
Festival, she claimed that “Zinco, or corrugated tin, immediately conjures up feelings of 
transition, or impermanence,” and how it reflected the will of the Palestinian refugee 
when they “started building rooms using zinco when it was illegal to do so beyond their 
legally allotted zones… I wanted to acknowledge the strength of refugees who are 
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creating space and reclaiming urban rights denied to them by the system.” 341  This 
temporary existence drove, arguably the most important issue to Palestinian refugees, the 
right to return. Initially a law, it has evolved into a determinant for the existence of 
Palestinians and Palestine. Those who were born outside Palestine, outside the refugee 
camps, and are officially not stateless, cling to the right of Palestinian refugees to return. 
For, without the right of return, or the belief of return, according to Yamani, the 
Palestinian identity will remain under question: 
The right of returns legalizes (sic) my identity as a Palestinian and attaches it to a physical space 
where I will have my civil, human and political rights. The right of return will transform my identity 
from an abstract, complex one, to a reality. There will be no need to hyphenate it; I will be a 
Palestinian, not a Palestinian refugee, Canadian-Palestinian and so on.342   
 
The right of return is the third major resolution brought forth by the UNGA pertaining to 
the Palestinian refugees. Resolution 194 Chapter 11 of December 1948: 
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property 
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments 
or authorities responsible343 
 
In July 1950, Israel responded to the Palestinian Right of Return with their Jewish Law of 
Return: 
1. Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh (Returnee). 
2. (a) Aliyah (Return) shall be by oleh's visa. 
(b) An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel, 
unless the Minister of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant 
(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or 																																																								
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(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.344 
 
The Jewish Law of Return, a state policy, was put into effect and inspired Jewish 
migrants from all around the world to settle in Israel. The Palestinian Right of Return, as 
an international law, has been largely ignored for over 65 years. Palestinians in Lebanon, 
initially, were forbidden from even seeing their lost homes. Lebanese governments 
forcefully moved the settlements that were situated on the border in order to set up a 
“military zone”, in fear that if Palestinians were to be situated on the border they would 
use Lebanese land to organise attacks against the new state of Israel.345 This segregation 
in the Arab world and the oppression in Israel naturally led the Palestinians, as Rosemary 
Sayigh titled one of her works, to evolve From Peasants to Revolutionaries.346 This fear 
turned out to become a reality but before the PLO resided in Lebanon there were nearly 
two decades of segregation and a decade of harassment by Lebanese forces towards the 
Palestinian refugee population. The rest of this chapter will focus on the challenges faced 
by the refugees, physically and socially.  
5.2 Being a Palestinian Refugee 
To understand the difficulties the Palestinian refugees faced at the hand of the Arab 
world, and what the initial determinant of being Palestinian was, one need not look 
further than the identification given to the Palestinian refugees by their neighbours. 
Jordan has provided the Palestinians with full, yet complicated citizenship, unlike 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt.  
																																																								
344 See Appendix VI 
345 Peteet. 2005. op.cit. Pg. 111 
346 Sayigh, Rosemary, and Noam Chomsky. The Palestinians. London: Zed, 2007.  
 
		
			 157	
 
While the documentation provided by the Syrian and Iraqi governments provide for a 
semblance of rights, when used within the respective countries, the recent conflicts in 
these countries act as a reinforcement of the difficulty of being identified as a stateless 
person. The politicisation of Pan-Arabism, as well as the miscalculation of the actual 
strength of the new state of Israel definitely hampered the “Arab nation”; the 
mistreatment of the Palestinian refugees, all the while promoting the Palestinian cause, 
separated the Arab world. The exploration of events, and how they affected the 
Palestinians, in the different Arab countries since the Nakba, demonstrates that 
Palestinians were never fully integrated into their new places of residence. Tasoulla 
Hadjiyanni, in her study on the children of Cypriot refugees or displaced peoples argues 
that, for the descendant of a refugee, being a refugee becomes a choice.347 She cites four 
stages of “Refugee Consciousness Construction”; Parental Attachment- Projection- 
Memory Transfer- Adoption of Refugee Identity.348 For the Palestinians, being a refugee 
was not always a choice. The children born into the camps faced difficulties in being able 
to integrate in their place of residence. As mentioned in the introduction, identifying 
myself with the refugees was a choice, I went through the four stages Hadjiyanni 
mentions and willfully adopted a sense of being Palestinian and Canadian. Although born 
nearly forty years after the Nakba, if I was born in Burj al Barjneh camp in Lebanon, or 
Wahdat camp in Jordan, or Yarmouk camp in Syria, or even in Dheisheh camp in the 
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West Bank, or Khan Younis camp in the Gaza Strip I would not have to adopt 
refugeeness, rather it would be ingrained in my actual life and upbringing.  
 
Iraq experienced three waves of Palestinian mass migration; the Nakba, the 1967 war and 
the Gulf War in which 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait- an act of 
punishment due to Yasser Arafat’s decision to ally with Saddam Hussein in the original 
Gulf War.349 During the second 2003 invasion of Iraq, many Palestinians were forcefully 
expelled from their homes while Iraqi Shia insurgents killed others as they were seen as 
sympathetic towards Saddam Hussein. Hundreds of Palestinians who fled Iraq were 
forced to live in refugee camps near the border in Syria and Jordan or in camps set up in 
the buffer zones between the bordering country and Iraq. The conditions in these camps 
provided for a prison like atmosphere, where no one was allowed to exit, nor enter, the 
food was rotten and the children had no access to education.350 Though some of the 
refugees were able to flee to the urban centres of the surrounding countries, those who 
ended up in Syria were engulfed into another conflict soon after.  
 
The Palestinians in Syria historically enjoyed a good relationship, as Syria started the 
Palestine Arab Refugee Institution in 1949 to provide moral and material support to the 
camps.351 Nevertheless, the Palestinians in Syria continue to face a challenging time 
attempting to seek refuge in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon during the current civil war 
which started in 2011. Although Palestinians remained neutral in the war, outside of the 																																																								
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leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command Ahmad 
Jibril, who sided with the Assad regime, the Palestinians in Yarmouk camp were drawn 
into the Syrian Civil War by both the government and the opposition. Jordan, though 
historically been a “friendly” option for Palestinian refugees, made their policy on 
accepting Palestinian refugees from Syria clear, as quoted by Prime Minister Abdullah 
Ansour: “Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision to not allow the 
crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents…they should 
stay in Syria until the end of the crisis.”352  Those who attempted to flee to Lebanon, 
before the barrier was closed to the Palestinians, either faced rampant poverty in the 
already overcrowded camps, whilst some were deported back to Syria.353 The rest of this 
chapter will focus on Palestinians in Lebanon and the manner in which they strengthened 
and refined the Palestinian national identity. Though it is important to note, as Afif Safieh 
relayed: 
I wouldn’t restrict Palestinian experiences to one segment of Palestinian society. The oppression 
was a result of the uprooting of a nation and the diasporisation of that society and one of its 
tragedies was they did not live in the same environment. Some lived in the orbit of Egypt in the 
Gaza strip, some were annexed by Jordan and some were in refugee camps in the periphery of the 
homeland, others moved to more hospitable shores abroad and on an individual basis were more 
successful. I wouldn’t restrict identity to refugee camps only, even though the re-emergence of 
Palestinian nationalism in the early 60’s was mainly based on the refugee community.354 
 Without	disregarding	the	other	segments	of	the	Palestinians	the	rest	of	this	chapter	will	focus	on	the	refugees	who	resided	in	Lebanon.	As	I	believe,	and	this	chapter	will	
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show,	that	the	Palestinian	experience	in	Lebanon	will	encapsulate	the	difficulties	the	Palestinians	faced,	both	socially	and	politically.			 
5.3 Palestinians in Lebanon 
According to Yusri Shami, one of the founding members of the first Palestinian rap group 
from the Lebanese refugee camps Katibe 5: 
I am not officially a Palestinian; I am not welcome in Palestine. I was always asked where I’m from; 
when I say I am Palestinian people will ask me where I am born. When I tell them I was born in 
Lebanon they tell me, then I am not Palestinian, I am actually Lebanese. I am not Lebanese; I resent 
the notion to be called Lebanese, I am a Palestinian refugee, and more so a refugee than a 
Palestinian. 355 
 
A Palestinian refugee finds himself or herself not welcome in Palestine/Israel, while not 
welcome in the country they are born in. In the days after the Nakba, Nasser and the 
concept of Pan-Arabism provided them with hope and a sense of belonging. This chapter 
reveals that Palestinian national identity post-Nakba was not developed in Palestine; 
rather it was developed mainly in the refugee camps. 
 
For the Palestinian refugee, the most severe situation is in Lebanon, where for over 60 
years the Palestinians refugees have been living under trying conditions, as of 2011, two-
thirds of the population living in poverty, over half the Palestinians are unemployed, 62% 
of the population still resides in the camps and 8% of the school-going population is not 
enrolled.356 As an example, Iqbal al-Assad graduated from her medical school in Qatar at 
the age of 20 becoming the youngest doctor in the region. Unfortunately for Iqbal and 
many other Palestinian refugees who aspire to support their community in the camps, 
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Palestinians are not allowed to practice medicine in public hospitals. The employment 
restrictions are only one aspect of the fear of Palestinian towteen (permanent settlement) 
in Arab countries.357 The major reason behind this fear is that Lebanon, unlike Jordan and 
to a lesser extent in Syria, is home to a small population with a number of conflicting 
religions and as the Palestinians make up approximately 10% of the population, 
integrating them into society would shift the demographics in favour of the Sunni Muslim 
population.  
5.3.1 The Arrival 
During the morning of October 30, a few villagers decided to carry white flags and then meet the 
Jews west of the village. They were to tell the Jewish soldiers that the villagers had gotten rid of 
the ALA (Arab Liberation Army) and that the village was safe and prepared to surrender… Jewish 
soldiers picked twelve of our men at random, blindfolded them, and shot them in front of us. I kept 
praying that my husband would not return to the village. One night I joined about 60 families who 
had decided to leave to Lebanon. 
- Umm Abd al-Qiblawi358 
 
Umm Abd was one of approximately 100,000 Palestinians359 who were expelled from 
their native Palestine and forced to settle in Lebanon. Since 1948, the number of 
Palestinians in Lebanon, who remain registered as refugees, is just under 450,000 people 
living predominantly throughout twelve refugee camps.360 Initially, the Palestinians were 
generally well-received by their Lebanese hosts. The Lebanese people provided the 
Palestinians with means of assistance as well as social acceptance. 361  This general 
welcoming may have been attributed to the Pan-Arab fervour of the time as well as the 
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fact that the Palestinians were perceived to be short-term guests, with their right to return 
looming.  
 
During the initial Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Lebanese army played a very minor role. 
They neglected the Arab plan of attack, forbidding forces to advance into Palestine 
through the Mediterranean and even barring soldiers from attacking Palestine from their 
side of the border. Their superficial involvement provided Ben-Gurion with enough 
reasons to speed up the armistice talks, in order to give the impression that Lebanon and 
Israel in peace. The only battle between the two during the war took place at the border 
village of Malakiyya. The battle did end in favour of the Arab Liberation Army but it was 
highly overstated as a symbol of Lebanon doing its part, mainly to appease the Muslim 
population in Lebanon.362 Hezbollah, situated in South Lebanon, has arguably become 
Israel’s largest threat in the region, but this was not the case at those times.  
 
In the Lebanese Maronite right-wing, Ben-Gurion and the newly developed state of Israel 
had their allies. The two parties shared one common goal according to Ben-Gurion; to 
“Establish a Christian State, whose southern border will be the Litani river.”363 Hindsight 
shows that this goal never came to fruition, but the Israelis had developed their first open 
ally in the Arab world, in turn, creating the Palestinians first open Arab enemy. The 
Maronite right-wing would play a big role in the Palestinian story as well as the treatment 
of Palestinians in Lebanon. The alliance between the Maronite right-wing and Israel 
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became a fatal one for the Palestinians and arguably the PLO, which will be discussed 
throughout this chapter and the next.   
5.3.2 Restrictions  
 
In 1965 Lebanon decided not to abide by the League of Arab States Protocol (1965) 
which urged Arab states to provide citizenship to Palestinian refugees hosted.364 While 
the labelling of Palestinians as “foreigners” further reinforced the notion that the 
Palestinian identity is separate from other Arab states, it is difficult for a supra-state 
entity, in this case the Pan-Arab nation, to flourish when one of the nations under the 
umbrella were defined as foreigners and have restrictions imposed on them.  
 
The treatment of Palestinians as foreigners was not expected by the United Nations, as 
the prior chapters argued, the views of the Western world was that the region is not 
bound to regional or geographical allegiances as they were all intertwined and connected 
be it through history, ethnicity or religion. Irredentist theory would argue that the 
artificiality of the border drawn between Lebanon and Palestine through the Sykes-Picot 
agreement would make for a swift integration of Palestinians in Lebanon and other Arab 
host states.  
 
The creation of UNRWA was based on the recommendations of the “The first interim 
report of the U. N. economic survey (CLAPP) mission for the Middle East”365 written by 
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Polish national Feliks Bochenski for the World Bank. Here we see the importance of 
wider geo-political relations in shaping local issues. Similar to Resolution 181, the 
Partition of Palestine, the Arabs of Palestine and the Jewish Nation’s future were both 
decided by external parties. This makes theorising Palestinian national identity far more 
difficult, as for the most part, they were not in control of their own destiny. Although the 
powers behind the partition plan supported its coming to fruition, the same could not be 
said about the resolutions that promised the Palestinian refugees their rights resulting in 
the CLAPP mission concluding: “As no compensation for the abandoned property has 
been received by any refugees those who have not been able to gain a livelihood in their 
new surroundings are completely destitute. It is estimated that out of 774,000 refugees, 
some 147,000 are self-supporting.” 366 While the next conclusion found that the plight of 
the refugees was an obstacle to peace and that the UN should “adopt a resolution stating 
that refugees wishing to return should be permitted to do so and others should be 
compensated,”367 the recommendations did not exactly promote this repatriation. Instead 
the mission sought to “examine the economic situations in the countries affected by the 
recent hostilities, and to make recommendations.”368 In place of repatriation was a public 
works project developed to reduce the need for aid. The projects suggestions were as 
follows: 
• Syria: Afforestation, construction of roads, improvement of Mezze airport, 
reclamation of Madkh swamp, construction of Latakia harbour and supporting 
Aleppo water supply.  
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• Jordan: Highway development, improve Amman airport, afforestation, irrigation 
of Wadi Qilt, development of basin Wadi Zerqa.  
• Lebanon: Irrigation and draining of South Beqaa, irrigation of Akkar Plain, 
completion of Tyre-Saida irrigation project, irrigation of area south of Tripoli.369 
Simply, what was suggested by the CLAPP mission was to use the Palestinian refugees 
as cheap labour to develop the underdeveloped areas of the Near East. By the 1960s, the 
Palestinians would use these skills to make their mark on the Middle Eastern economy 
and help fund their national aspirations by way of the PLO. 370  Nonetheless, for 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, UNRWA became an alternative to focusing on 
regaining their own country. One activist, interviewed by Rosemary Sayigh, recalled that 
UNRWA “used to give loans to people to set them up in small businesses such as ‘shoe-
mender or carpenter,” if that did not succeed, they would promote immigration to either 
Australia or America. The trade-off was the ration card, technically, UNRWA would 
provide these loans and/or flight tickets to the West in exchange for their daily bread.371 
While these two options would have in fact lessened the burden on the Palestinian 
refugees by either providing work or opportunity abroad it may have had an adverse 
effect on the development of a viable national identity. As Yamani noted, the fact that the 
Palestinians were cut off from society, and forced to live on services strengthened their 
understanding of their collective identity.  Further, being that these countries were not the 
wealthiest a number of the local poorer population would have resented the Palestinian 
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refugees. The Palestinians have become the “Jews of the Arab world”,372 ironically, after 
the Jews of Europe and the Orient took the place of Palestinians in their lost homeland 
the Palestinians were now subjected to the same ghettoisation by the Arabs that the Jews 
faced in their former homes.  
 
The works programme did provide for a sense of professional development amongst the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Nearly a decade into their exile, Palestinians were 
known to be skilled in labour trades: plumbing, tiling, electricians, et cetera.373 Although 
this did allow the refugees to become gainfully employed, the average daily earnings in 
Shatila camp were 65 cents per day, which, even after accounting for inflation is not 
nearly adequate for a family to survive. 374  Lebanon was influenced by its Arab 
inhabitants and its European colonisers, making for a working class that was more skilled 
than the surrounding states. Aside from Lebanon’s delicate sectarian equilibrium, this 
made for fiercer restrictions on Palestinian employment in Lebanon.375 The Palestinians 
in Lebanon were subject to a social structure that simply did not include them. Max 
Weber defined “ethnic groups” as: “Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief 
in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or 
because memories of colonization (sic) and migration.” 376  
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This definition is essential when exploring Palestinian identity; in that, the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese did not differ physically or culturally, no more than the norm across 
villages or cities in any part of the world. What made the Palestinians different, or a 
minority, was their migration and the difference between the colonised past of the two 
groups. In the West, minorities may be driven by different issues than the general 
population. Issues such as immigration, refugees and foreign policy (particularly amongst 
the Arab minority) may be more of a self-interest issue for minorities, instead of issues 
such as the economy and national security. In the Weberian definition, though the 
Palestinians do not differ visibly, they do differ in what is important to them, at least soon 
after their exodus. Those who have lived in exile for decades will be interested in issues 
such as the economy, but then, the main issue was their stance on Israel and how their 
host country can support their struggle to return home.  
 
The idea that certain groups, be it ethnic, class or statuses are privy to certain rewards is 
defined as “social stratification.”377 The manner in which society is divided changes from 
country to country, and over time. The United States for example has a history of slave 
labour and cheap migrant labour. While these days are historical, these types of divisions 
are still prevalent, though mainly through class structures. Unfortunately for the 
Palestinians in Lebanon, while they were not brought to Lebanon for the purposes of 
labour, they were seen as different from the local population due to their traumatic 
experience.  
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Throughout her extraordinary study, Rosemary Sayigh was able to interview a number of 
refugees on the “economic marginality” of the refugees’ early years. There were a 
number of practices that were generally not practices of Palestinians or Arabs at the time. 
The first was the idea that children must work in order to support their families as the 
rations were not enough or the father was not able to provide solely. Palestinians initially 
were without many rights or privileges, with that said, child workers received even fewer 
privileges. They were paid less, if at all. The second norm which developed contrary to 
normal cultural and social practices of the time was women leaving their children at 
home to go work. These changing cultural practices continued to disgrace the Palestinian 
refugees in their own eyes and that of other Arabs.378 This type of employment was not 
always available, for those who were not able to gain employment, UNRWA acted as a 
safety net. UNRWA did its part, essentially a safety net put in place to ensure that the 
Palestinians did not die of starvation by providing rations and some sort of order and 
opportunity to the destitute camp-dwellers. 
 
According to one unnamed Palestinian refugee, Palestinians were forced to apply for 
work-permits, just as any other foreigner would. He claims that permits would be 
provided for those who would apply to do menial labour but mainly denied when they 
aspired to do more. Further, in 1966, social security for sickness and accidents was 
established and all local workers would have to contribute to this fund through a tax 
levied from their income, Palestinians included. The issue for Palestinian workers is that 
they were not able to access any of the benefits, because they were considered foreigners. 
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While Pan-Arabism was at its strongest stage, only soon after the independence of 
Lebanon, fellow Arabs who, less than half a century prior, were all part of the same 
nation were now seen as foreign.  When this was taken to the Social Security 
Department, the Ministry of Justice decided that Palestinians ought to receive the same 
benefits as the Lebanese. In order to justify their discriminative practices, the Social 
Security Department decided that foreign workers would receive the same benefits that 
Lebanese workers may access when working in their state, as the Palestinians had no 
state they continued to be denied benefits.379 This is essential to our understanding when 
exploring Pan-Arab nationality, while the Palestinians were often viewed similar to 
nationals when it benefitted the state but foreigners when there was benefit to be accessed 
by the Palestinians. The chapter on Pan-Arabism showed that the Palestinian cause was 
an important issue to the Arab world and Arab leaders used that importance to strengthen 
their political position, unfortunately for the Palestinians the Arab policy when it came to 
combating Israel did not reflect their policy on the treatment of the Palestinians.  
 
The camps are overpopulated, unclean and dangerous. Regardless of this, the Palestinians 
were seeking time and place in which they can replace their newfound placelessness. The 
only party who may have predicted that these camps would develop into mini-cities was 
UNRWA itself (when UNRWA leased the camps for 99 years, this should have sent out 
warning signals). The Palestinians saw these camps as temporary, the Lebanese shared 
this view and would not allow Palestinians to believe otherwise.  
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In the first twenty years the tents that were provided upon arrival evolved into makeshift 
structures consisting of stones, boards and zinc. If anyone was found hammering a nail 
into anything other than zinc they would be punished as any building equipment that 
needed nails to be constructed was prohibited.380 The infrastructure has not developed 
much throughout its six-decade existence. The camps remain overcrowded with poor 
housing conditions, leaky pipes, unsanitary water and sewage systems which fill the air 
with an unbearable odour. 381  The social fabric of the country neglected Palestinian 
refugees, thus naturally developing them into the “other”. The Palestinians in Lebanon 
faced what Weber referred to as social closure. Under the notion of one ethnic 
collectivity of Arabs, there was a hierarchy in which the Palestinians found themselves at 
the bottom. This closure played an integral role in defining the self-identity of the 
Palestinians. As Guibernau and Brubaker claimed; identity is developed through 
sameness and/or being excluded from a group. The fact that the Palestinians did not have 
rights in Lebanon, and that they were forced to live amongst each other in camps, cut off 
from society, their identity developed through a lack of ethnic collectivity.  
5.3.3 Education 
 
Palestine is our country, 
Our aim is to return, 
Death does not frighten us, 
We shall never forget her, 
Another homeland we shall never accept382 
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Subjecting the Palestinian refugees to the camps allowed for the initialisation of national 
sentiment, transferring a common history from generation to generation through 
UNRWA schools. The quote above was a pledge recited throughout UNRWA schools by 
Palestinian students. Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist, claims that the social 
construct in which a revolution portrays itself through action, not thought. He claims that 
the “men of the revolution were not scholars who contrived a system in the silence of the 
study but men of action who believed themselves called upon to reconstruct society on 
new foundations.”383 Education acts as a tool of transferring this reconstruction, and the 
sense of revolution, return, or instilling change of the status quo developed a new 
generation of Palestinians who believe that they are outside of the “norm” and must 
attach themselves to this collective identity that is distinct from their neighbours.  
 
People who are oppressed or searching for freedom may assimilate, may accept the 
discrimination or may revolt. The path a society takes depends heavily on how the youth 
are educated. Paulo Friere, in his work Pedagogy of the Oppressed, claims that the 
oppressed create an image of the oppressor, accept their guidelines and are fearful of 
freedom.384 In order to reverse the guidelines, particularly in the situation faced by the 
Palestinians it is essential to allow education to ensure the youth understand national 
tradition. The creation or invention of heroes and customs, as theorised in the literature 
review by Hobsbawm, Wayne and Taylor, may shape or reshape the national identity. To 
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ensure the viability of the traditions and the transfer of customs, education must be the 
source.  
 
Further, education is essential in driving pauper societies out of poverty, while training 
and education were important amongst Palestinians, the extent to which education would 
support development in the camps was not the norm, as seen in more developed 
countries. Sayigh refers to two reasons as to why this was not the case for the 
Palestinians. Firstly, there simply were not enough spaces available for all the students in 
UNRWA’s education system. This meant that people would be forced to find alternative 
options that they could not afford. Secondly, the idea that education would actually allow 
for a refugee to be employed in a better paying profession.385 There were not many 
opportunities for Palestinians who aspired to join the Lebanese workforce in a non-labour 
profession, making it difficult to justify spending the time and money for someone to 
become a scientist or lawyer when they would have to settle for working in construction, 
or one of the many trades needed within the camps to ensure their self-sufficiency. Those 
who were educated would generally move to the West or the oil rich Gulf states; 
throughout the 1960s the number of families in Shatila camp with a son working in the 
Gulf rose from 5% to 25%.386 One profession that was in demand, which became one of 
the more popular options for the Palestinian refugee was to be a teacher. 
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All teachers in UNRWA schools were Palestinian,387 allowing the schools to become a 
breeding ground for national aspirations. The teachers were mostly born in Palestine, 
raised in the refugee camps. With UNRWA operating in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) as well, they were forced to remove any inciting information from the 
history books, meaning that the body responsible for educating the Palestinians did not 
include Palestinian history in the curriculum.388 The responsibility for teaching students 
about the British occupation and the Nakba came with the teachers themselves who 
undertake activities promoting Palestinianism outside of the scope of the mandated 
curriculum.  
 
It reached the extent where UNRWA schools in Lebanon were pressured to forbid any 
Palestinian history as well as use of the words Palestine, liberation, fida’iya along with 
replacing all Arabic names of cities in historic Palestine with the new Hebrew terms. 
There was threat of a general strike of all teachers in the Palestine Diaspora, allowing the 
books used in Lebanon to remain.389 Regardless of this decision, after 1958, Palestinian 
teachers were under constant surveillance, one teacher recalled: “If a teacher was a 
nationalist they’d have them lose his job. This was part of their work, also beating, 
shaving heads, and imprisonment.” 390  Teachers were not allowed to commemorate 
national days, nor teach Palestinian songs as they were under strict scrutiny.391 Teachers 
that were once leading the nationalist focus of Palestinian life were harassed and after 																																																								
387 Sayigh 2007. op.cit. Pg. 123 
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1958 they would have to receive permission from Lebanese authorities before being 
considered for employment. 392  The authority given the responsibility to provide 
permission for employment was Maktab Thani- a powerful domestic security 
organization, also known as the Deuxième Bureau of Lebanon (DB), that would become 
one of the main drivers of a need for a Palestinian revolution.393  
5.3.4 Security 
 
Nearly a decade and a half before the widely documented Lebanese Civil War of the 
1970s, Lebanon found itself on the brink of internal disaster in 1958. Following the Suez 
crisis in 1956 Lebanon was ideologically split between those who supported the Pan-
Arab notion of Nasser and the predominantly Maronite group who supported the West. 
At the centre of this quarrel was President Chamille Chamoun who, when he was the 
Lebanese representative at the UN rejected the creation of the State of Israel and 
supported Nasser. His tenure as President did not provide for the same policy, he was not 
exactly a pro-Zionist, but was anti-Nasser and pro-West, his allegiance namely to France. 																																																								
392 Sayigh 2015. op.cit. Pg. 79 
393 Today, the situation has become more manageable due to a number of NGO’s operating 
throughout Lebanon. The following two organizations located in Beirut are examples of how 
these organizations impact Palestinian students, old and young.   The Ghassan Kanafani Cultural 
Foundation, started in commemoration of the late Palestinian author and journalist Ghassan 
Kanafani has actively been setting up kindergartens throughout the refugee camps. Their work, in 
2011, directly benefitted approximately 1700 people throughout 6 Palestinian camps, 780 of them 
children between 3-6 who were provided with a pre-school education. Moreover, they have set up 
rehabilitation centres for children with mental and/or physical disabilities. The next organization, 
spearheaded by a number of volunteers, is the Unite Youth Lebanon Project, who aims to unite 
disadvantaged youth from different religious and ethnic backgrounds, which in a hotbed of 
political division is ground-breaking. They allow children to see past their respective 
backgrounds and see a fellow child for who they are rather than who they are labelled to be. What 
is particularly special about this organization is their bridge academy. The academy is made 
accessible to Palestinians within the UNRWA schools, starting in grade 10. They set out to 
improve the students English, help them with decisions pertaining to college and help prepare 
them for the SAT or TOEFL exams. Once the student is accepted to university is where the magic 
begins, they ensure the student’s tuition, books, accommodations and living expenses are all 
covered.  
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He opposed the Arab call to break diplomatic relations with Colonial France and Britain 
and supported the Eisenhower Doctrine,394 which he would soon attempt to enact.395 
  
The rebel group, mainly comprised of Muslim Pan-Arabists trained and armed by either 
Syria or Egypt, controlled the Northern and Eastern areas of Lebanon while the Lebanese 
government controlled Mount Lebanon and East Beirut. Israel, at the request of Lebanese 
Foreign Minister Charles Malik, played their part, defending the Lebanese-Syrian border 
for their Lebanese counterparts. The conflict claimed the lives of approximately 2,500 
people and when President Chamoun requested the support of the United States they 
rejected it, deciding to intervene only when the Pro-Western monarchy in Iraq fell. They 
were able to get the parties to cease fighting and supported General Fuad Chehab, a 
Maronite who kept the Lebanese Army out of the conflict in order to ensure that they 
would not sway the outcome, as the new President of Lebanon.396 President Chehab’s 
Presidency lasted from 1958-1964, and it was under his rule that the DB began 
controlling the refugee camps. Bassam Abu Sharif recalls the treatment of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon when he was studying in Beirut, recalling: 
I was a student in the early 60’s at American University of Beirut (AUB) and we used to go and 
visit camps and we used to see that Palestinians in the camps were treated like animals from the 
Lebanese DB. They were not allowed to build, also, Palestinians were not allowed to leave the 
camps without permission even to visit their families in another camp. No demonstration was 
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allowed, no newspapers, no political meetings, to mentioning of Palestine or the liberation of 
Palestine.397  
 
The sole concern of the DB was to set up in the outskirts of the camp and oppress the 
Palestinians. Joseph Kaylani, one of the notorious officers of the bureau, described: “The 
Palestinian is like a spring, if you step on him he stays quiet, but if you take your foot off 
he hits you in the face.”398 While this sentiment was not shared amongst the Lebanese 
population, there was a distinct political divide that created an “us vs. them” mentality. 
This type of thinking allowed Israel to solidify itself as a state and begin its rampant 
development while the Palestinians were more entrenched in a battle of survival against 
Arab security and intelligence officers.   
 
Under the control of the DB, Palestinians were forbidden to visit other camps without 
permission and those who were visiting a neighbour after nightfall would be punished. 
Aside from movement, the DB would monitor water usage, bathing hours as well as any 
building, as mentioned above with regards to using nails. 399  To say the word 
“Palestinian” became a crime under the oppressive rule of the DB,400  the attempted 
curfews and lack of movement in itself has resembled an apartheid system. Though the 
DB is no longer in power and things have become slightly better for the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, Zionist publications such as the Jerusalem Post 401  and Times of Israel 402 
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attempt to discredit the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement as well as 
events such as Israeli Apartheid Week by shifting the focus to the Apartheid rules of 
Lebanon.  
 
At a time where Pan-Arab sentiment was popular and powerful, the Palestinians in 
Lebanon were forced to view themselves as outsiders. They had a special identity, were 
bound to the refugee camps, special schools and were surviving on UNRWA rations. The 
Palestinian population in Lebanon were facing constant shame and deprivation and 
although Nasser was powerful and popular, the Palestinians could not help but develop an 
identity separate from their Arab brethren.    
5.4 Impact on Identity 
From the onset of their exile, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon began to exemplify 
practices and realities that forced them to see themselves as separate from their Lebanese 
counterparts. While this separation was not always felt individually, as suggested by 
Farid Ayad, there was a distinct civil divide. While the basis of nationalism and national 
identity is enshrined in the development of a national consciousness based on a common 
history or memory which then develops itself into a functioning society, the treatment of 
the Palestinians in the camps may have reversed this development.  
 
When exploring classical theory, starting with Smith, the Palestinians were able to 
develop a sense of economic and legal regularity which would define them. 
Unfortunately for the refugees, it was not done in similar fashion to most nations, the 
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Palestinians in Lebanon had a common economy, common laws and common territorial 
mobility defined by their lack of mobility and economic opportunity. Similarly, Gellner’s 
theory predicated on division of labour may provide for a similar development of 
identity, in which, the Palestinians were not able to develop a division of labour, as their 
economic prospects were not exactly in their control. The division of labour, as it applied 
to the Palestinians, was a product of the evolving ethnocratic make-up of states such as 
Lebanon, Israel, Syria and Jordan. This is important due to the construction of Palestinian 
identity not forming itself from memory or history but due to trauma and lack of 
opportunity in their places of residence. 
 
In the first chapter, a number of Palestinian notables were quoted arguing that the 
Palestinians are Palestinian because they chose to be, or chose to relate to one another. 
The experiences in Lebanon provide for a different conclusion, the Palestinians were 
forced to be “Palestinian”; they were forced to be different than their Lebanese 
neighbours. That is not to say that they did not have an attachment to their lost homeland, 
but that the necessity for a homeland and control of their destiny was strengthened by the 
treatment of the Palestinians in the refugee camps.  
 
In revisiting the first research question; “What events had to take place in order for the 
Palestinian political factions in the Arab world to be able to control their own 
narrative/cause and for the Arab, then later the Western world to recognise the PLO as 
the sole representatives of the Palestinian people?” The separation was forced upon them 
while in Lebanon. Previous chapters have shown to what extent the Arab world attempted 
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to control the Palestinian narrative, but the suppression of Palestinian consciousness and 
the politics of division in Lebanon were instrumental in the Palestinians taking control of 
their own affairs. The concept of “the other” or “belonging” as theorised by Guibernau, 
Hobsbawm, Said, Hall and others has shown itself to be essential, but not as regularly 
depicted as Arab vs. Jews. The initial development of the Palestinians as a group, unique 
to their surroundings was not formulated against Israel per se but against those of which 
they share a history, ethnicity and language.  
 
This thesis argues that the Palestinian identity before their trauma has become irrelevant 
in the modern day. The argument of who was in the land of historic Palestine or who God 
may have promised the land to will not sway political favour to the Palestinians. The 
Palestinians in the Arab world were not always welcomed, nor were they integrated, even 
with the best efforts of the United Nations.  
 
The refugees in Lebanon have faced decades of oppression and mistreatment, but in 
terms of forming a Palestinian national identity, this mistreatment may have been 
instrumental. The impact or being forced into refugee camps, sent to special schools, 
surviving on UNRWA rations created a sense of “place” for the Palestinians. The walls 
of these refugee camps have become a place to channel resistance.403 The graffiti and 
posters pledging allegiance to different political parties or commemorating certain events 
has allowed for this identity and history to be passed down from generation to generation.  
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During the early 1960s the epicentre of Arab nationalism was in Syria and Egypt, the 
majority of Palestinians were in Jordan but the Palestinian revolution did not start in these 
states, it did not start in the West Bank or Gaza, it started in Southern Lebanon. On 
January 1, 1965 the General Command of al-Asifa Forces (Fatah’s military wing) 
announced that they had conducted a raid into the occupied territories and returned 
safely. It is not clear whether this raid actually happened or if it as thwarted, nevertheless, 
there was jubilation in the camps. It took four years before the revolution returned to 
Lebanon, but the third stage of Abu Lughod’s politics of revolution and hope began to 
take form as a revolution, the suffering has become a struggle. Bassam Abu Sharif also 
suggests the pertinence of the time in Lebanon, stating that:  
In Lebanon particularly, in the camps of Lebanon, the Arab nationalist movement was created 
raising the slogan that Arab unity is the way to liberate Palestine and return to Palestine while 
Fatah started al-Asifa in order to start their own military resistance to their colonisers. Certain 
Arab regimes, the West in general, and Israel in particular were trying to wipe out the belonging of 
the Palestinians, this adhering of the Palestinians to their identity, the strong belief of the 
Palestinians roots in the Palestinian soil, these deep roots that have confronted all invasions of 
their land through history.404 
 
Palestine was longed for, but not as a romanticised paradise, but simply where the people 
felt they were home. Take for example the impoverished Palestinian peasant population 
who were, for the most part, living on rations. Due to their connection with Europe, 
Lebanon was more advanced when compared to the surrounding Arab states, allowing for 
the educated few to flourish. The Palestinians were an agrarian society- their attachment 
to the land was based on their livelihood. When their land was taken away, so was their 
sense of ownership and self-sufficiency. 
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Wayne Norman spoke of remoralising and reconfiguring identity, the changing of content 
as it affects identity. It is at this stage where this process began, the nature of being 
Palestinian was not based on being from Palestine, but being treated differently than their 
neighbour. Here I will refer to the discussion on the impact of identity with Bassam Abu 
Sharif, where he believes that the Palestinian national identity will always be, and has 
always been an Arab identity, what changed, or in this case developed, was a Palestinian 
political identity.405 The rights and responsibilities of the Palestinians were not existent, 
nor was there much opportunity to develop their own society as their rights were taken 
away. The treatment of the refugees in Lebanon was damning, but it allowed the 
Palestinians to reengage thoughts on identity developed through a lack of rights, 
economic opportunity and mobilisation.  
 
In regards to nationalism and identity theory, the Palestinian case acts as an outlier in that 
it was shaped by the lack of inclusion. The Palestinians came together while 
geographically dispersed, not because of a memory or attachment, but as a need to 
survive. The refugees in Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world reignited the bitterness 
Fatah leaders had towards the Arab armies due to their negligent handling of the Arab-
Israeli war of 1948. The next chapter will explore how the PLO’s revolution created a 
sense of a quasi-state in Jordan and then Lebanon providing the Palestinians with a sense 
of pride while empowering the nation.406  																																																								
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Chapter 6: The Revolution 
Listen to me, the Palestinian identity is based on fighting against occupation and continuous 
struggle, it is not based on peace. The definition here is important, the Palestinian identity actually 
became stronger when the Palestinians started fighting and the Palestinian national cause faded or 
weakened when the Palestinians moved towards peace. You cannot separate the impact of the 
fighting spirit from the Palestinian identity, the fight is an integral part of the Palestinian story, 
you cannot separate the identity from the revolution and the idea of fighting for your most basic 
human rights by any means necessary.407   
 
The previous two chapters set the basis of the Palestinian and Pan-Arab identities, as 
shaped by their initial expulsion and life in the refugee camps. In keeping with Abu-
Lughod’s three determinants, this chapter will explore the final stage of his three-pronged 
theory: the politics of revolution and hope. With the creation of the PLO as well as the 
rise of the Palestinian political factions, Palestinian identity was able to differentiate itself 
from the rest of the Arab world. In this chapter the fractured concept of Pan-Arab unity 
and the idea of a Pan-Palestinian consensus are explored through the development of the 
PLO, the evolution of the Palestinian charter and events in Jordan between 1967 and 
1971. 
 
The Palestinians were in dire need of representation, while the creation of the PLO was 
historic and symbolic, it was highly criticised by many Palestinians who feared that it 
would do nothing but replicate the 1948 All-Palestine Government.408 Abu Iyad believed 
that the creation of the PLO was a reactionary act by President Nasser due to the 
popularity of Fatah’s campaign for an armed resistance. Though there was reason for 																																																																																																																																																																					
and the relationship between the Palestinians and the Lebanese, rather the shame of depending on 
financial aid, rations while living on economic and developmental restrictions. The vast majority 
of Palestinians across the world continue to long for their homeland, but for the most vulnerable 
the memories and history attached to the homeland have become irrelevant. Palestine is seen by 
camp-dwellers as a place where they belong, a place where they may apply their skills to benefit 
themselves, their families and their society.  
407 Atwan, 2017. op.cit 
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suspicion, Bassam Abu Sharif believes that regardless of the political wing, the creation 
of the PLO also meant the creation of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), which would 
ultimately end up ‘graduating hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from military 
academies, whether pilots, tank commanders or infantry which gave the Palestinians the 
opportunity, for the first time to have real trained, military options.”409 Nasser feared that 
Abu Iyad’s sentiments would resonate amongst the Palestinians and Arabs alike, and 
thereby likely to drag the Arabs into a war with Israel, he called on Ahmed Shuqayri to 
create an organisation to represent the Palestinians.410 Shuqayri was a lawyer, a diplomat 
who held prominent positions including Vice-President of the Saudi Arabian delegation 
to the UN and Syria’s representative to the Arab League.411 He was the perfect candidate 
as no Palestinian was as well connected nor as well versed in Arab politics. Shuqayri was 
not an advocate of the armed struggle, and was therefore against Fatah, referring to the 
organisation as enemies of the Palestinian resistance movement and denouncing them in 
the name of the PLO.412  As Fatah was little known at the time, no one could have 
predicted that their leader Yasser Arafat would eventually take Shuqayri’s position as 
chairman of the PLO and become the epicentre of Palestinian politics until his death in 
2004. 
 
According to Leila Khaled, airplane hijacker and member of the PFLP, the creation of the 
PLO was undertaken to shift the focus from their failures in dealing with or responding to 
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Israel’s NWC project. There was fear that this would give the Palestinians an excuse to 
raise arms against Israel, Khaled notes: 
The honourable (sic) presidents and noble kings, without consulting the Palestinian people or 
considering other candidates, appointed Ahmed Shuqayri chairman of the PLO. Shuqayri was 
their man. He could be relied upon to make the necessary flamboyant pronouncements to appease 
the Palestinian masses, without precipitating a crisis or organizing (sic) the Palestinians into a 
fighting force.413  
 
The first Palestine National Congress took place in East Jerusalem on May 28th, 1964, 
opened by King Hussein of Jordan. The event itself was historic, resulting in the creation 
of the first Palestine National Charter, which would then be amended four years later. 
The charter attempted to answer the question that this thesis has explored, who are the 
Palestinians? The newly formed PLO defined a Palestinian as follows:  
Article 5. The Palestinian personality is a permanent and genuine characteristic 
that does not disappear. It is transferred from fathers to sons. 
Article 6. The Palestinians are those Arab citizens who were living normally in 
Palestine up to 1947, whether they remained or were expelled. Every child who 
was born to a Palestinian parent after this date whether in Palestine or outside is 
a Palestinian. 
Article 7. Jews of Palestinian origin are considered Palestinians if they are willing 
to live peacefully and loyally in Palestine.414 
Still anticipating their return to Palestine to be near, this definition of identity is not 
everlasting as it only includes those born in Palestine or the first generation born in exile. 
This narrow approach is myopic and reactive, driven by an imminent return, thereby 																																																								
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eschewing the developing characteristics of the Palestinian identity in favour of 
primordial ones.   Additionally, the Palestinian identity is defined through a narrow lens 
viewed to be recurrent or primordial. Of course those who adopted this charter could not 
foresee the future, nevertheless, the status quo may have led the Palestinian identity to 
have become extinct. Finally, what may have been most troubling to those who were 
critical of the PLO were articles 11 to 14 all of which argued for Arab unity, even forcing 
this belief upon their constituents arguing that  
Article 11. The Palestinian people firmly believe in Arab unity, and in order to 
play its role in realizing (sic) this goal, it must, at this stage of its struggle 
preserve its Palestinian personality and all its constituents. It must strengthen the 
consciousness of its existence and stand against any attempt or plan that may 
weaken or disintegrate its personality.415 
To be Palestinian is to firmly believe in Arab unity, while playing a “role” in liberating 
their homeland, as portrayed in this charter as well as the Arab League’s resolution of 
1964. The Palestinians wanted more than to play a role in their fight for self-
determination. A number of events had to transpire in the region before the PLO refined 
their charter in 1968, starting with the Arab failure in 1967. 
 
I tell you truthfully that I am ready to assume the entire responsibility. I have taken a decision with 
which I want you all to help me. I have decided to give up completely and finally every official 
post and every political role, and to return to the ranks of the public to do my duty with them like 
every other citizen. The forces hostile to the Arab nationalist movement always try to picture it as 
Abdel Nasser’s empire. That is not true, for the hope for Arab unity began before Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. It will remain after Gamal Abdel Nasser.”416 
- President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
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Even in the bleakest of times that have troubled the Arab world, the Arabs will always 
have, and have always had a number of attributes that connect them. The Arabs cannot 
deny their classical bond; they are connected by a similar language, a predominant 
religion, and a ranging but similar culture. For the Arabs, as discussed throughout this 
thesis, that part of the story, as defined by Gellner, is not exactly relevant today. The 
impact of geopolitics and the nation-state has forced ethnic customs and allegiances to 
redefine themselves in order to fit into national boundaries. The Pan-Arab mentality was 
served by political instrumentalism to distract from local policies while reaffirming 
broader ideological views against the West and Israel.  
 
As the Arab nation faltered, the Jewish nation soared. According to Norman Finkelstein, 
only 1 in 20 American Jews took the trip to visit Israel before the 1967 war. According to 
Erich Fromm, the Suez Crisis of 1956 was a humiliation in the eyes of American Jews, 
and the kidnapping of senior Nazi Adolf Eichmann in Argentina was viewed as 
unbecoming of the Jewish state by American Jewish elites, even likened to the type of 
“lawlessness of exactly the type of which the Nazis themselves… have been guilty.”417 
Due to the Holocaust, the decline of Europe, in response to the rise of the Soviet Union 
the United States were naturally inclined to support Israel, due to its democratic nature as 
well as the Arabs’ Soviet ties. Nevertheless, while the tides were quiet on the Cold War 
front, the Kremlin sent a message to the White House on June 5th, 1967 reassuring the 
United States that they would be observers in the Middle East war, as long as they would 
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do the same.418 Although the United States agreed, Nasser pointed to imperialist collusion 
by the British and the United States as one of the reasons for their downfall.419 Regardless 
of why Israel won the war, or who colluded with whom, the United States found their 
military ally in the region and American Jews became, what Finkelstein calls; “born-
again Zionists.”420 Meanwhile, the Arabs were once again defeated by Israel, their leader 
had resigned and the rest of Palestine was occupied by the state of Israel. 
Yasser Arafat and the others had rushed back to Damascus… Together we listened to that fateful 
speech of June 9 over the radio. When Nasser ended it by announcing his resignation, our despair 
reached its peak. It was as if we had suffered a double defeat, military and political- political 
because for us, despite everything, the fall of Nasser meant the end of all hope. Despite 
everything, Nasser symbolized (sic) the rejection of the fait accompli, the symbol of resistance 
which to our mind must inevitably emerge.421 
 
The excerpt above, as recounted by Fatah leader Abu Iyad, identifies the Palestinians as a 
people in limbo, not exactly understanding the circumstances or the reality. Just two 
years before his resignation, Nasser’s Egypt claimed that Fatah were representatives of 
the Muslim Brotherhood or even worse the CIA. Nasser’s commander-in-chief to the 
United Arab Forces requested all Arab governments to crush Fatah,422 yet, they were in 
despair and disbelief that “the great leader of the Arab nation, the man sent by destiny, 
the hero that was going to help us recover at least part of our usurped country,” had been 
defeated. According to Aby Iyad, the manner in which the Israelis welcomed the news of 
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Nasser’s resignation meant that they had no choice but to stand against it.423 Fatah leaders 
were not the only ones to share this sentiment.  
 
As protests raged throughout the Arab world calling for their President to remain, Nasser 
was forced to rethink his decision, leaving the decision with Egypt’s National Assembly. 
To which they declared: “The people have stressed they do not agree with you and it 
always has been your practices to accept the people’s will.”424 Nasser remained, but Pan-
Arabism, as it was practiced in this time period, had taken its final blow. 
 
Even the founders of the pro-Nasser ANM, who later in 1967 would become known as 
the PFLP declared: 
The June defeat, in our opinion, is not merely a military defeat, but actually a defeat for these 
regimes and their programs (sic). It reveals the incapacity of these regimes to effect any political, 
military, economic or ideological mobilization (sic) that would ensure steadfastness and victory 
over neo-imperialism, its alliances and plans in our homeland.425  
 
In the Palestinian political forum, the biggest loser was the PLO itself, people still did not 
trust Shuqayri and the PLO was not initially invited to the Arab League Summit in 
Khartoum in 1967, which was called to discuss the question of Palestine and the 
Palestinians after the war. It took a last minute meeting between the PLO’s representative 
to Lebanon, Shafiq al-Hout and Prime Minister Mahjoub of Sudan to confirm an 
invitation to Shuqayri.426 The outcome of the summit was the Khartoum Resolution made 
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famous by the three no’s, simply; “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no 
negotiations with it.” 427  This was obviously troubling to Israel, strengthening the 
argument that the Palestinians and Arabs alike want to destroy Israel and reject Israel’s 
right to exist. 
 
The resolution was not welcomed by the Palestinians either, namely the call for “the 
withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been 
occupied since the aggression of June 5.”428 The resolution called for the withdrawal of 
the lands seized in the 1967 war, disregarding those seized in 1948. The PLO withdrew 
from the summit during its closing session citing the exclusion of their request for a 
“fourth no” which prohibits any unilateral acceptance of a proposal dealing with the 
question of Palestine.429 The PLO was neglected once again later on in 1967 when Egypt 
and Jordan accepted United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 which was 
adopted unanimously on November 22nd, 1967. 
The resolution, which gave no mention to the Palestinians, called for: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
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within secure and recognized (sic) boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force;430 
 
Jordan and Egypt’s acceptance of this resolution contradicted the Khartoum Resolution, 
namely with regards to the recognition of Israel. This left the PLO with no support, as the 
Arabs began to serve their own interests and after pressure from a number of 
organisations, Ahmed Shuqayri resigned on December 24th, 1967. He appointed Yahya 
Hammuda as his successor. His first order of business was to claim that “the PLO is not a 
party but an instrument for representing the Palestinian people.”431 The Palestinians were 
to enter a period of competing ideologies. 
6.1 The Rise of Palestinian Political Factions 
 
The Palestinian political arena consisted of four ideologies, according to al-Hout; local 
movements in isolation from the larger Arab nationalist movements, the Marxist/Leninist 
movement, the Islamic movement and the Arab nationalist movement.432 At this stage, 
the Islamic movement, namely the Muslim Brotherhood was dormant and it would be 
fourteen years before the creation of the Islamic Jihad of Palestine and twenty years 
before the creation of Hamas. At the time where Islamic sentiment began to rise again, 
due to the failures of the state in 1967, the Palestinian foundation still found itself to be 
secular. This era in Palestinian politics would be dedicated to the growth of isolated 
groups, Marxist groups, and those sponsored by a range of Arab states.  
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Arafat later declared that “the defeat in 1967 was very painful but at the same time it was 
a great incentive for us to work harder and achieve something.”433  Abdel Bari Atwan 
shared Arafat’s sentiments, educing that “After 1967, and a little before, though Nasser 
revived the ideas and hope of liberation, it was not until 1967 when the feda’yeen, the 
guerrillas, when they realised that the Palestinian identity started to get stronger and 
stronger, deeper and deeper, they gained more confidence and more hope.”434  What 
became known as the Naksa, the setback, for the Palestinians due to losing what was left 
of their lost land became a political opportunity for the armed resistance. Bassam Abu 
Sharif recalls the defeat in 1967 from a similar lens, calling a “turning point”, arguing 
that since Egypt, Syria and Jordan’s military and intelligence institutions were defeated, 
the Palestinians were provided with an opportunity to organise in a manner that was 
forbidden by the aforementioned Arab countries.435  
 
In August of 1967, the guerrilla organisations of Fatah, the PFLP, the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF), the Vengeance Youth, and the Heroes for Return met in 
Damascus to create the National Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (NPF). 
When the announcement was to be made, there was no representative from Fatah, with 
the excuse that Fatah was still without a leader.436 While it was founded by a group of 
individuals, Arafat amongst them, he was still not officially declared leader and when his 																																																								
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colleagues set out to look for him before the announcement all that was found was a note 
reading; “The leadership is in the field.”437 Due to their absence, Fatah was denied entry 
into the NPF. 
 
Palestinian identity remained fragmented, still reeling from the loss of the West Bank, 
East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip, the most vulnerable became those living in the new 
Israeli occupied territories. The bond that developed through a historic connection 
amongst the Palestinians was being driven apart not only geographically but also through 
time. Twenty years after the Nakba, there were new generations of Palestinians who were 
perceived to be less than their neighbours and the dream of Nasser had become a 
nightmare. There were two separate fronts, the PLA and the NPF, with Fatah on the 
outside looking in. Both organisations consisted of Pan-Arabist camps comprised by the 
educated masses. Most importantly, these organisations were set up in Cairo, Amman, 
Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait, Riyadh and Lebanon. In order for a national message to 
really gain ground, or develop into something everlasting, it was essential to involve the 
core of the conflict, in this case the core is the base of the national movement; Palestine.  
 
The people of the West Bank, disconnected from the revolutionary movement, took the 
brunt of Israel’s initial crackdown after the 1967 war. Abu Shakib, a veteran Fatah 
member recalls that: “We had at least 500 to 600 members in the West Bank, in about 15 
days’ Israeli defense (sic) minister (Moshe) Dayan managed to capture 300 of them and 
everything fell apart. I remember Arafat being in the West Bank at the time travelling 
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under assumed names.”438 Being that  Arafat was literally “in the field,” for a civilian 
population that is constantly reminded that their fellow citizens reside in exile, Arafat’s 
infiltration of the freshly occupied territories was not only important to his legacy as well 
as his pending role in the Palestinian revolution. More so, he reinvigorated the 
population, he drew a connection between the refugees, the feda’yeen and those who 
remained. Unsure of what would happen to the land, the Palestinians only option to unite 
was in belonging to a nation, defined by more than its territorial unity.  
 
Guibernau explains this as the psychological dimension of national identity; the first of 
her five dimensions. Before the cultural, historical, territorial and political dimensions, 
she resorts to the psychological closeness and unification of a group of people. It is 
difficult to quantify the closeness of a people who face geographical divides, especially 
considering that the identity of the Palestinians for the previous twenty years had been 
tied to the Arabist cause. Recalling E.G.H. Joffé’s loyalties in the Arab world, the 
Ummah became dormant after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and it became time to 
transfer from the Quam, prevalent under Nasser, to the Watan. The failures of the ANM; 
known in Arabic as Harakat al Qawmiyin al Arab, and the growing success of Fatah; 
known in Arabic as (Harakat al Tahrir al Watani al Filistini) encapsulate this transfer. 
From their onset, Fatah defined itself as a Watani organisation and Arafat’s trip into 
Palestine attempted to take it into his own hands. 
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This thesis is not attempting to portray Yasser Arafat as the sole leader of the Palestinian 
people, but as a pragmatic actor who played a highly impactful role in creating the 
bridges that connected Palestinian refugees with those still living in Palestine, thus 
supporting the psychological development of Palestinian national identity. His first step 
was his mission to the West Bank and Jerusalem to coordinate the resistance developing 
outside the territories with those who would have to carry out the activities. Upon 
returning to Damascus, he explained his travels to his colleagues as well as advising them 
to travel to the battle zones of the 1967 war to retrieve the arsenal left behind by the 
Syrian army as they retreated.439 Before attempting to retain their land, the Palestinians 
were thrust into defending their dignity, known in Arabic as Karameh. 
6.2 The Battle of Karameh   
 
In introducing the pertinence of the battle of Karameh, Afif Safieh recalls; 
Karameh was an important moment in contemporary Palestinian history in the sense that it 
occurred after the humiliating, surprising and intriguing defeat in 1967. Here was a group of 
guerrilla fighters who violated the principles of guerrilla warfare, which was to always avoid 
confrontation at the moment of choice of your superior enemy and choose the moment of 
harassment at your own timing. The guerrillas of Fatah decided to violate these rules and make a 
stand, and the contribution of the Jordanian army in that battle was of immense important but that 
too is due to the fact that the Fatah movement opted to make a stand. Had they not made a stand, 
had they vanished into thin air and no confrontation had occurred the Jordanian army would not 
have joined the battle and the Israeli army would not have had as many casualties as they did.440  
 
The Palestinian factions used the bases in Jordan to coordinate a number of attacks within 
Israel, none more troubling than the attack of March 18th, 1968- when an Israeli school 
bus drove over a landmine. The attack claimed the lives of two adults while wounding a 
number of children.441 It was no secret that the Palestinians had crossed the line and Israel 																																																								
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would retaliate; Israel made their intentions explicit. Palestinians travelling from Jericho 
to Amman would stop in Karameh to inform the militants that many Israeli troops were 
amassing at the border while Israeli media was declaring that they would soon be 
attacking the Palestinian camps.442 Abu Jihad summarised the situation: 
Very quickly we realized (sic) what Israel’s strategy was. In the first place the Israelis were 
sending a message to Jordan. By showing their hand so openly the Israelis were saying to Hussein 
and his forces the following: “We mean business. We intend to smash Fatah. If you get in our way 
we’ll smash you, too.”443 
 
Abu Jihad claims that to be the first message, with the second directed at the Palestinians: 
 
With us the Israelis were playing a much more clever game- or so they thought… Rule number 
one is that a guerilla force does not stand and fight a regular army…In short they were challenging 
us to break the rules of guerrilla warfare and to stand and fight. With all the world publicity that 
was focused on the situation at the time, they calculated that we could not afford to be seen as 
cowards who ran away. So they believed there would be a good chance that we would stand and 
fight for the sake of our credibility. And that meant that they could finish us.444 
 
For the first time in their history, the Israelis and the Palestinians were set to battle; the 
United States made one last ditch effort to compel the Palestinians to retreat. Through the 
Jordanian military, Abu Iyad and Yasser Arafat received a message from the CIA that 
Israel was intending to attack their base in the Jordan Valley.445 Similarly, the Iraqis and 
Jordanians told Arafat that they have no chance against Israel and that they should 
retreat.446 The advice provided by the United States as well as the Arabs fell on deaf ears. 
The reasoning behind the tip from the CIA is not as clear, while it may have been done as 
a favour to King Hussein, acting as a back channel for Israel to ensure that Jordan 
understood that the attack was not directed at them. Additionally, understanding the 
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might of the Israeli army, as well as the mystery that was Fatah, there may have been fear 
of perception. Israel had developed the strongest army in the region, if they were to 
convincingly win the battle the images of a defeated refugee camp may have been 
perceived negatively. Also not known, is whether the United States advised Israel not to 
carry out the attack, before advising the Palestinians to retreat.  
 
The Palestinian commanders debated whether or not to retreat. Abu Iyad claims that they 
agreed unanimously after a short debate.447 Bassam Abu Sharif recalls arriving to Jordan 
and seeing Arafat wrestling with the decision himself before telling Sharif; “We will 
confront them. This is our chance to change the morale of the entire Arab world. We 
must prove that a small group can stand up to a giant. Even if we die, we will have died 
trying and thousands more will take our place.”448 Bassam Abu Sharif also notes that the 
decision was not unanimous; instead a number of fighters retreated.  
 
Abu Jihad, who was revered as the military leader of Fatah, was one of the people to 
retreat to Damascus. Although he claims that he returned to collect weapons, Alan Hart, 
the writer of one of Arafat’s biographies argues that Arafat was so sure that they were 
going to die that he instructed Abu Jihad to return to Damascus to spare his life, in order 
to carry on the leadership of Fatah.449 Accounts show that they were all but expecting to 
lose the war and die in the process, but expected this to be the event needed to ensure the 
growth and popularity of their cause. 
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The exact numbers as to how many died in the battle are disputed and the clear military 
victor was the Israelis. Palestinians such as Bassam Abu-Sharif claim that “Israel 
incurred huge losses,” 450  while Israeli Mordechai Bar-On, author of a biography on 
Moshe Dayan claims that “Dayan defeated the terrorists on the battlefield.” Regardless of 
the victory on the battlefield, Bar-On articulates that “Arafat and his people gained in 
power and status.”451 For the purpose of this thesis, and what the battle of Karameh 
meant to the Palestinian national consciousness, understanding that the details may have 
been fabricated, Abu Iyad’s and Arafat’s collection of events will be used to explain what 
transpired. 
 
Arafat stated: 
 
Our fighters, our children, they came up from their secret places and they threw themselves at the 
Israeli tanks. Some climbed onto the tanks and put grenades inside of them. Others had sticks of 
dynamite strapped to their bodies.452  
 
Abu Iyad stated: 
 
On March 21, exactly three days after General Khammash’s warning I was awakened at dawn by 
one of the feda’yeen who announced that the Israeli offensive had begun. In the distance tank 
columns of the Jewish army, followed by infantry units, could already be discerned crossing the 
Jordan. The artillery went into action while helicopters dropped parachutists behind our lines. 
Some 15,000 men stormed our bases along a front about eighty kilometers long. The main attack 
was clearly directed against Karameh, which we had to defend with fewer than 300 men. Without 
waiting for instructions from his high command, Mashur Haditha- the Jordanian general in charge 
of the region- gave orders for the Jordanian artillery to fire back. The descending tanks were 
greeted by a hail of hand grenades and heavy gunfire. Feda’yeen poured down from the 
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surrounding hills to take part in the battle… The fighting continued until twilight, after which the 
Israelis began to gather their dead and wounded before retreating.453  
 
The Palestinians did sustain more losses than the Israelis, Karameh was devastated and 
though oft neglected by the Palestinians, without Jordan, it is difficult to say whether or 
not a single fida’i would have survived the Israeli aggression.   
 
Nevertheless, the Palestinians had their first symbolic victory. The Palestinians reached a 
crossroads in their history, after the loss in 1967 their identity was on the brink of 
extinction. The heroes and national symbols of the past were replaced by the ongoing 
setbacks and the self-pity of viewing themselves as victims and refugees. This all 
changed in 1968, prior to the battle of Karameh the Palestinians were “eaten by diseases 
of laziness, dependency and indifference.”454 The shift after Karameh was essential due 
to the belief that the Palestinians, for the first time, viewed themselves as controllers of 
their own destiny and identity. 
 
As argued in chapter five, the Palestinians identified with one another after the Nakba 
due to the lack of freedom and opportunity. When explored through the lens of classical 
national theory they can only be classified as a “nation” when Smith’s and Gellner’s 
theories are reverse engineered to be explained through the lack of a social structure. 
However, in a critical sense, they were not a nation, they were refugees. As Arabs, 
attached to the Arab nation, the Palestinian identity was merged with their neighbours, 
even though those residing in the neighbouring Arab states had little to no rights. 
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The stand at Karameh once again reinvigorated and reconfigured the identity, not so 
much in the scope of national rights and responsibilities as posed by Norman but through 
the creation of heroes and hope.  The refugees became feda’yeen, and more importantly 
for their national consciousness the victims became the fighters. In prior years, as the 
Palestinians sat on the sidelines watching the Arab armies fail to retrieve their lost 
country, they constantly viewed themselves as victims, patiently waiting for someone 
else to provide them with direction. The development of a modern Palestinian identity 
had to shed itself of its own tag of self-pity and overcome the shackles that came with 
being a refugee.  
 
Israel’s plan to rid itself of the unknown organisation infiltrating their security and to 
“parade captured terrorist leaders in Jerusalem,”455 backfired. Instead they acknowledged 
the Palestinian resistance while giving the Palestinian masses the psychological victory 
they were waiting for. The resistance movement became something that all Palestinians 
could get involved in, aside from the fighting itself Palestinians were developing 
Palestinian schools, orphanages and hospitals.456 Abu Jihad recalls that: 
Within a day or two of the battle of Karameh many cars and trucks began to arrive at our new 
headquarters in Salt. They were bringing us presents of blankets, clothes and food from 
Palestinian communities across the Arab world. From these gifts we had enough food to feed our 
fighters, including the new recruits, for three months.457 
 
Aside from the non-violent support, Fatah’s recruitment numbers grew to the extent 
where they would actually turn fighters away. Ayad claims that after Karameh, Yasser 																																																								
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Arafat and Abu Jihad would go to an open field and recruits would line up in the 
hundreds for a chance to be chosen as a fida’i.458 There was still one issue for Fatah to 
resolve, they were still without a clear leader. Three weeks after Karameh, Abu Iyad, 
while in Damascus, received intelligence that one of their comrades, who he wouldn’t 
name, was set to announce that he was the commander in chief of Al Asifa, the military 
wing of Fatah. Without consulting the leadership, he released a press release announcing 
that Yasser Arafat has been appointed as the leader of Fatah. Arafat was not aware and 
only learnt about this appointment while listening to the radio. Abu Iyad claims that he 
was irate when he got the news, but his actions leading up to Karameh, which include his 
visit to Jerusalem, show that he was positioning himself to be the leader of Fatah.459 The 
Palestinian resistance was riding high. 
Afif Safieh argues that the stand at Karameh was the first time the Palestinians were 
successful in motivating their Arab neighbours, saying: 
One of the principles of Fatah in ’65, when they started, was the idea that the Arabs lacked the will 
for confrontation and had they had the will they would be militarily superior to the Zionist Israeli 
challenge. Fatah decided that they would provoke the situation of revolution so the Arabs would 
decide to engage in the battle. In a way Karameh was a successful model for that ideology 
although you can go a little bit earlier and say that their provocations of the Israeli state in ’65, ’66 
and ‘67 provoked the escalation that led to the ‘67 war and the defeat that followed but in 
Karameh it was a success.460 	
Bassam Abu Sharif echoes this reaction, though focusing on the reunification of 
Palestinians, claiming: 	
When I say reuniting the Palestinians I meant, with the loosening of the grip of the Arab regimes 
on the Palestinian refugee camps in the surrounding Arab countries the Palestinians found, in the 
PLO, their representative. This is new, all of a sudden the refugees who were treated as slaves, as 
tenth grade citizens who were not allowed even to work to earn a living, these refugees found 
themselves free to join the PLO and finally be proud to say that they are Palestinian and fight to 
liberate Palestine.461  																																																								
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6.3 After Karameh 
 
Fatah, then took steps to take control of the PLO, although not all members were 
supportive of merging the resistance with the bureaucratic and political PLO. By June 
1968, half of the seats in the Palestinian National Council (PNC) were occupied by 
members of the resistance. The first course of action was to amend the Palestinian 
National Charter. As Karameh was arguably the most important event in reawakening the 
Palestinian national identity, the revised charter acted as the tool in which the Palestinians 
redefined their identity. The articles that directly attempted to define the identity were 
slightly amended to the following: 
 
Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent 
characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation 
and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which 
befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their 
membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them. 
Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally 
resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed 
there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside 
Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian. 
Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of 
the Zionist Invasion will be considered Palestinians. 462 
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The major changes lie in the terminology, what was referred to as the “Palestinian 
personality” in the 1964 charter became the “Palestinian identity” and the new charter is 
more encapsulating as it claims that the Palestinian identity does not change with the 
circumstances of each person, which obviously vary. Further, with regards to children, 
the 1968 charter defines the Palestinian father more loosely. Finally, when defining the 
Jews of Palestine, the 1968 charter considers those living in Palestine before the Zionist 
invasion as Palestinian while the 1964 charter claims that all Jews who are willing to live 
in Palestine, loyal to a Palestinian state, are Palestinian. On Arab unity, the 1968 charter 
asserts:  
 
Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute 
their share toward the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the 
present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop 
their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or 
impair it. 
Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary 
objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. 
Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine 
leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization (sic) of one objective 
proceeds side by side with work toward the realization (sic) of the other. 
Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, 
depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs 
the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The 
people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization (sic) of this 
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sacred (qawmi) goal.463 
 
In 1964, the Palestinians were to play their role, in supporting the Arab world in 
liberating their homeland. The 1968 charter states that the Palestinians are responsible for 
their own liberation, and that the Arabs were to play a role. Further, that the Palestinians 
would lead the way for uniting the Arab world itself. Lastly, possibly the most important 
part of the new charter was the idea that: 
Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall 
strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their 
absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to 
work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their 
return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise 
their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.464 
The Arabs were very clearly embarrassed after the 1967 war and while the Palestinian 
resistance couldn’t reverse the outcome of the war, they were able to shift the focus and 
revitalise the Arab masses. Egypt and Jordan, who were fierce opponents of Fatah, were 
now supporters of the resistance. King Hussein of Jordan even publicly announced that 
they are all feda’yeen.465 Regardless of the number of casualties, regardless of the regular 
determinants of a military victory, Fatah had arrived and the world took notice. In 
December 1968, the cover of Time Magazine sealed the victory for Fatah. The cover 
story spoke about the rise of Fatah, the 1967 war and the personal story of Yasser Arafat 
but it was the opening quote that defined the times; “The revolution of Fatah exists! It 																																																								
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exists here, there and everywhere. It is a storm, a storm in every house and village.”466 
Fatah had arrived and was settling comfortably in Jordan as the controllers of the PLO. 
Before exploring the first major standoff amongst Arab states, it is essential to introduce 
the political opposition of Fatah: the PFLP who, aside from being the largest opposition 
to Fatah, they were the group that brought the Palestinian struggle to the international 
stage. 
 
Soon after the 1967 war, the Movement of Arab Nationalists (Harakat al Qawmiyin al 
Arab) severed ties to the Arab nationalist movement and focused itself solely on the 
liberation of Palestine. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the founders of the Arab 
nationalist movement was George Habash who believed that only through Arab unity 
would Palestine be liberated, the constant failure of this theory forced Habash’s hand 
resulting in the creation of the PFLP. According to Yamani: 
The PFLP did not give up on the idea of Pan-Arabism; it was initially the Palestinian branch of the 
Arab National Movement. They had a different ideology and organizational (sic) structure providing 
each branch the autonomy to deduce what the best tactics and policies based on the social, economic 
and political circumstances of each country. When the PFLP established it cancelled the central 
decision making process which was necessary for the movement to make the Palestinian identity 
bold amongst the Arab National Movement in the struggle against Israel.467  
 
While the PFLP was created after the Arab defeat in 1967, the divisiveness between the 
Palestinian faction and the central Arab command (Nasser) began when Israel developed 
their NWC without an Arab response.468 As Yamani mentioned, it was not Pan-Arabism 
that was disavowed by the PFLP, but the central governance and ideology of the Arab 
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countries. The founding leaders of the PFLP, George Habash, Wadi Haddad, Hani il-
Hindi and Ahmad Al-Yamani did not believe that Nasser’s and the Baath’s socialist 
agenda would suffice and instead defined their party through a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.469  It was believed that the Marxist-Leninist agenda would allow the PFLP to 
relate with other movements of the time, it also allowed the PFLP to differentiate 
themselves from other Arab and Palestinian organisations. While ideologically different, 
it did not take much time for the PFLP to distinguish themselves from the precautionary 
Arab approach and the predominantly local Fatah approach. 
 
Before exploring the actions of the PFLP, who embarked on an international hijacking 
campaign, it was what the New York Times defined as a “Jerusalem-born Jordanian”470 
who was born in “Palestinian Jerusalem”471 who took the first shot, both literally and 
figuratively, that launched what would become known as “Palestinian terrorism”. Shortly 
after winning the Presidential California Democratic Primary, Robert Kennedy, brother 
of slain President John F. Kennedy, was assassinated by a 24-year-old man named Sirhan 
Bishara Sirhan. 472  When Wadi Haddad found out about the assassination he was 
fascinated by Sirhan, who was described in the news as a Jordanian Muslim, which he 
discovered was false due to his being from Jerusalem from a Christian family. He would 
tell others that Kennedy was killed by a Palestinian Christian, and that this would force 
people to wonder why a Palestinian would kill an American politician, thinking that 																																																								
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decision makers would work to reverse the injustices facing the Palestinians in order to 
ensure assassinations such as this would not continue.473 The publicity Sirhan gained 
forced Haddad to change his thinking as to how to liberate Palestine and inform the world 
of the Palestinians.  
 
On July 24th, 1968, the New York Times had two headlines pertinent to this research. The 
first, on page 1, read: “Algeria Detains 21 Israelis from Hijacked Plane” while the 
second, on page 16, read: “Front Claims Role.”474 The PFLP was defined as an “Arab 
guerrilla organisation,” known at the time to be the “second largest Palestinian guerrilla 
group after Al-Fatah.” While the Western world did not know what to make of the 
hijacking, and the Israelis, for obvious reasons, were extremely troubled by the attacks, 
the Palestinians were provided with an alternative to the popular Fatah organisation. 
According to Leila Khaled:  
While Fateh (sic) and the PLO were playing hide-and-seek and enjoying the comfort of the Nile 
Hilton, three lonely revolutionaries performed a dramatic history-making feat, which the new PLO 
denounced. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine seized an El-Al aeroplane of the 
Israeli semi-military, semi-civilian airlines… The incident was an eye-opener for me. It was the 
beginning of the end of my exile. I was about to be liberated; I had found an alternative to Fateh 
(sic), and I sought to make contacts with the PFLP. 475 
 
The operation, seen as a success by those in the PFLP, was followed up by two more 
attacks targeting El Al Airlines within months. The first was in Athens, when two 
gunmen opened fire, killing one civilian and seriously injuring another.476 The second, in 
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Zurich, carried out by four Arabs, wounded six as the El Al plane was attacked with 
grenades and gunfire as it was taxiing.477 The obvious difference with these two attacks 
was that there were casualties. It seemed, at least to the New York Times, that there was 
confusion after the first attack and instead of terrorism, it was viewed as a method of 
public disruption, these two attacks allowed the New York Times, to frame the PFLP, not 
as guerrillas fighting Israel, but as international terrorists.  
 
To Leila Khaled, who would soon become one of the most famous Palestinians, if not the 
world’s, most famous female figures, was jubilant not only about the operation but the 
inclusion of one Amina Dhahbour. She recalls: “I ran out in my pyjamas screaming 
throughout the dormitory. ‘She did it! She did it! Palestine will be free... A Palestinian 
woman was fighting while we were talking in far-away Kuwait. Within a few minutes we 
were all celebrating the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of women.”478 If Ms. 
Dhahbour’s actions did not open the door for women to join the resistance, the same day 
of the attack in Zurich nearly 200 women staged a sit-in in Ramallah, at the time referred 
to as a city in “Israel-occupied Jordan”.479 These women did not take the violent route of 
the resistance, but were able to inform people across the world that their “homeland is 
taken,” and they are protesting to be “treated like a human being.”480 The Palestinians 
propelled themselves onto the world stage, while they were referred to as guerrillas and 
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terrorists, after Karameh and the PFLP operations; there was a sense of excitement 
amongst the likes of Khaled and Abu Iyad.  
 
Through their resistance, the Palestinians, across both major parties, made a commitment 
determining that only through armed resistance, controlled by Palestinians and supported 
by the Arab world, would they liberate their homeland. When tested against Calhoun’s 
three forms of identity- nationalism, ethnicity and kinship, the Palestinians used their 
trauma and mistreatment to develop a kinship amongst one another, separate from the 
broader Arab ethnic framework. Post-trauma the Palestinians were separated, living 
under very different conditions- the refugee camps and the oppression in these camps 
gave them a time and place while creating a sense of urgency as they found themselves 
being outliers from the rest of the Arab world.  
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis about the Hanthala, providing 
examples of the work of Naji Al-Ali, which depicted the pain, and sorrow of the 
Palestinian people. It is at this point that the symbolism attached to the Palestinian people 
began to shift. The “shackles” of colonisation were not yet shaken off, but accepted. 
Norman argued that the post-colonial shift is the basis of the resurgence of the identity. In 
accepting their fate, and understanding the uphill battle before them the Palestinians took 
the burden off the shoulders of the Arab world and made it their own. In an article titled 
“The Palestinian Diaspora” in the New York Times, February 22nd, 1969 Professor 
Malcolm Kerr of the University of California observed that: “We are witnessing a kind of 
‘Zionist’ movement in reverse, on behalf of a Palestinian Arab Diaspora, insisting on its 
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right to return to its homeland.”481 Regardless of the severity or viability of their actions, 
the Palestinians began carving out their identity and taking responsibility for their own 
destiny. 
 
While the PLO was of the belief that they were moving independently and successfully, 
without the time and place provided by the Arab world, they would have been unable to 
operate. Ultimately, the Arabs were happy to allow the PLO to operate, as long as they 
did not threaten their sovereignty. As the revolution gained steam, it was all but 
inevitable that the Arab leaders would feel threatened.  The PLO and Arafat were clear 
that they would not involve themselves in any Arab politics or Arab affairs, the PFLP and 
their founder George Habash was more akin to the school of thought of “by any means 
necessary.” 
After 22 years of injustice and inhuman living in camps with nobody caring for us, we feel that we 
have the very full right to protect our revolution, we have all the right to protect our revolution. 
Our Code of Morals is our revolution. What serves our revolution, what helps our revolution, what 
protects our revolution is right, is very right and honourable and very noble and very beautiful, 
because our revolution means justice, means having our homes back, having our country back, 
which is a very and noble aim.482  
 
The above quote, spoken by George Habash, taken from Leila Khaled’s autobiography 
reflects the transformation of the Palestinian identity. The revolution brought forth the 
third stage of Abu Lughod’s theory; it started with the politics of accommodation which 
was present in the time soon after the Nakba when the Palestinians were forced to 
acclimatise to their new surroundings. This was followed by the politics of rejection, 
encapsulating the Nasser years when the Palestinian identity was attached to the broader 																																																								
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Pan-Arab movement in rejecting Western imperialism, colonisation and intervention. The 
final stage of Abu-Lughod’s theory is defined by the revolution, which started in 1965, 
going on for decades, albeit with a number of setbacks. At this point, there were two 
major parties representing the Palestinian people, Fatah and the PFLP. Whilst there was a 
clear disparity between the ideologies of the two parties, according to Yamani there was a 
mutual bond: “The relationship between Habash and Arafat was firm in its national 
allegiance, in that they were both against the state of Israel, although defined by the 
different perspectives of each leader. On a one to one basis, they were still very close to 
each other, united by a mutual respect.” 483  This united stand, was essential to the 
ensuring the viability of the Palestinian identity. 
 
Bassam Abu Sharif claims, that after Karameh, Arafat had a very simple political 
programme “that was the base for reunification of the Palestinians who always had 
different points of views, with different ideologies, but never had a different view in 
relation to the liberation of Palestine, the return to Palestine, the independence of 
Palestine.” 484  This clear political programme allowed all Palestinian organisations, 
regardless of political ideology, to unite under one umbrella, though Bassam argues, 
Arafat believed that Fatah had to be the head of this organisation as they were the only 
party that would not let their political ideology to undermine the overall goal. Though 
there were a number of organisations, the crux of the PLO and the unification of the 
Palestinians relied on Fatah and the PLO, according to Bassam, despite the disagreements 
of Fatah and the PFLP, Arafat always viewed them as their closest ally due to the fact 																																																								
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that they were not influenced by any foreign government. Regardless of their differences, 
when things really became contentious, the PFLP would always stand by Fatah, as long 
as they were dedicated to the initial political programme, liberating the whole of 
Palestine.485 
 
While there was a mutual respect, the differences played an integral part in what would 
become known as Black September.  
 
After Karameh, and King Hussein’s claim that he was also a “Fida’i”, the Palestinians 
started to become more and more powerful in Amman, running their own “quasi-state” in 
Jordan. While Fatah made it their policy to distance itself from intra-Arab affairs, their 
popularity in Jordan alone gave the King reason to worry. Abu Iyad refers to October 
1968, when one of their first members, Abdel Fattah Hammud, died from a car crash as 
the initial strain on the relationship. The death was an accident, but when they organised 
a funeral for Hammud and thousands of people came out in Amman to pay their respects 
for someone who was no more than a mid-level Fatah operative, King Hussein was 
threatened.486  The Palestinians own strength in Jordan began to backfire against the 
national cause.  
 
Between the 1967 war and Black September 1970, as recalled by Crown Prince of Jordan 
Hasan Bin Talal: “There were more than 30,000 cases of lawlessness from the throwing 
of hand grenades to premeditated murder. There were even attacks against his majesty the 																																																								
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King.”487 The Palestinians viewed much of this lawlessness as a ploy by the Jordanians 
themselves in order to cheapen the revolution. One month after Hammud’s funeral news 
broke that a Royal Jordanian Guard was kidnapped by Palestinians. Abu Iyad claims to 
have never heard of the organisation and that they later learnt that it was a ploy by the 
Jordanian Secret Service.488 Although Fatah was the leading Palestinian organisation, to 
be followed by the PFLP, it was the PFLP and the divisions from within it which 
controlled much of the time in Jordan. While the PFLP evolved into its own party there 
were people who would disagree with its direction, forcing them to create their own. 
From the many that were created, those which remained were the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine and the PFLP-General Command.489 Pluralism is essential in 
democratic governance, but in times of a revolution, the idea of different organisations 
acting independently may have hindered the progress.  
 
The time in Jordan was dominated by these divides, Mamdouh Nofal, a member of the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), would point fingers at the PFLP 
arguing that their ideology “manifested itself in the celebration of Lenin’s birthday in 
delivering Marxist speeches from pulpits of mosques it was an excuse for threats, 
expensive cars were stolen and the excuse was that they belong to the bourgeoisies’ 
classes.”490 While Bassam Abu-Sharif from the PFLP points back claiming that; “The 																																																								
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DFLP used to paint slogans such as all power to the resistance. What does this mean? It 
means that the DFLP was working to overthrow the Jordanian regime.”491 With the fact 
that the Palestinians acted out of hand and that the Jordanian government attempted to 
influence the view of the Palestinians accepted, the PLO was still powerful and were 
situated in a country with a large shared border with Israel, allowing for their continued 
operations into the West Bank. 
 
The Palestinian population was generally undereducated and those who were successful 
were predominantly farmers, this may have played a role in Fatah’s success in 
recruitment. To attach a Maoist or Marxist-Leninist ideology to a people who find 
themselves in limbo was possibly too advanced for the destitute Palestinian population. 
The leaders, or what Horowitz refers to as the “ethnic entrepreneurs” of the Palestinian 
movement are responsible for defining the trajectory of the people. What the likes of 
Habash (PFLP) and Hawatmeh (DFLP) did, was to define the Palestinian struggle as a 
struggle of the times, a global struggle, attached to the other leftist movements around the 
world. Arafat’s vision was not an “educated vision” or an ideological vision, what 
resonated is that he allowed all people to play a role and there was one clear view. Arafat 
was a pragmatist aligning himself with anyone who would support his cause, regardless 
of ideology, religion or ethnicity.   
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6.4 Black September 
 
When the Palestinian revolution began, the first step was to wrestle control of the 
Palestinian’s destiny from the rest of the Arab world. The Palestinian stance at Karameh, 
then their growth in Amman, allowed them to do so and there was once again pride 
among the Palestinian population. Regardless of their political connections, they were 
able to unite under the umbrella of the Palestinian revolution. On the other hand, in 
carving out their own place in the Arab world, they sent fractures through the idea of 
Arab unity. Ultimately, with the Palestinians protecting their own national interests, they 
indirectly gave permission to the likes of Jordan and Egypt to do the same.  
 
On August 6th, 1970, five Arab countries; Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Sudan and Libya met in 
Tripoli to discuss Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli war. This meeting was called while 
Secretary of State William Rogers was negotiating a cease-fire between Israel, Egypt and 
Jordan that would become known as the “Rogers Plan”,492 which came into effect the 
next day. 
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Figure 3 : Arab-Israel Ceasefire493 
The day the agreement was signed, the Palestinians, and many Arabs alike, began 
protesting Nasser’s ceasefire with the state of Israel. Although the Palestinians were 
successful in gaining their own identity and wrestling away their destiny from their Arab 
friends, by doing so, they allowed the Arab countries to take action in their own national 
interests. According to Khaled the main concern was that the Palestinians were not 
included in the agreement discussions. Even when they were invited to the negotiating 
table, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the peace talks were generally brokered by 
Israel’s staunchest ally, the United States and driven by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.  
Nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and governments 
involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help; they 																																																								
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can provide a catalyst; they can stimulate the parties to talk; they can encourage; they can help 
define a realistic framework or agreement; but an agreement among other powers cannot be a 
substitute for agreement among the parties involved.494 
 
Once the ceasefire came into effect Hussein and Nasser met in Cairo, upon the King’s 
return to Jordan rumours began to circulate that Nasser gave the King the green light to 
squash the Palestinian resistance in Jordan due to their public opposition to the 
agreement.495 The Fatah leaders took it upon themselves to visit Nasser in Cairo to hear 
from him the reasoning behind the agreement where Nasser mocked Arafat asking: “In 
your opinion, how many years do you need to destroy the Zionist state and build a new 
unified and democratic state on the whole of liberated Palestine?496” This agreement, 
brought the Arabs to the bargaining table with Israel, but also initiated the concept of the 
two-state solution. Part of national identity is defined through a common goal, as well as 
understanding what is right and what is wrong. One of the major issues behind the Pan-
Arab identity is the fact that each group are managed or governed by an individual, or 
group of individuals, who must take actions that protect their interests. Egypt acted in the 
best interests of Egypt, Jordan did the same, and the Palestinians handling their own 
destiny had little option but to allow them to do so. When the Arab states were removed 
from handling the Palestinian issue, they were free to make decisions, regardless of 
Palestinian sensibilities. 
 
One month after the Rogers Plan was signed, the PFLP took action, cementing the 
Western notion that the Palestinians had shifted from a guerrilla group fighting to liberate 																																																								
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their lost homeland to international terrorists in just over five years. On September 6th, 
1970 PFLP commandos hijacked four different planes, one was unsuccessful and diverted 
to London where Leila Khaled was arrested, one was flown to Cairo where all passengers 
and staff were removed from the plane before it was blown up and the other two landed 
in Jordan in what would become known as the “revolution airport”.497 Three days later, in 
order to pressure the British to release Khaled a sympathiser hijacked a B.O.A.C airplane 
taking off from Bahrain joining the other two airplanes in Jordan.498  These hijackings 
and breach of Jordanian sovereignty provided King Hussein with leverage to rid himself 
of the Palestinians in Jordan.  
 
Although Arafat suspended the PFLP from the PLO Central Committee, King Hussein 
went on to create a military government setting off the civil war between the Feda’yeen 
and the Jordanians. In order to ensure that the Palestinians did not receive any support 
during the conflict, the Jordanians drove the Iraqis out of Jordan and when Syria decided 
to send in their forces, Hafiz al-Assad refused to send his air force to cover their soldiers 
due to the United States and Israel’s threats to enter the conflict to remove them. Not 
wanting Israel to enter their airspace, the Syrians were ultimately removed by the 
Jordanian Air Force. 499  The fighting went on, and the Palestinians were simply 
outmatched.  
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Days into the fighting, Abu Iyad was arrested, prompting Nasser to send a delegation as 
well as a message urging King Hussein to join the ongoing summit in Cairo and come to 
a ceasefire. When Nasser’s delegation returned to Cairo, they took Abu Iyad with them in 
order to devise a plan which would allow Arafat to escape Amman and attend the 
conference himself. Once Arafat was able to escape, King Hussein quickly travelled to 
Cairo and soon after Nasser was able to broker a ceasefire between Arafat and 
Hussein.500 Just the next day, on September 28th, 1970 the Arab nation and the concept of 
Pan-Arabism changed forever, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the Arabs, 
died of an alleged heart attack.  
Leila Khaled, who was highly critical of Nasser, recalls: 
I was stunned, emotionally paralyzed (sic). The feelings I had when Che and Ho died returned. 
This time perhaps more poignantly, for I was, as every Arab was at one time or other, an admirer 
of Nasser. He was one of the greatest Arab leaders of the modern era. As a giant among dwarfs, he 
symbolized (sic) everything noble, great and weak among the Arabs. He was from us and one of 
us; he was a leader of men. I felt a part of me died with him. I was happy I had lived in the age of 
Nasser. I will only be happier to live in a liberated Palestine.501 
 
On the same day, on behalf of Fatah, who were saved just the day before by Nasser, Abu 
Iyad sent this message to Vice-President Anwar Sadat: 
Nasser, who incarnated the aspirations and dreams of the entire Arab nation, had fallen on the field 
of honour, but that his ideas would remain engraved in the memories of generations to come of the 
Palestinian people to whom he restored, as to all the Arab peoples, their dignity and cause for 
hope.502 
 
Soon after the death of Nasser, the PLO held their eighth national congress where the 
PFLP and DFLP were calling for a united Palestine and Jordan stating:  
What links Jordan to Palestine are national ties and a national unity molded by history, culture and 
language since time immemorial… The Palestinian Revolution which brandished the slogan of the 																																																								
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liberation of Palestine did not intend to differentiate between the eastern bank and the western 
bank of the River.503  
 
This idea of a united Palestine and Jordan was a clear threat to the monarchy, something 
that concerned King Hussein. While there was an agreement between the PFLP and 
Hussein about unity between the Jordanians and Palestinians, the terms were obviously 
different. In a letter to his Premier, King Hussein stated that Jordan “must deal 
conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to establish a separate 
Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian People.”504 Unity 
according to the Jordanians was a united East and West Bank under Jordanian rule, unity 
according to the PFLP was the whole of Palestine as well as Jordan under Palestinian 
rule, and unity according to Nasser was Egypt, Syria and Yemen under Egyptian rule.  
 
The root of the problem addressed in this thesis is driven by power politics; this need for 
power includes the Palestinians. As Shlomo Sand argued, identity is not an overcoat; it is 
not all encompassing and may change to fit the situation at hand. The Palestinians would 
align themselves with the Arabs when beneficial and would attack them when beneficial- 
the Arabs would support the Palestinians when beneficial, but at the same time would act 
against them when called on to defend their own sovereignty. Black September, and the 
year that followed, was a severe blow to the Palestinians and Pan-Arabism. During this 
period, there was a civil war amongst Arab States, there was a United States brokered 
agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Arabs lost Nasser and according to Yasser 
Arafat, the Jordanians acted disproportionately: “What took place in Black September 																																																								
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was not simply an attack by the Jordanian military regime against the revolution but an 
attempt of genocide against the Palestinian population as a whole”.505 
 
This chapter has sought to show that the Palestinians were successful in separating 
themselves from the Arab world, but not without consequences. With the Palestinians 
urging the rest of the Arabs to allow them to control their own destiny and speak for 
themselves they indirectly gave the Arab world, namely Egypt and Jordan, the excuse to 
begin acting in their best interests, without receiving a backlash from their own 
population who were still sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. While Yasser Arafat 
consolidated power, becoming the leader of the PLO and ethnic engineer of the 
Palestinian identity, not all Palestinians, or Arabs accepted this. For example, the PFLP 
constructed their party through a left-wing Marxist ideology connecting themselves with 
revolutionary fighters in Latin America and Asia, thus reinventing their own identity. 
Fatah was preoccupied with allowing the Palestinians to fight for themselves, while the 
PFLP was opening the doors to broaden their reach through similar ideologies, rather 
than similar national consciousness.  
 
Throughout the New York Time articles sourced in this chapter, the Palestinians have 
been referred to as “guerrillas” when fighting Israel, “terrorists” when hijacking planes 
and “feda’yeen” when fighting against Jordan. What started as a liberation movement 
solely against Israel grew to become a war fought on three fronts with the Arabs, the 
Israelis and the international community. The following chapter analyses the official 																																																								
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Arab League decision to allow the Palestinians to be the sole representatives of the 
Palestinian people culminating in Yasser Arafat’s speech to the United Nations, 
symbolising the Palestinian entities right to join the world stage.  
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Chapter 7: The Statesman: Diplomacy, Betrayal and Tragedy 
I define the PLO as an idea and institution, the idea being our sense of identity and our quest for 
independence and sovereignty with the idea being stronger than the institution. I always joke by 
saying that I’m more comfortable representing the idea rather than the institution… I said then, up 
until now the PLO represented the Palestinian people and it’s high time now that the Palestinian 
people represent the PLO.506 
 
The previous two chapters focused on the Palestinian reality: the destitute conditions in 
the refugee camps as well as the need for the Palestinian revolution as they could no 
longer depend on the Arab world to liberate their homeland. This chapter will explore the 
political progress made by the Palestinians; the attempted transformation from guerrillas 
to statesmen, and the responsibility that came with this newfound power.  
  
To echo the question asked at the beginning of Chapter 1, as posed by Richard Koch and 
Chris Smith: “Who am I?” The Palestinian paradox of identity was not perpetuated by 
searching for their role in reference to a group of nations but necessitated by the threat to 
their very existence. From the outset of their expulsion the identity itself was naturally 
blurred, as defined by human nature, that in times of despair people will look towards the 
most likened individual and connect themselves to that group or individuals through 
different avenues, in this case, religion and/or ethnicity.  
 
During their initial time in the camps, which Khalidi referred to as “the lost years” and 
defined by Abu-Lughod as the “politics of accommodation” the Palestinians were 
attempting to reconstruct their identity post-trauma. Taylor’s theory argues that people 
choose their identity not directly due a national consciousness or a spiritual view, but a 																																																								
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manner in which to express what they believe is right, wrong and/or admirable. In the 
same context, Calhoun postulates that identity may be determined on the basis of 
nationalism, religion and ethnicity but also kinship.  
 
Take for instance the ANM, which later became the PFLP, founded by Qustantin, Habash 
and Hawatmeh. When attributed to modern day borders, Qustantin is Syrian, Habash is 
Palestinian and Hawatmeh is Jordanian. The ANM was a national party founded by 
likeminded people who represent different nations, understanding that these nations were 
all citizens of Greater Syria less than a half a century before the party was created, they 
continued this likeness after the post-colonial divide of their homeland. These values of 
Arabism as it presented itself at this period in history was predicated by the Sykes-Picot 
agreement but motivated by the Palestinian Nakba. As proved throughout this thesis, the 
concept of Arab identity remained prevalent for approximately two decades.  
 
On the other hand, not all Palestinians were privy to the exclusive, intellectual ANM. 
This thesis argues that the basis of the Palestinian identity is highly attributable to the 
treatment of the refugees who were forced into the camps and into an impoverished life. 
While there were cases of where the Palestinians believe they belonged amongst their 
Arab neighbours, they were, for the most part, humiliated by the system in which they 
lived. Guibernau argues that the construction of identity may formulate itself, not through 
choosing to belong to a group, but being rejected from another. As already discussed in 
chapter one, this concept is essential to Palestinian identity, as they have experienced this 
phenomenon in a number of sequences. They were provided citizenship without full 
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rights in Israel, they were provided citizenship without full opportunity in Jordan and 
most difficult to comprehend, those who remained in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
which were still under Arab control were not provided with a sense of nationality or 
rights.  
 
With all the limitations in the early years in Jordan and Lebanon, including their 
expulsion from Jordan, the Palestinians solidified themselves as a nation amongst the 
Arab nations. What has been reiterated above is essential in individuals understanding 
where they belong. For that initial connection to be cemented, and become everlasting, it 
needs social inclusiveness and social collectivity. The definition of identity as derived by 
Brubaker and Cooper understands identity as a basis for social action, pinning self-
understanding against universal self-interest. Throughout the years covered in this thesis 
(1948-1982), identity in the Arab world was fluid, where universality and individualism 
were constantly in question. What this thesis has shown is that the concept of universality 
amongst the Arab nations was in essence a manner in which to protect and promote self-
interest. Palestinian social action was essential in ensuring that their identity was not lost 
in the Arab collectivity. It is for that reason, that the most essential aspect to the 
resurgence of the Palestinian identity is unity through social action and political 
objectives.  
 
It is accepted that people will identify with one another viewing each other as friends or 
comrades against a common enemy, alluding to Guibernau or Hobsbawm’s concept of 
“us vs. them.” For the Palestinians, up until the point covered in the last chapter, they 
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were drawn into conflict with a number of parties, including the British, the Israelis and 
what is especially essential to this thesis, their fellow Arabs. By 1971, through another 
tragedy, the Palestinian identity has resurged. Taking the revolution to Israel was 
essential in reviving the Palestinian people, but just as important was the rejection and/or 
the oppression faced at the hands of the Arabs. The fact that the Palestinians opposed the 
state of Israel, and were in conflict with them was obvious, but the fact that they were not 
completely accepted by their Arab neighbours hindered the strength of the Arab identity 
and motivated the need for a distinct Palestinian identity. While this thesis attests that 
after Black September the Palestinian national identity was reconstructed, resurged and 
solidified the Palestinians were still facing difficulties.  
 
As noted above, Abu-Lughod’s concept that the Palestinian national story was defined by 
three different stages, the politics of accommodation, then rejection followed by 
revolution and hope. The author of this research agrgues that the third stage was a three-
pronged concept in itself; refugee, revolutionary and statesmen. The Palestinian national 
consciousness, as it stood after Black September falls under the study of sociology as the 
unity amongst Palestinians and the Palestinian national identity was driven by history, 
memory and a developing mythology. The identity still lacked political power and the 
Palestinians, although a force, were still operating outside of their homeland. 
 
Identity theory is predominantly based on social cohesion whereas nationalism studies 
constantly stresses the importance of determinants predicated on statehood. When tested 
against Guibernau’s theory on nationalism there is a clear shift that must occur for an 
		
			 226	
identity to be preserved. While Guibernau does not directly tie nationalism to statehood, 
her theory, which is made up of five dimensions, starts with psychological, cultural and 
historical connections, all of which have been postulated through this thesis. The final 
two dimensions are territorial and political, even though there is a common sentiment 
amongst Palestinians that there is a territory that bonds them, the political reality is that 
the state of Israel is made up of nearly 80% of that territory. In order for the Palestinians 
to make progress politically, they were forced to begin making concessions on their 
historical, cultural and territorial unity, implicating the psychological dimension. 
 
After 1970, regardless of how depicted, the Palestinians existed and through their conflict 
with Jordan solidified themselves as a separate entity throughout the Arab world. What 
followed was the war of attrition, ending in a cease-fire (UNSC Resolution 339)507 
between Egypt and Israel. What was technically viewed to be the Arab-Israeli conflict 
has begun to take shape as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was at this crossroads, that 
the PLO was forced to decide which path they would take moving forward. Yezid Sayigh 
postulates this dilemma as follows: 
The PLO was faced with a dilemma. If it were to enter the Arab and international systems, thereby 
protecting its physical security, it would have to renounce its "revolutionary" character and accept 
the legitimacy of the existing Arab order. Similarly, the hope of achieving some territorial gains 
within the Arab and international systems implied a scaling down of Palestinian demands. The 
choice facing the PRM, then, was either to maintain maximal goals, requiring a level of military, 
infrastructural, social, and economic strength it had not come close to enjoying even at its peak in 
the 1968-70 period, or to adopt the minimal goals that could be achieved through international 
diplomacy. Given the PRM/PLO's weakness and the prospect of further defeats at Arab hands, it 
opted for the second course.508  
The PLO was provided with an opportunity to control their own destiny, knowing that 
they would not be able to do so without the support of the Arab world, the PLO made 																																																								
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their first concession in their “Ten-Point Plan”. Although the plan opposed Resolution 
242, section 2 of the plan may have proved otherwise. Section 2 read as follows, 
 
2. The Palestine Liberation Organization (sic) will employ all means, and first and 
foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the 
independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of 
Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being 
effected in the balance of power in favour of our people and their struggle.509 
 
The major concession, or development, was that the PLO agreed to “establish the 
independent combatant national authority…over every part of Palestinian territory that is 
liberated,” in contrast to their national charter of 1968 which defined their homeland as 
“Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible 
territorial unit.”510 Abdel Bari Atwan attributes this concession to the financial rewards 
promised to the PLO: 
I believe that they succeeded in showering the PLO and Fatah with money thus turning it into a 
paid staff, like any company. This actually affected, not only the identity, but the strength and the 
roots of the identity. They convinced the PLO that the only way to survive was to take an 
instalment and have their own state in the West Bank and Gaza, started the trend in 1974 in the 
PNC when they adopted the Ten Points that they would establish a Palestinian state on one 
kilometre of territory liberated from the Israelis, thus starting the trend of concessions.511  
  
This concession was disturbing to many, no party was more alarmed than the PFLP. The 
PLO’s attempt to come to a political solution created a divide amongst the different 
Palestinian factions. Starting with George Habash’s decision to withdraw the PFLP from 
the PLO Executive Committee, only to be followed by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), 
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the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the 
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) to create what would be known as the 
“Rejectionist Front.”512Although the Palestinians were divided, Arafat had a plan and it 
was set into motion.  
 
At the 1973 Summit in Algiers, it was agreed upon that the PLO would represent the 
Palestinian people, unfortunately for the PLO, King Hussein did not support this 
development thus it was not made public. Days after the summit, King Hussein stated 
that it is his obligation to ensure that the West Bank was to return to Arab control, a 
notion supported by Anwar Sadat, the new President of Egypt.513 By the next summit in 
Rabat in 1974, partially due to the Ten-Point programme, the Arabs resolved: 
 
1. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to return 
to their homeland; 
2. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent 
national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(sic), the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian 
territory that is liberated. This authority, once it is established, shall enjoy the 
support of the Arab states in all fields and at all levels; 
3. To support the Palestine Liberation Organization (sic) in the exercise of its 
responsibility at the national and international levels within the framework of 
Arab commitment; 
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4. To call on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization (sic) to devise 
a formula for the regulation of relations between them in the light of these 
decisions so as to ensure their implementation; 
5. That all the Arab states undertake to defend Palestinian national unity and not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.514 
 
The PLO was finally recognised across the Arab world as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people. This chapter will explore this identity as it developed throughout the 
previous chapters, applying the parallels and shortcomings in both classical and 
contemporary theory to the Palestinian identity as it is viewed by their Arab brethren.   
7.1 Arafat Speech to the United Nations 
3210 (XXIX). Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization 
The General Assembly, 
Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine, 
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization (sic), the representative of the Palestinian people, to 
participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings. 
2268th plenary meeting 
14 October 1974515 
 
Nearly a month after the UNGA invited him, Yasser Arafat addressed the world body, 
much to the chagrin of the Israelis. While much of the 138 nation general assembly 
welcomed Arafat’s remarks, Israeli Ambassador Yosef Tekoah’s reiterated “Israel’s 
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readiness and desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the Palestinian state of Jordan in 
which Palestinian national identity would find full expression.” 516  Although the 
Palestinians were coming off armed conflict and expulsion at the hand of the Jordanian 
army and the Arab world supported the independence of the PLO, recognising them as 
the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the Israelis continued to refuse to 
recognise the Palestinians as a distinct people deserving of their own state.   
Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive 
branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.517 
 
While Arafat’s speech, a symbolic gesture, is remembered for the famous quote above, he 
brought the question of Palestine to the world stage. There are two aspects of the speech 
which will be focused on due to their pertinence to the concept of identity and 
nationalism, starting with his introduction to what would be a Palestinian recollection of 
the history of the conflict between the Palestinians and Zionism/Imperialism. Arafat 
noted: 
In addressing the General Assembly today our people proclaims its faith in the future, 
unencumbered either by past tragedies or present limitations. If, as we discuss the present, we 
enlist the past in our service, we do so only to light up our journey into the future alongside other 
movements of national liberation. If we return now to the historical roots of our cause we do so 
because present at this very moment in our midst are those, who, while they occupy our homes as 
their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same 
time that we are disembodied spirits, fictions without presence, without traditions or future. We 
speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded-and continued to regard-
our problem as merely a problem of refugees.518 
 
The above quote reflects a lot of what has been argued throughout this thesis. The 
Palestinian nostalgia, or romanticism of their history, was a tool used to inform and 
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connect to their lost land, but not a tool to define their future. While this view may have 
been a forecast into the future, laying the grounds for the two-state discussion and the 
concession of parts of historical Palestine it also supports the notion that the Palestinians 
do in fact have their own history, but it is not exactly relevant when speaking of the 
present and the future. In the same regard, Arafat claimed that: “The Palestine Liberation 
Organization (sic) was a major factor in creating a new Palestinian individual, qualified 
to shape the future of our Palestine, not merely content with mobilizing (sic) the 
Palestinians for the challenges of the present.”519 The Palestinian people are not defined 
only by their leadership and the PLO, but the revolution defined a new individual through 
belonging to a collective.  
 
The PLO and the Palestinian revolution defined who the “us” in “us vs. them”. Through 
all their conflict with fellow Arabs, “them” continued to be the Zionists, it was the 
concept of “us” that was up for debate. Since their expulsion, the liberation of Palestine 
was an Arab project, a Muslim project, a leftist project and only through the rise of the 
PLO did the liberation of Palestine become a Palestinian project. It so happened that 
Fatah became the strongest Palestinian faction and that Arafat was the one to relay this 
opinion, regardless of who controlled the PLO, Palestinian identity was cemented 
through a popular faction taking over the PLO and then being accepting into the Arab 
League of nations.  
 
The second aspect of Arafat’s speech which is pertinent to this research is the 
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development and transitioning of identity. Gellner, and to a lesser extent Smith, pointed 
to the maturing and progress of a nation to belong in the evolving world. Arafat touched 
on this, starting with education: 
We tried every possible means to continue our political struggle to attain our national rights, but to 
no avail. Meanwhile, we had to struggle for sheer existence. Even in exile we educated our 
children. This was all a part of trying to survive. 
 
Arafat continues: 
 
The Palestinian people produced thousands of physicians, lawyers, teachers and scientists who 
actively participated in the development of the Arab countries bordering on their usurped 
homeland. They utilized (sic) their income to assist the young and aged amongst their people who 
remained in the refugee camps. They educated their younger sisters and brothers, supported their 
parents and cared for their children.520 
 
As portrayed in the chapter focusing on the refugees, the Palestinians were invested in 
ensuring that anyone who was provided the opportunity would be educated. Additionally, 
just as importantly, those who were successful were responsible for leading the funding 
of the revolution as well as acting as a social safety web for those less fortunate. While 
the Palestinians did not have a state structure in which to pay taxes in order to develop 
and maintain a welfare system people were parting with their own money in order to 
support people who, in some cases, they have never and will never meet. Outside of the 
armed struggle and the revolution itself, when the Palestinians began to depend on those 
in their diaspora to support the less fortunate it supported the concept of community and 
nationhood. Staying with the aspect of development, another exert from Arafat’s speech 
pertinent to the development of nationhood; in attempt to appease the world body: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (sic) can be proud of having a large number of cultural and 
educational activities, even while engaged in armed struggle, and at a time when it faced 
increasingly vicious blows of Zionist terrorism. We established institutes for scientific research, 
agricultural development and social welfare, as well as centers (sic) for the revival of our cultural 
heritage and the preservation of our folklore. Many Palestinian poets, artists and writers have 																																																								
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enriched Arab culture in particular, and world culture generally. Their profoundly humane works 
have won the admiration of all those familiar with them.521 
 
In its infancy the PLO was regarded widely either as a revolutionary or terrorist 
organisation, Arafat stressed that they focused on a number of features. Arafat was 
attempting to show the world that the PLO was not only a fighting force, but a 
government in waiting. In supporting education, culture, agriculture and science they 
were working on becoming a “self-sufficient people” capable of governing their own 
state. Arafat’s speech was historic, becoming the second non-state entity, after the Pope, 
to address the UNGA.  
 
Further, as important to the PLO, were UNGA Resolution’s 3236 and 3237; Resolution 
3236 officially introduced the Question of Palestine, for the first time including the input 
of the Palestinian people. The majority of the resolution was riddled with reaffirmation, 
the following reflection on Arafat’s speech standing out; “Having heard the statement of 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the representative of the Palestinian people.” 
Moreover, sections three to seven, which read: 
3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of 
Palestine: 
4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment 
of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 
5. Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all 
means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 																																																								
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Nations; 
6. Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to 
the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the 
Charter; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;522 
 
The above was the first step recognising that the Palestinian people, not the Arabs of 
Palestine, were to be, along with the Israelis, key figures in any peace settlement in the 
region. Following RES/3236 came RES/3237, which provided the PLO with an official 
status amongst world nations, inviting them to join the UNGA as observers: 
 
1. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and 
the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer; 
2. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and 
the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the 
General Assembly in the capacity of observer; 
3. Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as 
an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened 
under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the 
implementation of the present resolution.523 
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7.2 Initial Relations with the United States 
 
Anthony Wanis-St. John, assistant professor at American University in Washington, in an 
article written in 2006 about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process defines back-channel 
diplomacy as “official negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. 
These negotiations operate in parallel or replace acknowledged “front-channels” of 
negotiation; they can be described as the “black markets” of negotiation.”524 He uses this 
term as a manner in which to define the diplomatic relationship between the Palestinians 
and Israelis after they agreed in principle to the 1993 Oslo Accords. While this was, and 
still is, an integral alternative between the Palestinians and Israelis the PLO was well-
versed in back-channel diplomacy as they essentially began using this tactic with the 
United States in the early 1970s. 
 
With tensions high, both the PLO and the Government of Israel, led at the time by Prime 
Minster Golda Meir, were not at a position in which they could communicate directly, 
allowing Egypt and the United States to act as a representative of both sides due to the 
fact that they were already negotiating a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt 
following the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The 1973 war was a turning point for the 
Palestinians, it was at this point, according to Afif Safieh, where the Palestinians were 
forced to give up the guerrilla tactics, arguing: 
The war of 1973, where the Palestinians and the Arabs realized that there was no military solution 
to the problem. America would not allow Israel to be defeated and that we should seek a 
diplomatic outcome and then move gradually towards accepting Palestinian statehood on parts of 
Palestine. It was at this point we no longer asked for absolute justice but possible justice, its then 
we gradually moved from the dialogue by arms to using the arms of dialogue. I was working on 
Arafat’s teams and lived beside him in the 1981 two-week war with the Israelis, which was the 																																																								
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rehearsal for the war of 82, it was then I discovered that in Arafat’s military thinking, he knew that 
we are not going to liberate Palestine militarily, all he wanted was the we remain a military actor 
so that we get recognized as a diplomatic factor. In the absence of an Arab military option, there is 
no credible Palestinian military option, as Faisal Husseini used to say If I need to defeat Mike 
Tyson I must not keep inviting him to the boxing ring, I need to invite him to another game.525  
 
 It was at this time that William Buffum, former US Ambassador to Lebanon, reported to 
Washington that the PLO was exploring the possibility of creating a direct line of 
communication with the United States, as Arafat believed that the United States was the 
key in coming to a just settlement with Israel.526 A daunting task for the leadership of the 
PLO as they would first have to begin with repudiating the “Three No’s” and the concept 
of “revolution until victory”. 
 
The back-channel diplomacy between the PLO and the United States began prior to the 
PLO’s ten-point programme and following the 1972 massacre of the Israeli Olympic 
team in Munich as well as the Khartoum hostage situation where two American and one 
Belgian diplomat were killed. These acts forced President Nixon to establish a no 
negotiation policy of their own; the United States does not negotiate with terrorists.527 
Although President Nixon would not communicate with the PLO, Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger kept a close eye on the situation. The first known communique between 
the United States and the PLO came in December 1973 as a note from Kissinger to 
President Sadat to be relayed to Arafat in which he posed five points: 
1. Establish direct contact with HK [Kissinger] soon. 
2. Be specific and realistic in stating what is wanted from US. 																																																								
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3. Be prepared to explain further views on the following: 
-Resolution 242- what parts, if any, are acceptable? 
-Arab-Israeli peace settlement. 
-Existence of a Jewish State in Palestine. 
-Jordan and King Hussein. 
4. What practical first steps can be taken to establish framework and momentum for 
later steps? 
5. What coordination is desirable with Sadat, Asad(sic), Boumediene, Faisal?528 
 
The note went on to clarify that the US will conduct direct talks in the near future but will 
continue to protect the interests of Israel and King Hussein, but are serious in that 
Palestinian interests must be met. Further, they will be attentive to Arab positions (Egypt 
Syria, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia) and finally that they do not have a peace-plan in place, 
instead will pursue a step-by-step approach.529 In February of 1974, Robert Houghton, 
charge d’affairs at the Beirut Embassy, sent a cable to Kissinger claiming that Arafat and 
Abu-Iyad were more moderate than others and that the PLO was showing signs that they 
would accept a peace settlement with Israel, in so far that they would gain legitimacy and 
a national authority over a part of Historic Palestine.530 This concession was configured 
behind closed doors and the PLO were extremely cautious and ambiguous in relaying this 
information knowing that the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza as well as the refugees 
were not ready to give up on the basis of the revolution, namely the liberation of all of 																																																								
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Palestine as well as the right to return. 
 
In the same month, Fatah’s intentions began to become more transparent. The American 
University of Beirut served as the venue where George Habash (PFLP), Nayef Hawatmeh 
(DFLP), Ahmad Jibril (PFLP-GC) and Abu Iyad (Fatah) would present their case on the 
idea of an Arab-Israeli peace process. Those who comprised the “Rejection Front” argued 
their cases, while Abu Iyad, who was greeted with chants calling for revolution until 
victory in opposition to a peaceful solution, started his speech with “I’m afraid I am 
going to disappoint you.”531 This thesis has argued that the Palestinian identity was not 
developed as the “other” in comparison to the Israelis, but as another Arab nation 
amongst Arab nations. With that in mind, Fatah would argue that they are forced to begin 
exploring the two-state option not due to the strength of Israel, as a part of the Arab 
propaganda machine after the 1973 war argues that Israel is not invincible, but due to the 
fear that if the Palestinians do not gain control of the West Bank that King Hussein, “the 
butcher of our people”532 would be the one to control the destiny of the West Bank.  
 
In 1975, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold H. Saunders delivered 
a statement on the Palestinians before the Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on the Middle 
East. He stressed that Palestinian rights are an essential aspect of ensuring a viable long-
term peace in the Middle East. He went on to provide the statistics, that there are nearly 3 
million Palestinians, 450,000 residing in Israel, one million in the “Israeli-occupied” 
West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, with the rest living as refugees in surrounding 																																																								
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states. He argued that the Palestinian problem was initially dealt with as a refugee 
problem, with an unusually large amount of them becoming quite successful occupying 
leading positions around the Arab world. Nonetheless, with regards to this thesis, the 
most important part of his speech was the following: 
Today, however, we recognize (sic) that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding 
to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into 
account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians 
today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in 
determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among 
themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there 
is to be peace between Israel and its neighbors.533  
 
In Kissinger’s note above he also noted that: “This is not just a matter of refugees.”534 
This, coupled with the Palestinians exploring a possible two-state solution, provides the 
complexity of Palestinian identity. Although there are conflicting ideas as to how to 
resolve the Palestinian problem, to relay what Saunders claimed, it is a fact that there are 
millions of people who define themselves as Palestinians. For the Palestinians, they have 
developed into a political force, but for the international community they had to shift 
from being a refugee population, into a people striving for self-determination. A month 
after Saunders’s statement, the UNGA adopted resolution 3379. “Elimination of all forms 
of racial discrimination”, which determined that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination.”535 This declaration essentially defined the Palestinian people as a race, 
who were discriminated against due to their Palestinian identity. 
 
As argued in chapter 5, it was the refugees and the treatment of these refugees which 																																																								
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drove the need for a Palestinian political force. When discussing this oppression and the 
results that followed, Afif Safieh paralleled the events to the Jewish experience: 
Jean Paul Sartre, in his reflection of the Jewish question says that it is the anti-Semite that created 
the Jews and anti-Semitism that preserved those communities throughout centuries giving them 
the cohesion and drive. I believe that, yes persecution and oppression is a cementing factor driving 
communities and helps define the identity through the suffering while giving birth to aspirations 
that are born through said suffering and oppression.536 
 
 The refugees were the ones who, after the Nakba, faced discrimination at the hands of 
their fellow Arabs, forcing the Palestinians to define themselves as separate from the 
Arab world when Pan-Arabism was the “zeitgeist of the time”, as argued by Elie 
Podeh.537 While Palestinian identity was fragmented due to their expulsion, no identity is 
all-encompassing, there will be different facets to each identity which attract people to a 
certain group. While the refugees were the initial spark which reignited the Palestinian 
cause, they were part of a broader people who were faced with different realities. 
Attempting to manage these different, but essential, parts of the Palestinian people and 
Palestinian identity made the job of the PLO and the defining of the Palestinian identity 
more difficult.  
 
Essentially, at this stage, while the Palestinians were divided as to how to move forward, 
the concept of the Palestinian identity remained solid.  As explained at the beginning of 
the chapter, the first stage of the resurgence of the Palestinian identity was accomplished 
through the reconstruction of their identity. This process took years, even decades, but the 
Palestinians were successful in differentiating their political identity from their Arab 
counterparts. When exploring history, culture, territory and other determinants of identity 
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as offered by the theories provided throughout this thesis, a lot remains unchanged. The 
Arab world, namely the land of Greater Syria, continued to share similar customs, 
language, cuisine and historical territories. What changed were the social and political 
realities of the population.  
 
Aside from the Palestinian catastrophe faced during the Nakba it was life in the camps, 
surviving on rations, faced with restrictions on movement and building initially that 
created the need for a Palestinian entity in order to protect them from groups such as the 
DB or the army of King Hussein. With support for the Palestinians being popular 
amongst the Arab masses, by taking the fight to Israel, Fatah and later the PLO were able 
to gain support from Arab governments through training, financing and room to operate. 
At the time of the launch of the Palestinian revolution, they would refer back to the 
heroic nature of the likes of Sheikh al-Qassam and Abdel Qader al-Husseini to propagate 
the Arab hero who fought and died against Zionism and colonisation. While this was a 
common practice, and the Palestinian factions were rewriting history in order to unite 
their people the losses and failures resulting in their bitter reality outweighed the 
mythology of the past. The stand at Karameh, although it was a military victory for Israel, 
the decision to take a stand in Karameh created what Rashid Khalidi referred to a 
“foundation myth”538. It is indisputable that without the support from the Jordanians the 
Palestinians would have faced more losses than they did, further arguments that Yasser 
Arafat was not actually at Karameh539 have become irrelevant. In response to the “myth 
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of Karameh”, Afif Safieh interjects: 
I always refer to Karameh as the moment when the masses joined the vanguard. There was there 
the Fatah movement as the vanguard of a few hundred and the heroic stand they took, defying the 
laws of guerilla warfare making them extremely popular among an Arab public opinion that 
needed a morale boost after the humiliating defeat of 1967. So I wouldn’t fall into the trap of those 
who try to ridicule or penalize, just as I would put in prominence the contribution of the Jordanian 
army.540 
 
Pairing the stance at Karameh with the conflict with the Jordanians, as well as the 
treatment of the refugees, defined the Palestinians. The traditions of the proud fighter and 
the myths attached to these traditions allowed for the culture to flourish as an identity of 
the Palestinian revolution. In keeping with the theory, the Palestinian story at this point 
has satisfied the concept of identity and belonging. The Palestinians identify with one 
another; they define themselves as a separate Arab people and their likeness is not 
defined through their history, or through their romantic attachment to a lost homeland. 
While the attachment to historic Palestine remained, and continues to remain, their 
contemporary likeness and identity was reconstructed instead to face their reality rather 
than revive their history. To reiterate a quote by Ali Abunimah in the introduction to this 
thesis; “Palestine exists because Palestinians have chosen to remember it.”541 The concept 
of “Palestine”, and whether or not it existed in the modern-day state system, is arguable. 
What the different Palestinian factions succeeded in doing was disproving Prime Minister 
Golda Meir’s statement that “there is no such thing as Palestinian people, they do not 
exist”.542 Be it through a note from Henry Kissinger, a vote at the United Nations, or a 
statement read by the Deputy Secretary of State, the Palestinians identify themselves as 																																																								
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Palestinian, and reconstructed what it means to be Palestinian through their response to 
the trauma faced in 1948 and the myths and traditions that united them, while differing 
them from their fellow Arabs. 
 
A premise revealed throughout this thesis is the notion attributed to Gellner that “half the 
story is enough” and in this day and age the half that is enough is driven by national 
theory, rather than identity theory. For identity to be preserved, and in this case, the 
people to be protected by the rule of law, the PLO decided that for their national 
aspirations to be secured, they must gain recognition as an independent state.  
 
Prior to advancing to the three major events that will close out this chapter; the Camp 
David Accords, the Tel al-Zaatar and the Sabra and Shatila Massacres it is essential to 
introduce the 39th President of the United States, Jimmy Carter. In retrospect, Carter is 
arguably the most pro-Palestinian American President. On March 16th, 1977, just months 
after his swearing in, at a town hall in Massachusetts Jimmy Carter provided his own 
three step programme. The first two points were for the PLO to recognise Israel’s right to 
exist and the establishment of secure borders for Israel. The third point came as shock to 
many, where he argued that “there has to be a homeland for the Palestinian refugees who 
have suffered for many, many years.”543 For the first time, the President of the United 
States supported the concept of a Palestinian homeland.  
 
The Palestinians understood that it was essential for the world, and the United States, to 																																																								
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support their bid for self-determination and independence. Securing a state, in the scope 
of the theory on nationalism, would allow the Palestinians to define their own set of laws, 
their territory, their economy all the while developing institutions to preserve their history 
and customs. Although Carter’s statement was critiqued by Kuwaiti diplomat Fayez 
Sayegh for not defining the Palestinian homeland as Palestine and for referring to the 
refugees, not the national rights of all Palestinians Yasser Arafat welcomed the comment, 
declaring: “They tell me he mentioned the Palestinian homeland. If he did, it is a very 
important note. It is a progressive step because it means he has finally put his hand on the 
heart of the problem of the Middle East Crisis.”544 The critique by Sayegh is important as 
it shows the shift in the Palestinian problem, as the rhetoric for the first two decades after 
the Nakba focused on the refugees and their right of return. At this integral stage in the 
Palestinian story, after the Palestinians were recognised as an independent people the 
focus began to shift to the land of Palestine, in keeping with contemporary nationalism 
studies. While the Western world was coming to recognise the Palestinian as a distinct 
people, the pertinence of a state structure, in which they are their own protectorate, 
became the new aspect of the Palestinian revolution. Though the PLO had changed their 
rhetoric, now that they gained a semblance of recognition and were more focused being 
diplomats and politicians rather than statesmen; the 1970’s and the early 1980’s were 
mired in a similar, but bloodier, sequence of events. To the outside observer the sides 
were clear, Israel had their enemies: the Palestinians, the Egyptians, the Syrians, the 
Jordanians and the Lebanese and the Palestinians had their allies: the Egyptians, the 
Syrians, the Jordanians and the Lebanese. What transpired between 1975 and 1982 																																																								
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essentially proved otherwise, Yezid Sayigh believes that the PLO had three objectives 
while in Lebanon: 
The first of these immediate goals, without which pursuit of the larger ones would not be possible, 
was self-defence: the PLO felt it needed sufficient military strength to defend its main 
headquarters in Beirut, primarily against Lebanese official or paramilitary agencies…The second 
was the preservation of the PLO's political status, the need to safeguard the progress it had made 
both internationally and within the Arab and Palestinian arenas in gaining political recognition. 
Third was inducing movement towards resolving the Palestinian problem through a weakening of 
Israeli political will.545  
The rest of this chapter will explore how the Palestinians attempted, and ultimately failed, 
in satisfying these objectives.  
7.3 Lebanon and Syria 
 
‘Reform through arms’ is what, for the National Movement, the coalition of Muslim/leftist parties, 
it all came down to. Resisting reform by the self-same means, initially and tactically at least, was 
what it meant for the Lebanese Front, the Phalangist-dominated coalition of right-wing Maronite 
Parties.546  
 
While Egypt was deliberating creating their own peace with Israel, leaving the Syrian 
Baathist party, now led by Hafez al-Assad as the “leaders of Pan-Arabism”, in turn, the 
remaining Arab representative of the Palestinians 547  the PLO were now settled in 
Lebanon, where they were to be entangled in the Lebanese Civil War. The war was 
inevitable it just needed the PLO to spark it. Nearing the end of the French colonial era in 
Lebanon, the Maronite’s were the majority, thus it was agreed that the President of the 
country would have to be representative of this majority, with the Prime Minister being 
Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the National Assembly Shiite with one government post 
going to a member of each of the Druze and Greek Orthodox communities.548 By the time 																																																								
545 Sayigh, 1986. Op. cit. Pg. 101 
546 Hirst 2010. op.cit. Pg. 170 
547 Ibid. Pg. 175 
548 Haykal, 1996. op.cit. Pg. 335 
		
			 246	
the Palestinians arrived in Lebanon, the Muslims made-up the majority of the population, 
forcing them to want the above-mentioned reform.   
 
The defeat of the Arab armies paired with the occupation of the West Bank and the Golan 
Heights left the PLO with one territory in which they were able to carry out attacks 
against Israel; the south of Lebanon. At this stage, according to Rashid Khalidi, the PLO 
were regarded as the “vanguard of a Pan-Arab war of attrition against Israel,”549 thus 
welcomed by the predominantly Shia areas in the south of Lebanon.  
 
The Lebanese Civil war can be traced back to April 13th, 1975, where in an attempt to 
assassinate Pierre Gemayal, founder of the Maronite Kataeb party, four Phalangist 
militiamen were killed in a drive-by shooting in front of a church by unidentified 
gunmen. The same day, after a Palestinian anniversary celebrating a raid in northern 
Israel, 27 unarmed civilians were ambushed and killed by Phalangist gunmen.550  From 
the outset of the Palestinian refugee problem, they were at odds with the Maronites, as 
discussed in chapter 5. Pierre Gemayal, the leader of the Maronites, when once asked 
whether or not he would cooperate with the Israelis responded; “I am ready to cooperate 
with the Devil for the sake of Lebanon.”551 Understanding what reform and instability in 
Lebanon would mean to Hafez al-Assad’s primordial dream to reunite Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon,552 he decided to intervene. Although Assad was naturally a supporter of the 
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Muslim/leftist party, he entered the war in support of the Christians against the 
Palestinians.553 The Palestinians were once again at war with an Arab counterpart, this 
time with Syria and factions of the Lebanese government.  
 
The difference this time was that the PLO was not confined by refugee camps, as they 
were in Jordan. Arafat was essentially a head of a “Para-State”, whose borders included 
parts of the north and south of Lebanon, the Biqa’ Valley and the Fakhani-Arab 
University area which was situated in West Beirut.554 Though the Palestinians enjoyed 
vast wealth, and the Palestinians had a sense of authority, Abdel Bari Atwan views this 
era as a damaging turning point in Palestinian history: 
The worst thing that happened to the Palestinian movement and the Palestinian identity was when 
the Arabs began to interfere in Palestinian affairs, both financially and politically. This was a 
strong turning point, Fatah for example were given a lot of money, thus spoiling Fatah and the 
PLO pushing them more and more towards the American and Israeli solutions. I would not be 
surprised if Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were initiated by the United States and Europe to, in 
one way or another, drown the Palestinian movement with a sea of money. I think this was 
deliberate.555  
 
While the wealth enjoyed by the PLO may have played a factor in capitulation, the time 
in Lebanon had a number of turning points, two major events prove pivotal in this thesis, 
the Tel al-Zaatar Massacre and the Sabra and Shatila Massacres.556 While Assad led the 
charge in condemning Sadat after the Camp David Accords, his decision to enter the 
Lebanese Civil War was not only termed “constructive” by Henry Kissinger but was also 
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supported by the Israelis.557  Political decision-making of the leaders at the time was 
defined by constant shaming and prevarications, by all parties involved. The reasoning 
behind including these events and those that will follow is to further prove the necessity 
of a separate Palestinian entity amongst the broader Pan-Arab identity. 
 
Until this point, there had been considerable focus on the roles played by Egypt and 
Jordan, although there were a number of eruptions between the Palestinians and the 
Lebanese, it was predominantly done through the shaming of the defenceless Palestinian 
refugees. The events in April of 1975 were tragic for both sides, “Black Saturday” of 
December 1975 proved that these events were not isolated, instead it would be the start of 
a drawn out sectarian battle in which the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the 
Israelis, the United States and the United Nations would be involved. Black Saturday 
started with four Phalange militiamen being found dead in East Beirut. Bachir Gemayel, 
head of the Lebanese Front, the Maronite forces, advised that 40 Muslims were to be 
killed for this act. Christian forces then set up a checkpoint in Beirut and the first 40 
Muslim men who crossed were taken and beheaded, the Muslims followed this up with 
their own checkpoint and Christians who crossed would meet the same fate. This went on 
throughout the day and according to British reporter Robert Fisk, who was in Lebanon 
during the war, approximately 300 Muslims and Christians were killed that day. This was 
followed up by a siege of the Karantina refugee camp, where the Palestinian inhabitants 
were either murdered or expelled. This act by the Lebanese Forces forced the PLO’s hand 
in joining the Muslims in the civil war obliging Arafat to send his troops to Damour, a 																																																								
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predominantly Christian area, to support the Muslim assault on the Christian 
neighbourhood.558 With both sides having blood on their hands, the next siege would be 
end up being the bloodiest one to date. 
 
On January 4th, 1976, the Christian militias began a blockade on Tel al-Zaatar camp 
which lasted for months.559 By June, hundreds of Christian right joined the blockade and 
launched an assault on the camp as well as the surrounding neighbourhoods of Jisr al-
Basha and Nabaa. According to Abu Iyad; “It is not a coincidence that the siege began 
about ten days after the Syrian army entered Lebanon: The rightist forces had clearly 
waited for Damascus’ initiative before embarking on the genocide.”560 The blockade 
forced the population to live in extreme poverty, with access to water and food limited. 
On August 11th, the Arab League finally decided to intervene, drawing up an evacuation 
plan for the next day where the inhabitants, fighters included, would surrender and be 
transported away from the area by the Arab peace-keepers and the Red Cross. As the 
inhabitants began to evacuate the Christian rightists carried out one final offensive when 
the militiamen opened fire and began to gun down the travelling Palestinians and 
Lebanese Muslims. By the end of the day, according to Abu Iyad, 1,500 lives were lost 
on that day alone, matching the 1,500 who died during the siege.561 While Syria claimed 
to be neutral, the head of the Muslim/Leftist forces, Kamal Jumblatt, announced that 
Syria was supporting the rightists throughout the siege.562 Abu Iyad’s sentiments on the 
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Syrian involvement, and the late response by the Arab League, reiterates the ongoing 
argument of this thesis; that the Palestinian identity was a product of the necessity of a 
Palestinian entity: 
The Tal Zaatar (sic) tragedy was but another proof that we could rely on no one but ourselves. The 
so-called civilized (sic) world chastely adverted its eyes from the carnage… The real scandal, 
however, lies elsewhere: in the Arab world where no government, friendly to the Palestinians or 
otherwise, lifted a finger to save the 35,000 “brothers’ of Tal Zaatar. I refuse to believe that 
100,000,000 Arabs were incapable of breaking a siege imposed by a few hundred men, that they 
couldn’t so much as raise their voices to exert pressure, if not on the Christian militias, then at 
least on Syria which was protecting them.563 
 
Arafat, who was still attempting to be a “peace-maker” and was still a believer that the 
PLO should remain out of inter-Arab affairs, actually drew up a ceasefire proposal in 
order to thwart Syria’s involvement. According to Fatah leader Hani Hassan; just before 
the siege of Tel al-Zaatar Arafat flew to Damascus to persuade President Assad to hold 
off on intervening, to which the President approved, providing Arafat with a 48-hour 
window. Although the Muslims and the Leftists agreed to the ceasefire, it was clear to 
Arafat that the PLO forces, from other factions, would not attack the Syrian army as soon 
as they were to intervene.564 Just before the Syrians entered Lebanon Arafat, in one last 
effort to avoid Syrian intervention, left Lebanon to lobby other Arab leaders to persuade 
Assad not to intervene. Upon his departure, he drew a red-line, demanding his forces not 
to cross this line. He knew that the moment the PLO forces crossed the red-line near the 
Israeli border, the Israeli army would advance, and he knew that they were not able to 
faceoff with Israel due to the tensions of the time.565 Arafat did not believe he was able to 
stop the Syrian intervention, thus, if Israel was to join the war, the PLO would be fighting 
against the Lebanese rightists, the Syrian army and the Israeli army, essentially spelling 																																																								
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doom for the Palestinian movement. Though not involved directly in the military 
confrontation, Egypt’s President Sadat was preparing to take a courageous step that 
brought the Arab world to its knees. 
7.4 Arab Day of Mourning 
On January 1st, 1977, the United States and the Soviet Union released a joint 
communique which defined the: 
Key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the 
resolution of the Palestinian question including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis 
of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence.566 
 
Israel voiced their issues with this statement, starting with the fact that it did not mention 
resolutions 242 nor 338 as the principle of any peace plan between the Israelis and the 
Arabs.567 More troublesome to the Israelis than the framework for a peace deal was in the 
second section of the communique, which called for the Geneva Peace Conference to 
include “representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the 
Palestinian people.”568 Once again, the Palestinians have gained their recognition and the 
PLO was their representative and the aspect of having the PLO involved in direct 
negotiation with Israel irked the Israeli government. Interestingly, another party who was 
unhappy with the communique was Anwar Sadat, who did not want the Soviet Union to 
be involved. “We kicked the Russians out of the door and now Mr. Carter is bringing 
them back through the window.”569 Unhappy with the American decision to involve the 
Soviets, Sadat began to develop his own plan.  																																																								
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Sadat consulted with the President of Romania, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the 
King of Morocco and the Shah of Iran, who was constantly advising Sadat to turn his 
back on the Arab world and rediscover the separate Egyptian identity, all of which 
supported his plan to begin direct negotiations with Israel. On November 9th, 1977, Sadat 
delivered a speech to the Egyptian Parliament, with Yasser Arafat in the audience, to 
which he claimed: “I am ready to go to the ends of the earth for peace, even to the 
Knesset itself.”570 This obviously angered Arafat who stormed out of the Parliament and 
immediately left Egypt. Sadat, in a conversation with Walter Kronkite, reaffirmed that he 
would happily go to Jerusalem if he received an official invitation. Kronkite then 
contacted Israeli Prime Minster Menachim Begin who stated that he would extend an 
invitation through the United States as long as Sadat understands that the Israelis would 
not retreat to the 1967-borders, that they would not be open to discussions with the PLO 
and that they would not accept a Palestinian state. Sadat was supposedly not bothered by 
these demands as he had information through his liaison to the Israelis Hassan El-Tuhami 
that Israel had no problem conceding the Egyptian territory for peace with Egypt.571 If 
there was any reservation as to whether or not Pan-Arabism has become an ideology of 
the past, Sadat’s new policy all but confirmed it. Arafat viewed Sadat as a traitor to, not 
only the Palestinians, but to the whole Arab world: 
There is no doubt that Sadat tricked me and was using me. I was and still am very sure he did it to 
cause problems for me and, also, to cause splits and divisions among our Palestinian people. To 
me it was the first proof that Sadat was not being faithful to us Palestinians and to us Arabs. From 
then on I was convinced he was only playing games to disguise the fact that he was really working 
for a separate peace. If it wasn’t so, if he wanted to be faithful, he could have done the same thing- 
yes even the visit to Jerusalem- in another way…In my opinion he should have called a meeting of 																																																								
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Arab heads of state to discuss the whole strategy with them.572 
 
Arafat continued: “If I had been him, I would have said to my Arab colleagues the 
following: “Give me the chance. I will go and sacrifice myself. If I succeed the success is 
for all of us. If I fail the failure would have been mine.”573 Sadat’s declaration that he 
would of go to Israel for peace was an obvious issue to the head of the PLO, but at this 
point the PLO made it evident that they were not entirely opposed to direct negotiations 
with Israel, but more so that they were blindsided and once again they were to sit on the 
sidelines as another Arab leader represent the Palestinians with his own interests in mind. 
Further, Arafat was asked to arrive in Egypt the day before the speech where he was then 
sent to Libya to meet with Colonel Qaddafi on behalf of Sadat in order to quash the 
quarrel between the two leaders and ask the Colonel to provide Egypt with funding for 
their military.574 Obviously angered, as he felt that the Egyptian President has tricked 
him, the PLO were still not entirely convinced that Sadat would follow through and travel 
to Israel.575 Things moved quite quickly as Sadat was slated to land in Tel Aviv on 
November 19th, only ten days after his declaration.   
 
At the time of his trip, only three countries supported Sadat’s plan; Tunisia, Morocco and 
the Sudan. Libya called for Egypt to be expelled from the Arab League and the 
headquarters to be moved from Cairo, the Syrian government declared a national day of 
mourning, Jordan’s press called his trip an attack on Arab solidarity, the Egyptian 
embassy in Beirut was attacked by a rocket, students in Iraq declared a strike, Saudi 																																																								
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Arabia felt that Sadat put the Arab world in a precarious position and the PLO declared 
that Egypt was no longer qualified to speak on behalf of the Palestinians or the Arabs.576 
Though the Arabs were once again united, this time against the country that bound them 
together. The country of Nasser, the King of all Arabs, delivered the final blow to Arab 
state unity.  
 
This chapter intends to solidify the reasoning behind the need for an independent 
Palestinian entity, to support and shape the Palestinian identity. Though Egypt 
historically allowed the Palestinians to operate within the Gaza Strip, Sadat proved that 
the intentions of Egypt were similar to Jordan’s; to guarantee their interests without 
remorse for the Palestinian people. Sadat delivered his speech, recognising Israel and 
lending his own olive branch pleading to the Israeli Knesset: “If you want to live with us 
in this part of the world, in sincerity I tell you that we welcome you among us with all 
security and safety.”577 Though Sadat claimed that “there can be no peace without the 
Palestinians,” and, “it is no use to refrain from recognising the Palestinian people and 
their right to statehood and their right to return,”578 he failed to mention the PLO. Arafat 
claims that Sadat’s decision to leave the PLO out of his speech was actually done at the 
advice of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.579  Upon his return to Egypt Sadat 
invited experts from the PLO, the Arab world and Israel to take part in a meeting to setup 
a framework for a peace treaty. The PLO and the Arabs boycotted the meeting, and when 																																																								
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the Israeli delegation arrived to the meeting space in Cairo, only to see a Palestinian flag 
on the table, they gave the Egyptians an ultimatum; the flag goes, or we go.580 The 
Palestinian flag, the flag of the Arab revolt, was removed by the Egyptian delegation at 
the request of their guests.  
 
On September 17th, 1978 President Sadat and Prime Minster Begin signed the Camp 
David Accords, followed up by the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, signed on March 26th, 
1979, witnessed by President Jimmy Carter on the White House lawn.581 There was 
finally a symbol of peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, for the Palestinians and the 
Arab world, the peace treaty only normalised the relations of Egypt and Israel, 
disregarding the Camp David framework which called for a 5-year engagement plan to 
allow the Palestinians self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza. The response from the 
Arabs was an economic and diplomatic boycott of Egypt as well as their expulsion from 
the Arab League (Although Egypt withdrew from the Arab League the same day), an 
organisation Sadat deemed “useless”.582 Egypt was now viewed as a disgrace in the Arab 
world for capitulating to Israel although all signs pointed to the PLO willingness to 
accept a Palestinian mini-state living side by side with Israel.  
 
Ben-Gurion’s aspirations went further than the land of historic Palestine, as he stated that 
Greater Israel should include the Sinai, Transjordan, Southern Lebanon and Southern 
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Syria.583 Though Israel was not able to control Transjordan, and was forced to relinquish 
the Sinai they were at peace with their western neighbour Egypt and were controlling the 
West Bank, a large buffer zone with their eastern neighbour Jordan. Essentially, they 
could rest easy that these two states, Jordan and Egypt, were no longer their enemies due 
to the Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement and the events of Black September.  
 
In less than a decade the Palestinians were massacred by the Jordanians, the Lebanese, 
and indirectly by the Syrians and their greatest ally Egypt has abandoned them in order to 
serve personal interests. It must be said that the PLO were not without guilt in this whole 
situation, as they did develop their own “para-state” in both Lebanon and Jordan and 
were open to concessions with Israel before President Sadat actually acted on his trip to 
Jerusalem and were even drawn into their own civil battles, killing fellow Palestinians 
who chose to side with other Arab groups, namely Syria.584 Nonetheless, the Palestinian 
people were the ones who grieved, they were massacred, left defenceless and forced into 
further expulsion and poverty. They were threatened by their fellow Arabs, drawn into a 
sectarian war in Lebanon. The need for a Palestinian state, in which the Palestinians can 
live peacefully, was never more essential. Kissinger, fearing that the Lebanese civil war 
might spill over to Israel and wanting to put an end to the Palestinian question, even 
suggested to Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh that the Christian population 
emigrate to Canada and the United States, thus allowing Lebanon, or a part of it, to 
become an alternative Palestinian entity.585 An idea that all sides privy to the conflict 
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would not be in support of as the PLO constantly made it clear that this was not their 
country and Lebanon was not their main enemy.  
 
This thesis has ultimately provided a situation where the concepts of identity and 
nationality may have similar roots, but in order for an identity to be preserved and to 
flourish it must satisfy the national theories. The Palestinians, or the PLO, had 
recognition, but were under constant threat. As expressed many times throughout this 
thesis, they have an identity; they are united as a people, but were still divided 
geographically without any real protection or opportunity. As seen with the Kissinger’s 
suggestion, the United States and Western powers were supportive of a resolution to the 
Palestinian problem when pitted against other Arab states, the next and final event to be 
discussed in this chapter showed the world that the Palestinians were in dire need for 
their own territory, that the resolution to the Palestinian plight was simply a recognition 
of an independent territory of Palestine.  
7.5 The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 
 
In response to the Camp David Accords, Abu Iyad stated:  
 
We weren’t going to let Carter, Begin, and Sadat get away with a so-called peace which 
would deprive the Palestinian people of their future. We had to show Israel that it was 
futile to exclude us from a settlement and remind the Arabs that it was dangerous to 
sacrifice us to their selfish interests.586  
 
The PLO decided to carry out a military operation in Tel Aviv, where, according to Abu 
Iyad, they would kidnap soldiers to use to negotiate for the release for Palestinian 
prisoners. Due to a coastal storm, this plan faltered, forcing the militants to improvise. 
The person leading the group was a twenty-year-old woman Dalal al-Mughrabi, who 																																																								
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actually grew up fearing war and armed conflict. Except, she was a survivor of the Tel al-
Zaatar massacre, essentially a product of that operation. Al-Mughrabi, eight other 
Palestinian militants, and over 30 Israeli civilians were killed in a shootout with the Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF) between Haifa and Tel Aviv. Abu Iyad argues that it was the IDF 
who fired on the bus and the motorists, Israelis argue that it was the Palestinian militants 
who killed the civilians. Regardless of who was at fault, the result was that the Knesset 
passed a law allowing Israeli secret service (Mossad) to kill Palestinians wherever they 
may be in the world in order to quell terrorism and three days later Israel carried out a 
military assault in Lebanon.587 The Tel Aviv bus operation was a tragic mass murder of 
civilians, motivated by all parties involved in the current geopolitical crisis. 
 
The retaliation for this attack was an Israeli invasion of Lebanon which resulted in nearly 
250,000 refugees and 2000 dead. The bombing continued in 1979, Noam Chomsky 
recalls that the Israeli attacks in Lebanon “was regarded as so ordinary and 
unremarkable.”588 On March 19th, 1978 the UNSC adopted Resolutions 425 and 426 
calling for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the creation of the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon,589 the Israelis complied two days later but being that there was 
no mention of the PLO, Arafat did not agree to the terms until March 28th. Helena 
Cobban, in her book on the PLO notes:  
Arafat’s decision to co-operate with the UNIFIL command-and thus, by implication, to endorse 
resolution 425- marked a turning-point in the history of the Palestinian resistance movement, 
whose importance has generally been overlooks. It constituted the first open acceptance by the 
leader of the PLO of a cease-fire agreement with Israel, and his decision to co-operate with 
UNIFIL was subsequently endorsed by all the official PLO bodies. Arafat has extracted from the 																																																								
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UN negotiators what he considered a fair price for the making this concession: public recognition 
from them, through their agreement to meet with him openly, of the PLO’s interests in and 
importance to the disengagement process in south Lebanon.590  
 
The ultimate result of the 1978 invasion was a Maronite-Israeli partnership with the 
Maronite forces in East Beirut and throughout the northern coastal enclave and an Israeli 
agent force occupying the southern part of Lebanon with the PLO facing a prospect of an 
all-out onslaught assault from both sides with nowhere to go. 591  The PLO and the 
Palestinians had faced this kind of pressure before, but always had an ally to lean on for 
support. At this point, outside of the Muslim, Druze and Arabist Lebanese population 
who were in the bunkers with them there was nowhere to turn to for support. 
 
After relative calm, Israel decided to resume their extensive bombing of Palestinian 
targets in Southern Lebanon in response to an assassination attempt of their Ambassador 
in the United Kingdom by the Iraqi sponsored Abu Nidal organisation, who the PLO 
suggested were motivated by the Mossad.592 In August, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin was re-elected as Prime Minister, appointed as his Defence Minister was Ariel 
Sharon. Sharon, who was highly involved in the group Gush Enunim (the Block of the 
Faithful), an Israeli settler movement whose ultimate goal is the full Judiazation of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.593 Sharon was in favour of the ceasefire that was put in place 
as it allowed him the time to draw up a plan to once again invade Lebanon and put his 
final solution into play. Sharon’s final solution had three elements; first, the ultimate 																																																								
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destruction of the PLO in Lebanon including the liquidation of the PLO leadership, 
followed by the creation of a puppet Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza 
and finally the overthrowing of King Hussein in Jordan allowing for the occupied 
territories to forever become a part of the Jewish state and Jordan becoming the 
Palestinian homeland.594 The PLO were once the heads of a para-state in Jordan, and 
when driven out of Jordan, again in Lebanon. Although their intention was to take the 
fight to Israel, they also had to protect their citizens and provide them with a semblance 
of rights and social assistance- it was this assistance that drove the economy of Lebanon 
allowing them to gain power. Palestinian power, so close to the Israeli border, was clearly 
troubling to Sharon and had to be dealt with. 
 
The 1982 war started on June 4th and the PLO’s plan to deal with Israel’s invasion was to 
have the world convene, putting an end to the conflict, as they did in 1956, 1967 and 
1973.595 On June 5th the UNSC passed Resolution 508 which called for an end to the 
escalation and for Israel to withdraw.596 Though the United States voted in support of 
Resolution 508, they did not exert any influence on Israel to disengage and on June 21st 
the State Department claimed that the resolution was no longer relevant.597 The Israelis 
intentions in Lebanon were clear, as propagated by a number of Zionist writers; the editor 
of the New Republic advised that the defeat of the PLO “will clarify to the Palestinians in 
the West Bank that their struggle for an independent state has suffered a setback of many 
years” continuing that, “the Palestinians will be turned into just another crushed nation, 																																																								
594 Hart 1989. op.cit. Pg. 445 
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like the Kurds or the Afghans.”598 Danny Rubenstein of Davar wrote that “the PLO as an 
orderly political body is more terrifying to the government of Israel than the powerful 
terrorist PLO.”599 In dismantling any political strength gained by the PLO through their 
concessions and in keeping with ceasefires, they were able to gain support to carry out 
their attacks in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. 
 
As for the war, the Israeli army was too much to handle for the PLO, especially after 
Syria’s ceasefire with Israel and their decision to withdraw from the war at the end of 
June.600 The war, where Israel intended to corner the Palestinians and the Muslims into 
East Beirut to cut them off from all sources of foods,601 where they set up concentration 
camps where Palestinian prisoners were tortured602 and where hospitals were attacked 
and doctors sent to Israel for interrogation still did not reach its apex.603 What drove the 
PLO’s fear about leaving Lebanon was the treatment of those who remained. Although 
the United States provided the Palestinians with written guarantees that a multinational 
force would be instilled to protect the Palestinian camps, Arafat did not trust Sharon or 
the Lebanese Christians.604 Soon after the expulsion of the PLO, the American promise 
was already proved insufficient as they could not protect the Palestinians left behind. On 
September 16th the Lebanese Kataeb Forces, with the support from the air and the sea, 
carried out a complete massacre of Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp. 
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When reporters were allowed in after a two-day bombardment, there was a shock that 
created an international outcry. Robert Fisk recalls: 
At first, we did not use the word massacre. We said very little because the flies would move 
unerringly for our mouths. We held handkerchiefs over our mouths for this reason, then we 
clasped the material to our noses as well because the flies moved over our faces. If the smell of the 
dead in Sidon was nauseating, the stench of Chatila made us retch. Through the thickest of 
handkerchiefs, we smelled them. After some minutes, we began to smell the dead. 
 
They were everywhere, in the road, in laneways, in back yards and across the top of the garbage 
tips. The murderers- the Christian militiamen whom Israel had let into the camps to ‘flush out 
terrorists’- had just left. In some cases, the blood was still wet on the ground. When we had seen a 
hundred bodies, we stopped counting. Down every alleyway, there were corpses- women, young 
men, babies and grandparents- lying together in lay and terrible profusion where they had been 
knifed or machine-gunned to death…Everywhere, we found signs of hastily dug mass graves. 
Perhaps a thousand people were butchered; probably half that number again.605 
 
Arguably the worst attack the Palestinians faced since their expulsion, the Sabra and 
Shatila massacre marked one of the darkest days in Palestinian history. While the fact 
that over a thousand people were killed is the point that sticks out, it is the whole 
Lebanon tragedy that will be remembered as the turning point in the Palestinian 
movement, forcing the world to understand the need for a Palestinian autonomous region.  
 
For his involvement, Ariel Sharon, who would become the Prime Minister of Israel in the 
future was found complicit. The Kahan Commission, an internal Israeli fact-finding tour 
found Ariel Sharon personally responsible.606 The PLO was expelled from their last safe-
haven which directly borders Israel, the United States proved itself as a dishonest broker 
and the Arabs, outside of the Muslim/Leftist group in Lebanon, were either at peace, 
colluding with or forced away by Israel. 
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This thesis has intended to explore the resurgence of the Palestinian national identity, 
arguing that the contemporary Palestinian identity was formulated through dealings, not 
with Israel, but with fellow Arabs. Although the Israelis and the British played an integral 
role in forcing the Palestinians into expulsion, this thesis is focused on the need for a 
separate Palestinian entity separate but united with their Arab brethren. This chapter 
establishes this defining characteristic; while the PLO and Yasser Arafat were attempting 
to carve out political influence, the Arabs interfered and the Israelis ensured that this 
would not happen. The next chapter, the conclusion, ties all the determinants of the 
Palestinian national identity, as argued throughout this thesis, while touching on the 
Israeli response to an accepted Palestinian nation, with inspirations to create their own 
state.   
 
What started as a people aspiring to gain recognition by their fellow Arabs, and re-
conquer the whole of historic Palestine turned into more of a pragmatic movement that 
reflects the nationalism determinants explored in the literature review. While in Lebanon, 
the development of a para-state is what forced the Israelis to act. Mordechai Bar-On, 
former director of education for the IDF, claimed: 
Anyone who visited Southern Lebanon… would see that the war was fought not just against 
terrorist organizations (sic) and the PLO, and not even solely to destroy the PLO’s military 
infrastructure in the region. It was fought against the very existence of the Palestinians as a 
community with its own way of life, which has been evolving in Lebanon since 1948, and at an 
enhanced rate since 1975… [against the] health and educational services, political and social 
organizations (sic), judicial and self-management systems…the Palestinian refugees have once 
again become a faceless mass of people, uprooted, evacuated and torn away from any form of 
collective life.607 
 
Israel stood by as the Palestinians were drawn into conflicts with the Arabs, as they used 																																																								
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international terrorism to drive their movement, it was only when they began to set up a 
social system in Lebanon they attacked. Western theory on nationalism has predicated the 
need for societal development, something very difficult to develop when in exile. The 
Palestinians, against all odds, were able to do so. The Israelis understand that “half the 
story” is enough and the other half grows to be irrelevant. The romantic Palestinian 
attachment to their homeland is not enough for the development of a Palestinian state, but 
the political work of the PLO, along with their attempts to follow international law and 
agreed upon ceasefires, the Israelis feared, would force many in the world to view the 
Palestinians as a people able to develop and govern their own state.  
 
Essentially, the development of a Palestinian identity post-1948 was a project that had to 
be worked out amongst their fellow Arabs who were either attempting to control 
“Palestinian territory” or drive the concept of Pan-Arab unity whereas the development of 
a Palestinian “nation-state” became a project that had to be worked out with the Israelis, 
who obviously had interests in ensuring this does not succeed, explaining, partially, their 
invasion of Lebanon.  
 
When discussing the end of the PLO’s experience in Lebanon, Bassam Abu Sharif sums 
up the time as follows: 
The enemy tried to take out the PLO in Lebanon early, they found that the regime of the time and 
the army in Lebanon couldn’t do it so they created a civil war in Lebanon and then finally had to 
invade Lebanon in 1982. They invaded Lebanon with the aim of killing the leadership of the PLO 
or taking them prisoner. Though they ultimately failed, the PLO left the war in Lebanon weak and 
more importantly, far away from Palestine. No borders for their forces, and they had to retreat and 
abide by the rules and regulations of Arab regimes that are friendly, but would not induce war at a 
time where they were not ready for it. 608 																																																								
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It was a grim reality for the Palestinians, as for the first time in their history, the PLO was 
not bordered with Israel or the Palestinian Territories. It was also here that the idea of a 
settlement really began gaining leverage, sending fractures into the Palestinian 
programme, but not the unity of Palestinians, as argued by Bassam Abu Sharif, who 
stated: 
Then the differences started again, as I said, unity had one vase, one pillar, the programme of 
liberation, independence and the return to the homeland. Now even that platform dwindled in the 
mind of those who considered that we should become more tactful, the idea of a settlement started 
and it was at this point the platform was no longer enough to keep the organizations united. One 
should differentiate here between two things, unification of the Palestinian organizations under the 
PLO flag is one thing, and the unification of Palestinians everywhere is another. In the sense, you 
might have organizations that differ, contradict, boycott each other upstairs in the leadership level 
of the PLO but that will never carry itself to the streets between members of the organizations who 
would remain Palestinians, brothers, ready to fight.  
 
But that was a political necessity, certain people believed that the best tactic would be one way 
while others would believe, no, we should take another route. Anyways. The entering of a 
settlement like the two state solution was a breaking point in the platform, the PFLP rejected that, 
in spite of the rejection by the PFLP to join the settlement and to go into a deal the PFLP remained 
inside the PLO, this is the difference, it didn’t flip on the PLO, which remains as the unifying flag 
of the Palestinian identity.609 
 
7.6 An Inclusive Identity 
 
Though this thesis focuses on developments that occurred between 1948-1982, it does not 
negate the pertinence of what preceded the Nakba and what followed the Shatila attacks. 
The premise of this research is based on the idea that, regardless of the undeniable Arab 
connection to Palestine pre-1948, the Palestinian national identity was forced to 
reconstruct itself after the Nakba. The author of this research contends that in 1982 the 
base of the Palestinian identity was formulated through the three stages conveyed 
throughout this thesis. In the years that followed, the political landscape changed 
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considerably, having an arguable effect on the identity. In concluding this chapter, two 
major developments will be introduced in order to justify the time-frame of this thesis. 
 
The first development was the creation of Hamas in 1987, and to a lesser extent the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement (IJM) which was developed in 1981. The Palestinian 
political parties who controlled much of the narrative until the 1980’s may have 
disagreed on political issues and ideology but they remained inclusive. The introduction 
of Hamas and the IJM brought forth an ideology predicated on religion, disregarding the 
notion that Palestine is at the epicentre of Christianity and there remained a modest, but 
essential, community of Palestinian Christians dedicated to the Palestinian nation. The 
leaders of Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the other organisations may have had leaders 
who were religious, but they did not discriminate against those of different faiths. In 
Hamas’ 1988 covenant, Article Six reads: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to 
Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of 
Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety 
where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. In the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, 
oppression spreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars will break out.610 
 
An article such as this will raise a number of issues, especially in discussing political 
Islam and the notion of an Islamic state. For the purpose of this research, what trouble 
some people is the idea that Palestine will be an Islamic state, and Islam will be the way 
of life in Palestine. The Palestinian national identity must be inclusive and the creation of 
Hamas who would later take control of the Gaza Strip, has two problems. The first clear 
issue is the fact that Palestinian Christians do exist and a Palestinian state, whether 
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independent or a binational state with Israel, will have to recognise the will of the Jewish 
people, in addition to the Christian and Muslim populations. The call to create an Islamic 
state in Palestine is equally polarising to Israel’s precondition that the Palestinian 
Authority must recognise them as a Jewish state to continue peace talks.  
 
More pressing, and impactful to this study is the fact that Hamas is an offshoot of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 611  The Brotherhood, a transnational Sunni organisation, was 
founded in 1928 in Egypt and until today serves as the head of an organisation that has 
expanded to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Bahrain and as mentioned before, 
Palestine.612 As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the Palestinian national movement’s 
initial goal was to wrestle away control of the Palestinian struggle from their more 
powerful Arab allies. The creation of Hamas, aside from their religious exclusivity 
restored a sense of transnational control of the movement, as their allegiance to outside 
actors is inevitable.  
 
The second major development was the Oslo Accords signed by Yasser Arafat and 
Yitzhak Rabin in 1993. The accords resulted in the creation of the PNA of which Arafat 
was president, possibly conflicting with his role as president of the Executive Committee 
of the PLO, a conflict that was transferred to Mahmoud Abbas upon Arafat’s passing in 
2004. While the PLO remained as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, 
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the cross control is an issue of grief to a number of Palestinian activists.613 The Oslo 
agreement is a highly debated topic amongst Palestinians and Israelis alike, aside of the 
wide range issues and downfalls in the agreement itself- the creation of the PNA created 
yet another rift amongst the Palestinian people. Abdel Bari Atwan claims that “you 
cannot say that we are Palestinian and support Oslo,”614 while Afif Safieh will argue that; 
“I for one, supported Oslo without any illusion and I’m speaking about 1993, as in 
political science as you know a state is defined as an authority on	 a	 demography	 on	 a	geography.”615 Upon return to the West Bank, the PLO leadership took control of a land 
and a reality they knew very little about. When Fatah was created, there was a wide range 
appeal in that they did not discriminate, the leadership came from humble beginnings and 
gained respect based on their actions. The Fatah leadership that were repatriated in 1994 
were the elite class, limiting the control and actions of the popular resistance that grew in 
Palestine over the decades that preceded.616 Politically, Hamas controls the sieged Gaza 
Strip, the PNA controls an occupied West Bank and the different refugee camps range in 
control and circumstances. As for the PLO, still under the leadership of Fatah and 
President Mahmoud Abbas, it has been limited to a figurehead status.  
 
The growth of the PNA, and the progress made resulting in the UNGA’s recognition of 
the “State of Palestine”, officially separated the Palestinian people. Oxford law professor 
Guy Goodwin-Gill notes the following: 																																																								
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The risk of fragmentation – where the State represents the people within the UN and the PLO 
represents the people outside the UN. Such a division of representation would run counter to the 
status quo and to the original intent of the international community in recognizing (sic) the PLO. 
The challenge is to maintain unity in these unique circumstances.617 
 
Though the UN decision propelled the PNA to a “non-member observer state”, and 
officially separated Palestinian representation, there is still a unified sense of what it 
means to be Palestinian. Throughout the timeframe covered in this thesis, the Palestinians 
enjoyed a sense of healthy pluralism. The leadership had their quarrels, but remained 
united and steadfast in their struggle, this unity was reflected by the Palestinian 
population, regardless of social and geographical differences.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations 
One should differentiate here between two things, unification of the Palestinian organizations 
under the PLO flag is one thing, and the unification of Palestinians everywhere is another. In the 
sense, you might have organizations that differ, contradict, boycott each other upstairs in the 
leadership level of the PLO but that will never carry itself to the streets between members of the 
organizations who would remain Palestinians, brothers, ready to fight.618 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to conceptually analyse the Palestinian national identity as 
it developed following the trauma of the Nakba. This chapter will summarise the main 
arguments and conclusions, drawing on the research question and hypothesis. 
Furthermore, this chapter will describe the limitations of the thesis as well as future 
recommendations.  
 
8.1 The Research Question Reconsidered 
There were three research questions, starting with exploring the events that preceded the 
recognition of the PLO as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. The second 
question asked why the Palestinian case is essential to the study of nationalism. Finally, 
the third asks whether or not the Palestinian identity, as reconstructed post-Nakba fits into 
the parameters of Western national theory. The hypothesis argues that the Palestinian 
identity was hindered due to the manner in which the Arab leaders controlled the conflict 
with Israel. This, along with the treatment of Palestinian refugees, forced the Palestinians 
to create their own political faction in order to represent themselves amongst the Arab 
world, and later the international arena. Further, the Palestinian case is essential, not only 
to broaden the myopic nature of the study of nationalism, but to also advance the 
understanding of the Palestinian people and their plight for self-determination. 																																																								618	Abu Sharif, 2017. op.cit.	
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The methodology used; interviews and content analysis of written records has provided 
sufficient information to explore the different dynamics of the identity. Using interviews 
and biographical records allowed for an in-depth perspective into the events that most 
directly impacted the trajectory of the Palestinian’s progression. In addition, the use of 
UN resolutions and official statements afforded a detailed evaluation of whether or not 
the actions of the PLO resulted in real political impact.  
 
The underlying constant recognised in researching the Palestinian identity, as it was 
formulated post-Nakba, is its fluid nature. Without a “time and place” the identity has 
perpetually evolved to reflect the necessity of the time and situation at hand. Due to this, 
the identity developed in conjunction with Abu-Lughod’s theory separating the 
Palestinian plight post-Nakba into three stages consisting of the politics of 
accommodation, politics of rejection and politics of revolution and hope. Abu-Lughod’s 
theory acted as a starting point in formulating what I found to be the three determinants 
of the Palestinian identity: the refugee, the revolutionary and the statesman.   
 
Between 1948 and 1982, the Palestinian identity took form in response to the trials and 
tribulations faced at the time. The initial phase of the identity was shaped by the plight 
and mistreatment of the refugees, followed by the revolutionary stage, concluded by the 
Fatah’s attempt at transitioning the PLO from a guerrilla organisation to a recognised 
political faction who officially represent Palestinian interests internationally. These three 
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phases and how they apply to the theory will be revisited in this, the concluding chapter, 
starting with the refugee stage.  
8.2 The Refugee 
After the Nakba, the Palestinians were scattered, living predominantly under Israeli, 
Egyptian and Jordanian authority or in refugee camps situated in Lebanon, Jordan and 
Syria. The fact that the Palestinians were forced to live in camps, and these camps still 
exist nearly 70 years later is a tragedy, but for Palestinian identity it was this time in the 
camps where the Palestinians began to view themselves as similar, but different to their 
Arab counterparts. As Guibernau and Hobsbawm argue, a major aspect of constructing 
identity is based essentially on belonging to a group of people. The Palestinians did not 
choose to belong to a Palestinian nation, they were forced to view their being as 
“different”. Though the Arab world was a region where the state was not the norm, 
effectively a new phenomenon for the Arabs, when exploring the Palestinian identity 
there is no region where the protection of a nation state caries more leverage.  
 
The Palestinians were internationally recognised as the Arab refugees of Palestine, 
collateral damage in the creation of the state of Israel. The seminal theories of Gellner 
and Smith define nations in the scope of a state structure, which, in essence, makes 
complete sense when viewed with a Western bias. Without a common economy, common 
law, freedom of movement and division of labour, referring to the Palestinians as a 
nation, in Western terms, is problematic. When applying these theories to a multicultural, 
Western nation, it is very highly plausible. In the 1950s when defining the Palestinian 
identity, the refugees were Palestinian due to a lack of legal rights, economic opportunity 
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and movement. Essentially in reverse engineering the theories of Gellner and Smith, one 
may derive a model that applies to the Palestinian refugees and/or other stateless nations 
who find themselves without any legal protections.  
 
The Palestinians, namely the refugees, were a pauper society and this has much to do 
with the reconfiguring of the identity. Palestine was a place where the masses benefited 
from the fertile lands to the east and north, and the long shoreline to the west. In 
Lebanon, these opportunities were not available to them. This forced the new generation 
of Palestinians to sway from the regular Arab culture where one will take on whatever 
industry their family operated in for generations prior, and explore new opportunities. 
Due to this, it was the education provided by UNRWA that was necessary. With that 
being said, the education system also allowed for Palestinians to learn about their lost 
culture and history. The educators made it part of their duties to inform the youth about 
Palestine, the Nakba and the reality at hand, making space for the revolution. 
8.3 The Revolution 
The revolutionary stage, which developed as a result of the Nakba, the treatment of the 
refugees and the Arab failures, namely that of 1967 acted as a bridge between personal 
recognition during the refugee years to international recognition in the statesman years. It 
was during the initial revolutionary years where the Palestinians had to gain recognition 
from the Arab world. The first step in doing so was the Battle of Karameh. While many 
Palestinians still view themselves as refugees, and some choose to identify as refugees, 
the revolution reconfigured how the Palestinians were defined. After the battle of 
Karameh, those who were solely helpless refugees were able to become fighters and the 
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fida’i became a staple of the Palestinian identity. International media began to take notice 
of the young men claiming ownership to the land widely recognised as Israel. 
 
At the centre of attention was Yasser Arafat. One can argue that on the international 
level, Arafat may be referred to the “first Palestinian”. Though Gellner was critiqued in 
the literature review for neglecting history and claiming that all that is relevant is “half 
the story”, when researching nationalism or identity in the scope of politics his premise is 
widely justified. Arafat understood this and even with his faults was pragmatic in his 
approach to the Palestinian struggle. Along with many others, he viewed the PLO as 
another tool for the Arab world to control the question of Palestine but instead of 
disregarding the organisation he, along with others in Fatah, began formulating a plan to 
take control of the PLO. Taking advantage of the situation preceding the 1967 war, 
Arafat infiltrated the West Bank and began making himself known to those still inside 
Palestine. 
 
Guibernau offers five determinants of identity; cultural, historical, territorial, political and 
psychological. When the Arab’s faced a tumultuous setback in 1967, Arafat was able to 
build a sense of unification amongst the Palestinians. Between 1967 and 1969, aside from 
the aforementioned visit to Palestine and stand at Karameh, he was elected as head of the 
PLO. The intention of this thesis is not to glorify Arafat or Fatah, but to examine their 
impact on the resurgence of the identity. The impact of having a leader prepared to risk 
his life in entering the West Bank and later leading his troops during the standoff with 
Israel provided a sense of pride to the Palestinian people. With the large amounts of 
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shame that came with being Palestinian, due to the guilt of being forced from their homes 
and dependency on rations, it was essential to regain this pride as part of the identity 
building process. As Guibernau notes, the amalgamation of a people psychologically is 
pertinent, the complications in doing this when scattered makes it even more difficult. 
Though this cannot completely be attributed to Arafat or Fatah alone, as there were many 
people working, with regards to recognition both nationally and internationally, Arafat, 
even if superficially, was at the centre of this unification. 
 
Another aspect of the psychological impact of the revolution was, what Norman referred 
to as the post-colonial shift, starting with a tabula rasa. Still facing the despair of post-
colonialism, having hope, or a sense of progress, allowed the Palestinians to accept what 
happened in 1948 and begin working on revitalising the Palestinian nation. The first step 
in doing this was gaining recognition from the Arab world. Without reiterating the events 
of Black September and the death of Nasser, these events spelled the end of Pan-Arabism 
as it was practiced at the time. Coupling these setbacks with the refugee stage leverages 
the notion that the Palestinians did not choose their identity, but were forced to accept it. 
Similarly, not only did they choose to belong together, they were rejected by other 
groups. Identity is not constructed solely through a national consciousness, but as Taylor 
argues, through choosing what is right or wrong or as Calhoun contends by way of a 
developed kinship. The Palestinian national identity was hereby developed, based 
predominantly on the social stratification in the Arab world forcing a Palestinian social 
cohesion driven by political action. Ushering in the next stage; the statesman.  
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8.4 The Statesman 
A wide range of the theory, whether contemporary or classical argues the importance of 
territory; a “time and place” to preserve a national identity. Still reeling from the events 
of Black September and the decision by Egyptian President Sadat to make peace with 
Israel, the PLO was forced to begin making concessions. The most pertinent aspect of 
this stage is the PLO’s attempt to satisfy the determinants provided by Smith and Gellner. 
Much of the theory on identity may be applied to the development of the Palestinian 
identity and although it came to be accepted that there are a “Palestinian people”, they 
were still lacking a national authority and official recognition from the international 
community.   
 
If this study set out to examine the Palestinian national identity, strictly in the scope of 
the sociological development of identity, there would have been more focus on 
Palestinian society pre-Nakba while disregarding the developments proceeding the 
launch of the revolution. Instead, as this is a political study, the idea of international 
recognition and the evolution of the PLO is an essential facet of this research. The PLO 
understood that in the wake of the falling out with Jordan and Egypt, they were required 
to begin making concessions and become more pragmatic to secure a national home for 
the Palestinians. As mentioned above, the theories on nationalism tend to favour the 
Western state system. For all intents and purposes of this research, the goal was not to 
question the dynamics of the state system, but to explore the impact of this state system 
on the Palestinian struggle for liberation and statecraft.  
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It is for that reason the final chapter focused on the concessions the PLO agreed to make 
and the response by the Israelis. As it was laid out in chapter 7, the Israelis were not 
threatened by a guerrilla organisation scattered through the region. Rather, they became 
wary of the PLO when they began gaining recognition at the global stage, and more 
importantly, developing a state-like structure in Lebanon which would allow for the 
Palestinians to claim the lands seized by the Israelis in 1967. The Palestinians in Lebanon 
became self-sufficient, albeit due to international funding. Nonetheless, they developed 
their own economy, supported their own education, healthcare and other social services. 
They policed their refugee camps, and allowed their people to live with an impression of 
autonomy.  
8.5 The Palestinian Identity 
Throughout much of the timeframe covered in this thesis, the Palestinian identity 
reflected the necessity of grouping together in the face of hardship. The base of the 
identity, even as it is practiced contemporarily can be attributed to the actions taken 
between 1967 and 1970. The refugee years acted as an awakening to the new reality 
faced, but it was not until the Arabs lost the war in 1967 did the Palestinian leadership, 
across the board, understand that they could not depend on the Arabs to liberate their lost 
homeland. The stand at Karameh created a sense of pride that drove many Palestinians to 
work in unison to support the revolution in any manner possible. Black September acted 
as a further assurance that they could not depend on fellow Arabs. It is here that 
Palestinian national identity was solidified, attributed largely to a social movement, 
regardless of where one was located, they were connected to the Palestinian revolution 
and felt a direct impact of the situation in Jordan.  
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The idea of the “statesman” did not impact what it means to be a Palestinian, instead, it 
was a method in preserving the Palestinian identity. The Palestinians cannot rest on their 
historical attachment to Palestine, even if they have documents proving that they resided 
in Palestine before 1948. The Palestinians exist, and as long as they choose to exist, that 
will not change. The actions taken during the refugee and revolutionary stage assured 
that. For “Palestine” to exist, the world would have to accept them into their community 
of states, allowing them to determine their own future, economy and law, justifying, to a 
degree, the actions of the PLO as statesmen. 
8.6 Research Limitations 
While the aims of this research have been met, there will be shortcomings. In the 
methodology chapter a number of these possible limitations were addressed, starting with 
the fact that the events explored in this thesis took place between 35 and 70 years ago. 
Though there is a wide-range of information available on the conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis, the inner workings of the different Palestinian political factions 
may not be completely understood. Aside from the historical limitations, in the modern 
day, the separation of the diaspora does create complications. There barriers that exist 
amongst Palestinians have not ceased to exist, as I wrote this thesis, I was living in 
between the United Kingdom and Canada with time spent in Lebanon, I have no access to 
the Gaza Strip, no access to Syria due to the civil war and no guaranteed access into the 
West Bank or Israel, even as a Canadian citizen. The complexities these restrictions and 
divisions offer were covered thoroughly throughout the thesis, though as a limitation, it 
also may hinder access to information.  
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While reflecting on these limitations, I am confident in the methods used to gain 
information. With Palestinians having different pasts and presents, emotion and loyalty 
will effect perception.  By way of depending on historical documents, and ensuring that 
the interviews focused more on personal anecdotes and general opinions rather than 
emotion allowed for a more impartial analysis.  The identity may be heavily impacted by 
a person’s allegiance or location, however, though Lebanon was much of the focus when 
speaking of the refugees and Jordan was much of the focus when speaking of the 
revolution, the identity as presented has provided as much uniformity as possible.  
8.7 Future Recommendations 
In accordance with the limitations, there are a number of dynamics that may be focused 
on in order to build on this thesis. The first being the next major event in the Palestinian 
story, which was the Intifada of 1987, leading to the Oslo agreement of 1993. This thesis 
has mainly focused on Fatah, the PLO and the diaspora, as much of the happenings were 
situated in the countries surrounding Israel/Palestine. The Intifada brought the revolution 
to Palestine and also very important in the modern discussion, brought the Muslim 
Brotherhood offshoot, Hamas, into the mix. Aside from the discussion on Pan-Arabism, 
religion was not a major identifier amongst Palestinians, the advent of Hamas allows for 
a study on whether or not Palestinian identity is impacted by religion and the role of 
Hamas.  
 
Moreover, the outcome of the Intifada was the first major political agreement between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis; the Oslo Agreement of 1993 resulting in the creation of the 
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Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The PNA was given a mandate, in which they had 
authority over the Palestinian Territories. A study into what effects, if any, does a 
Palestinian entity situated in Palestine have on the identity would provide for an 
interesting extension of this research.  
 
This thesis set out to define the basis of Palestinian national identity as it developed after 
the Nakba of 1948. The premise argued was that the Palestinians were forced to carve out 
their place amongst the Arab world before attempting to join the international 
community. The Palestinians and the Israelis have a number of similarities in the 
development of their respective nations and although they are intertwined the existence of 
one is not dependent on the other. The recognition of the Palestinians as an independent 
nation by their fellow Arabs is more impactful to the identity than recognition from the 
state of Israel. A mutual human recognition of rights and responsibilities amongst the 
Palestinian and Israelis are essential to peace, but for the Palestinians, the choice taken to 
resist the treatment of the refugees, the appropriation of their land and a mass expulsion 
of their population was a choice taken to ensure they exist.  
 
In closing, though this thesis has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there 
was a resurgence of the Palestinian national identity as it exists amongst the Arab world, 
there is still much work to be done in studying the idea of Palestine as it exists either 
side-by-side with Israel or as a binational state. In the introduction, a story of the 
Palestinian national football team and the complexities faced in creating that team was 
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offered. In conclusion, an anecdote of the 2016 Rio Olympics will be offered. On August 
19th, 2016, Avi Mayer, spokesperson for the state of Israel tweeted the following: 
Fun fact: The family of #JOR’s first-ever gold medalist Ahmad Abughaush is from Abu Ghosh, 
Israel! Mabrook, Ahmad!619  
 
Ahmad Abughaush, from a village near Jerusalem is a Palestinian refugee, who won a 
gold medal for the state of Jordan, is from Israel. The above tweet justifies the pertinence 
of this study and the need to an ongoing research on identity and nationalism in the 
Middle East.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
619 Mayer, Avi (@AviMayer). “Fun fact: The family of #JOR’s first-ever gold medalist Ahmad 
Abughaush is from Abu Ghosh, Israel! Mabrook, Ahmad!” August 19th, 2016. 6:53 a.m. Tweet. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Balfour Declaration 
 
His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 
 
Source: Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
London: Bloomsbury Plc, 2011. Pg. 341 
 
Appendix II: UNGA Resolution 181 (A) 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and 
instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future 
government of Palestine at the second regular session; 
 
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and 
issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of 
the problem, and 
 
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) 1/ 
including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with 
economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee, 
 
Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the 
general welfare and friendly relations among nations; 
 
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its 
evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; 
 
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all 
other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the 
future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out 
below; 
 
Requests that 
 
(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its 
implementation; 
 
(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require 
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such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it 
decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, 
the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by 
taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations 
Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which 
are assigned to it by this resolution; 
 
(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the 
settlement envisaged by this resolution; 
 
(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this 
plan; 
 
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their 
part to put this plan into effect; 
 
Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might 
hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and 
 
Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the 
members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such 
basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to 
provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions 
assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Future government of Palestine, A/RES/181(II), 
29 November 1947. 
 
Appendix III: UNGA Resolution 194 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Having considered further the situation in Palestine, 
 
1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of 
the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future 
situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and 
 
Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and 
devotion to duty in Palestine; 
 
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the 
United Nations which shall have the following functions: 
 
(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions 
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given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General 
Assembly of 14 May 1948; 
 
(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution 
and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General 
Assembly or by the Security Council; 
 
(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now 
assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce 
Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation 
Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the 
United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of 
the Mediator shall be terminated; 
 
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall 
present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, 
for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States 
which will constitute the Conciliation Commission; 
 
4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the 
establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the 
earliest possible date; 
 
5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the 
negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ 
and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation 
Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding 
between them; 
 
6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and 
authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between 
them; 
 
7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in 
Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing 
rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective 
United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in 
presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for 
a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include 
recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the 
Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political 
authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the 
protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be 
presented to the General Assembly for approval; 
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8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, 
including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, 
the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most 
western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, 
Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and 
should be placed under effective United Nations control; 
 
Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of 
Jerusalem at the earliest possible date; 
 
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the 
General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the 
Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive 
groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area; 
 
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, 
who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration 
of the Jerusalem area; 
 
9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the 
Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, 
rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine; 
 
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for 
appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access; 
 
10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments 
and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, 
including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and 
communication facilities; 
 
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss 
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should 
be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; 
 
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and 
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and 
to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine 
Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United 
Nations; 
 
12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to 
employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the 
effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution; 
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The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The 
authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking 
all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General 
will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the 
Commission; 
 
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the 
Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the 
United Nations; 
 
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the 
Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of 
the present resolution; 
 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to 
make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out 
the terms of the present resolution. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), Palestine -- Progress Report of the United 
Nations Mediator, A/RES/194 (III), 11 December 1948. 
 
Appendix IV: UNGA Resolution 212 
 
Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of 
immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report 
of 18 September 1948, part three, states that "action must be taken to determine the 
necessary measures [of relief] and to provide for their implementation"1/ and that "the 
choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them 
to die";2/ 
 
Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares 
that "the situation of the refugees is now critical"3/ and that "aid must not only be 
continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted";4/ 
 
Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine 
refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United 
Nations to bring peace to that land, 
 
The General Assembly 
 
1. Expresses its thanks to the Governments and organizations which, and the individual 
persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal; 
 
2. Considers, on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation, that a sum of 
approximately 29,500,000 dollars will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees 
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for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949; and that an 
additional amount of approximately 2,500,000 dollars will be required for administrative 
and local operational expenses; 
 
3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to 
5,000,000 dollars from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, the said sum to 
be repaid before the end of the period specified in paragraph 2, from the voluntary 
governmental contributions requested under paragraph 4; 
 
4. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary 
contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and 
funds required is obtained, and states, that, to this end, voluntary contributions of non-
member States would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies 
other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organization be 
carried out in such currencies; 
 
5. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a Special Fund into which contributions 
shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account; 
 
6. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 
4 of the present resolutions; 
 
7. Instructs the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration 
and supervision of the Fund; 
 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine 
refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this 
purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of the several Governments, 
the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International 
Children's Emergency Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of 
Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the 
participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan would in no way derogate from 
the principle of impartiality on the basis of which the assistance of these organizations is 
being solicited; 
 
9. Requests the Secretary-General to Appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees, to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider 
appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief programme; 
 
10. Agrees to the convoking, at the discretion of the Secretary-General, on an ad hoc 
advisory committee of seven members to be selected by the President of the General 
Assembly to which the Secretary-General may submit any matter of principle or policy 
upon which he would like the benefit of the committee's advice; 
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11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue and to extend the implementation of the 
present relief programme until the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set 
up; 
 
12. Urges the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the 
framework of the relief programme herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, 
specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their 
financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all 
communities; 
 
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, at the next regular 
session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 212 (III), Assistance to Palestine Refugees, A/RES/212 
(III), 19 November 1948.  
 
Appendix V: UNGA Resolution 302 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) 2/ of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) 3/ of 11 
December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter 
resolutions, 
 
Having examined with appreciation the first interim report 4/ of the United Nations 
Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East and the report 5/ of the Secretary-General 
on assistance to Palestine refugees, 
 
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the 
appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to 
contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress 
among the Palestine refugees; 
 
2. Expresses also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the 
League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the 
contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of 
great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief 
supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have 
given the Secretary-General that they will continue their co-operation with the United 
Nations until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis; 
 
3. Commends the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the 
important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of 
assistance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in 
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their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee 
Organization; 
 
4. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian 
organizations which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees; 
 
5. Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General 
Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of 
the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among 
them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures 
should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international 
assistance for relief; 
 
6. Considers that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9(d) of the present resolution, the 
equivalent of approximately $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works 
programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of 
$20,200,000 is required for direct relief and $13,500,000 for works programmes; that the 
equivalent of approximately $21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 
January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief 
should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by 
the General Assembly at its fifth regular session; 
 
7. Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East: 
 
(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; 
 
(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be 
taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works 
projects is no longer available; 
 
8. Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing 
Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme; the 
Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each near Eastern Government 
concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects; 
 
9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the 
Governments represented on the Advisory Commission; 
 
(a) The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and 
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Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General 
Assembly for the operation of the programme; 
 
(b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general 
arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff 
rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary-General 
shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of 
the Secretary-General; 
 
(c) The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial regulations 
for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 
 
(d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the present 
paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion 
available funds between direct relief and works projects in their discretion, in the event 
that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision; 
 
10. Requests the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable 
date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the 
programme, and of adopting rules of procedure; 
 
11. Continues the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under 
General Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as 
the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is affected, and requests the Secretary-General in 
consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers 
of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the 
Economic Survey Mission; 
 
12. Instructs the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United 
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April 1950, or at such date as may be agreed 
by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East; 
 
13. Urges all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary 
contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required 
is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6; contributions in 
funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the 
programme can be carried out in such currencies; 
 
14. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for 
this purpose and not exceeding $5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance 
operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 
December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under 
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paragraph 13 above; 
 
15. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee 
Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of 
$2,800,000 to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for 
repayment; 
 
16. Authorizes the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under 
General Assembly resolution 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the 
operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, uponä the request of 
the Director, for the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 
 
17. Calls upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, 
exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for 
Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and 
facilities necessary for the fulfilment of its functions; 
 
18. Urges the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International 
Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other 
appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the 
Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme; 
 
19. Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East: 
 
(a) To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board as 
observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be co-ordinated with the technical 
assistance programmes of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in 
Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A 6/ of 15 August 1949; 
 
(b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information 
concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be 
included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical 
Assistance committee of the Economic and Social Council; 
 
20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 
the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of 
General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 
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21. Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an 
annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the 
Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members of the 
United Nations, or its appropriate organs; 
 
22. Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the 
final report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to 
make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations 
and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV), Assistance to Palestine Refugees 1/, A/RES/302 
(IV), 8 December 1949. 
 
Appendix VI: Law of Return 
 
Right of aliyah** 1. Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh**. 
 
Oleh's visa 2. (a) Aliyah shall be by oleh's visa. 
(b) An oleh's visa shall be granted to every Jew who has expressed 
his desire to settle in Israel, unless the Minister of Immigration is 
satisfied that the applicant 
 
(1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or 
(2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State. 
 
Oleh's certificate 3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival 
has expressed his desire to settle in Israel may, while still in Israel, 
receive an oleh's certificate. 
(b) The restrictions specified in section 2(b) shall apply also to the 
grant of an oleh's certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as 
endangering public health on account of an illness contracted after 
his arrival in Israel. 
 
Residents and persons 
born in this country 
4. Every Jew who has immigrated into this country before the 
coming into force of this Law, and every Jew who was born in this 
country, whether before or after the coming into force of this Law, 
shall be deemed to be a person who has come to this country as an 
oleh under this Law. 
 
Implementation and 
regulations 
5. The Minister of Immigration is charged with the implementation 
of this Law and may make regulations as to any matter relating to 
such implementation and also as to the grant of oleh's visas and 
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oleh's certificates to minors up to the age of 18 years. 
 
 
DAVID BEN-GURION 
Prime Minister 
MOSHE SHAPIRA 
Minister of Immigration 
YOSEF SPRINZAK 
Acting President of the State 
Chairman of the Knesset 
 
Source: "Law of Return 5710-1950." Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. N.p., n.d. Web. 
 
Appendix VII: 1964 Palestinian Charter 
 
Article 1: 
Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the great 
Arab homeland, and the people of Palestine are part of the Arab nation. 
Article 2: 
Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral 
regional unit. 
Article 3: 
The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and when the 
liberation of its homeland is completed they will exercise self-determination solely 
according to its own will and choice. 
Article 4: 
The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent character that will not extinct, and is 
inherited by sons from parents. 
The Zionist occupation, and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the 
disasters that befell it, do not deprive it from its Palestinian personality and affiliation and 
do not nullify that. 
Article 5: 
The Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 
1947, whether they were expelled or remained there. Whoever is born to a Palestinian 
father after that date, within Palestine or outside is a Palestinian. 
Article 6: 
Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion 
will be considered Palestinians. (For the Zionist invasion is considered to have begun in 
19171.) 
Article 7: 
The Palestinian affiliation and the material, spiritual and historical ties with Palestine are 
permanent realities. The upbringing of the Palestinian individual in an Arab and 
revolutionary fashion, the undertaking of all means of forging consciousness and training 
the Palestinians, in order to acquaint him profoundly spiritually and materially with his 
land, and prepare him for the conflict and armed struggle, as well as for the sacrifice of 
his property and life to restore his homeland, until the liberation is achieved is a national 
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duty. 
Article 8: 
The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of national struggle for the 
liberation of Palestine. Therefore the contradictions among the Palestinian national forces 
are of minimal importance that must be suspended in the interest of the main conflict 
between Zionism and Colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the 
other. On this basis, the Palestinian masses, whether in the homeland or in exile, 
organizations and individuals, comprise one national front which acts to restore Palestine 
and liberate it through armed struggle. 
Article 9: 
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not a 
tactic. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding 
determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march forward towards the armed 
popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and restore its right to a natural life, and to 
exercise its right of self-determination and national sovereignty. 
Article 10: 
Fedaeyeen’s (freedom fighters) action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of 
liberation. This requires its promotion, extension and protection, and the mobilization of 
all the Arab and Palestinian masses and scientific capacities of the Palestinians, their 
organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution to ensure the 
continuation of the revolution, its advancement and victory. 
Article 11: 
The Palestinians will have three mottoes: National unity mobilization and liberation. (The 
text of this clause came in agreement with the 10th clause of the old version of the 
national charter, that stipulates the Palestinian people’s right to choose any political, 
economic or social system they believe suitable for their country) 
Article 12: 
The Palestinian Arab people believes in Arab unity. In order to fulfill its role in realizing 
this, it must preserve, in this phase of national struggle, its Palestinian personality and the 
conscience, thereof increase consciousness of its consistence and resist any plan that 
tends to disintegrate or weaken it. 
Article 13: 
Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary aims. Each one paves 
the way for the realization of the other. Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine and 
that leads to Arab unity. Working for both goes hand in hand. 
Article 14: 
The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends on the destiny of 
the Palestinian issue. The endeavor and effort of the Arab nation to liberate Palestine 
flows from this connection. The people of Palatine assumes its vanguard role in realizing 
this sacred national aim. 
Article 15: 
The liberation of Palestine from the Arab view point is a national duty to repulse the 
Zionist, imperialist invasion from the great Arab homeland and to purge it from the 
Zionist presence . This full responsibility falls upon the Arab nation, peoples and 
governments, with the Arab Palestinian people at their lead. For this purpose the Arab 
nation must mobilize all its military, human, material and spiritual capacities to 
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participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. They must 
grant and offer the people of Palestine all possible help and every material and human 
support and afford it means and opportunities enabling it to continue assuming its 
vanguard role in pursuing its armed revolution until the liberation of its homeland, 
especially in the present stage of armed Palestinian revolution. 
Article 16: 
The liberation of Palestine from a spiritual view point will prepare an atmosphere of 
tranquillity and peace for the Holy Land in the shade of which all the holy places, will be 
safeguarded, and freedom of worship and free access to all will be guaranteed without 
distinction or discrimination of race, color, language or, religion. For this reason the 
people of Palestine looks for the support of all spiritual forces in the world. 
Article 17: 
The - liberation of Palestinian from a human point of view will restore to the Palestinian 
human being dignity, glory and freedom. For this the Palestinian Arab people looks for 
the support of those in the world who believe in dignity and freedom for mankind. 
Article 18: 
The liberation of Palestine from an international view point, is a defensive act 
necessitated by the requirements of self-defense. For this reason the Arab people of 
Palestine are desiring to befriend all peoples, and looks for the support of the states that 
love freedom , justice and peace in restoring the legal situation in Palestine, establishing 
security and peace in its territory, and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty 
and freedom. 
Article 19: 
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is null and void from the 
very beginning, whatever time has elapsed because it was done contrary to the wish of 
the people of Palestine and their national right to their homeland and contradicts with the 
principles embodied in the charter of the UN, the first of which is the right of self- 
determination. 
Article 20: 
The Balfour Declaration, the mandate document and what has been based upon them are 
considered null and void. The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jews and 
Palestine does not tally with the historical realities nor with the constituencies of 
statehood in their true sense. Judaism in its character as a religion of revelation, is not a 
nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews are not one people with an 
independent personality. They are rather citizens of the states to which they belong. 
Article 21: 
The Palestinian Arab people in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, 
rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine. and rejects 
all alternative plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestinian issue or its 
internationalization. 
Article 22: 
Zionism is a political movement organically related to the world imperialism and is 
hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatic 
movement in its formation, aggressive, expansionist, and colonialist in its aims, fascist 
and nazi in its means. Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and is a human and 
geographic base for the world imperialism. It is a concentration and a way for 
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imperialism to the heart of the Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation 
for liberation, unity and progress. 
Article 23: 
The demands of security peace and the requirement of truth and justice oblige all states 
that maintain friendly relations with people, and loyalty of citizens to their homeland, to 
consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity. 
Article 24: 
The Palestinian Arab people believes in the principle of justice, freedom, sovereignty, 
self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to exercise them. 
Article 25: 
To realize the aims of this charter and its principles the Palestine Liberation Organization 
will undertake its full role in liberating Palestine. 
Article 26: 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization which represents the forces of the Palestinian 
revolution, is responsible for mobilizing the Palestinian Arab people in their struggle to 
restore their homeland, liberate it, and exercise the right of self-determination on it. This 
responsibility extends to all military, political and financial matters, and all else that the 
Palestinian issue requires on the Arab and international arena. 
Article 27: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization will cooperate with_Arab states, each according to 
its capacities and will maintain neutrality in their mutual relations in light of the 
requirements of the battle for the liberation, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of 
any Arab state. 
Article 28: 
The Palestinian Arab people affirms the originality and independence of its national 
revolution and rejects every manner of interference, guardianship or subordination. 
Article 29: 
The Palestinian Arab people possesses the prior and original right for liberating and 
restoring its homeland and form its relations with other states according to the later’s 
stands on the Palestinian issue the extent of their support for the Arab Palestinian people 
in their revolution to realize their aims. 
Article 30: 
The fighters and pears of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the popular 
army which will be the protection arm of the Palestinian Arab people. 
Article 31: 
This organization shall have a flag, oath, and anthem all of which will be determined in 
accordance with a special system. 
Article 32: 
To this charter- is attached a law known as the basic law of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, in which the organization’s structure is determined, its committees, 
institutions and the special function of every one of them, and all the requisite duties 
assigned to them in accordance with this charter. 
Article 33: 
This charter cannot be amended except by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the 
National Assembly in a special session called for this purpose. 
 
		
			 308	
Source: "The Palestinian Charter." Palestine Affairs Council. N.p., n.d. Web. 
 
Appendix VIII: UNSC Resolution 242 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Charter, 
 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 242, Land for Peace, S/RES/242, 22 November 
1967. 
 
		
			 309	
Appendix IX: 1968 Palestinian Charter 
Article 1: 
Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the 
Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation. 
Article 2: 
Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible 
territorial unit. 
Article 3: 
The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right 
to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance 
with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will. 
Article 4: 
The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is 
transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the 
Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose 
their Palestinian identity and their membership in the Palestinian community, nor do they 
negate them. 
Article 5: 
The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine 
regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after 
that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a 
Palestinian. 
Article 6: 
The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist 
invasion will be considered Palestinians. 
Article 7: 
That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual, and historical 
connection with Palestine are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up 
individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and 
education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the 
most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared 
for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back 
his homeland and bring about its liberation. 
Article 8: 
The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of 
national (watani) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the 
Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic 
conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, 
and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, 
regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (mahajir) 
constitute - both their organizations and the individuals - one national front working for 
the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle. 
Article 9: 
Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not 
merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination 
and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular 
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revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it . They also assert their 
right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and 
sovereignty over it. 
Article 10: 
Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This 
requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian 
popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed 
Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (watani) 
struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the 
Palestinian people and the Arab masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, 
its escalation, and victory. 
Article 11: 
The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (wataniyya) unity, national 
(qawmiyya) mobilization, and liberation. 
Article 12: 
The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the 
attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, 
safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and 
oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it. 
Article 13: 
Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the 
attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity 
leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and 
work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the 
realization of the other. 
Article 14: 
The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depend upon the destiny 
of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, 
and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the 
vanguard in the realization of this sacred (qawmi) goal. 
Article 15: 
The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it 
attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and 
aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon 
the Arab nation - peoples and governments - with the Arab people of Palestine in the 
vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral, and 
spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of 
Palestine. It must, particularly in the phase of the armed Palestinian revolution, offer and 
furnish the Palestinian people with all possible help, and material and human support, and 
make available to them the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to 
carry out their leading role in the armed revolution, until they liberate their homeland. 
Article 16: 
The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land 
with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's 
religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without 
discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine 
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look to all spiritual forces in the world for support. 
Article 17: 
The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian 
individual his dignity, pride, and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look 
forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in 
the world. 
Article 18: 
The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action 
necessitated by the demands of self-defense. Accordingly the Palestinian people, desirous 
as they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, and peace-loving states 
for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to re-establish peace and 
security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and 
freedom. 
Article 19: 
The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely 
illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the 
Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the 
principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; particularly the right to self-
determination. 
Article 20: 
The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and everything that has been based 
upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with 
Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what 
constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do 
Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own; they are citizens of the states 
to which they belong. 
Article 21: 
The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, 
reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all 
proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization. 
Article 22: 
Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism 
and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It 
is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims, and 
fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical 
base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to 
combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a 
constant source of threat vis-a-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since 
the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will 
contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look 
for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective 
of their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their 
just struggle for the liberation of their homeland. 
Article 23: 
The demand of security and peace, as well as the demand of right and justice, require all 
states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban 
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its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the 
loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded. 
Article 24: 
The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-
determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them. 
Article 25: 
For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the 
Constitution of this Organization. 
Article 26: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary 
forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle - to 
retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination 
in it - in all military, political, and financial fields and also for whatever may be required 
by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels. 
Article 27: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each 
according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of 
the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the 
internal affairs of any Arab state. 
Article 28: 
The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national 
(wataniyya) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship, and 
subordination. 
Article 29: 
The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and 
retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude toward all states 
and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-a-vis to the Palestinian revolution to 
fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people. 
Article 30: 
Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army 
which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people. 
Article 31: 
The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance, and an anthem. All this shall be 
decided upon in accordance with a special regulation. 
Article 32: 
Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It will lay down the manner in which the 
Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective 
competence of each; and the requirements of its obligation under the Charter. 
Article 33: 
This Charter shall not be amended save by [vote of] a majority of two-thirds of the total 
membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization [taken] at 
a special session convened for that purpose. 
 
Source: "The Palestinian National Charter." The Avalon Project. Yale Law School, n.d. Web. 
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Appendix X: UNSC Resolutions 338, 339 
 
Resolution 338 (1973) 
of 22 October 1973 
 
The Security Council 
 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of 
this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 338 (1973), S/RES/ 338 (1973), 22 October 1973. 
 
Resolution 339 (1973) 
of 23 October 1973 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 
 
1. Confirms its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all 
military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they 
occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective; 
 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United 
Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of 
Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United 
Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 339 (1973), S/RES/ 339 (1973), 23 October 1973. 
 
Appendix XI: Ten Point Plan 
 
1. Emphasize PLO's stand on the UN resolution 242 as it ignores our national rights 
and deals with our national issue as a refugees' problem. So dealing in any way 
with this resolution is rejected, be it on Arab or international level including the 
Geneva conference. 
2. The PLO uses all means the most important of which is armed struggle in its fight 
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to liberate the Palestinian land and establish the national independent Palestinian 
authority, on every liberated part from the Palestinian land. Achieving this 
requires creating a change in the power balance in our nations' favor. 
3. The PLO struggles against any design to create a Palestinian entity in return for 
recognizing and normalizing relations with Israel and its safe borders, and leads to 
giving up the Palestinian national rights and depriving our people from their right 
to return and self-determination on our land. 
4. Any partial liberation is just one part of the realization of PLO's strategy to 
establish the democratic Palestinian state as decided by the PNC. 
5. Jointly fight with Palestinian - Jordanian front aiming at establishing a Jordanian 
national democratic role in Jordan that unites with the Palestinian entity that 
struggles and fights. 
6. The PLO struggles for a strong unity between the two nations and all Arab 
freedom forces that support this program. 
7. In light of this program, the PLO fights to foster a stronger national unity that 
should be enhanced to a standard that facilitates for easier execution of its 
national aims. 
8. After establishing the Palestinian authority, it should struggle for unity between 
conflict-involved countries, as a step towards a complete liberation of the 
Palestinian land as part of the complete unity. 
9. The PLO struggles to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries and 
world liberal forces to foil all Zionist and imperialist designs. 
10. In light of this program, the revolution leadership is to decide a tactic that serves 
our issue and allows us to realize our aims. 
 
Source: "The Palestinian Charter." Palestine Affairs Council. N.p., n.d. Web. 
 
Appendix XII: UNGA Resolution 3210 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine, 
 
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, 
to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in 
plenary meetings. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 3210 (XXIX), Invitation to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, A/RES/3210 (XXIX), 14 October 1974. 
 
Appendix XIII: Resolution 3236/3237 
 
Resolution 3236 (1974) 
Of November 1974 
 
The General Assembly, 
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Having considered the question of Palestine, 
 
Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative 
of the Palestinian people,1/ 
 
Having also heard other statements made during the debate, 
 
Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved 
and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace 
and security, 
 
Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from 
enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination, 
 
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter, 
 
Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination, 
 
1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: 
 
(a) The right to self-determination without external interference; 
 
(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty; 
 
2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and 
property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return; 
 
3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine; 
 
4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East; 
 
5. Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 
 
6. Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the 
Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter; 
 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine; 
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8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth 
session on the implementation of the present resolution; 
 
9. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda 
of its thirtieth session. 
 
Source: General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX), Question of Palestine, A/RES/ 3236 (XXIX), 
22 November 1974 
 
Resolution 3237 (1974) 
Of November 1974 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Having considered the question of Palestine, 
 
Taking into consideration the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the 
Charter, 
 
Recalling its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, 
 
Taking into account Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 
1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974, 
 
Noting that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population 
Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine 
Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations, 
 
Noting also that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited 
the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer, 
 
1. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work 
of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer; 
 
2. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work 
of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in 
the capacity of observer; 
 
3. Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an 
observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the 
auspices of other organs of the United Nations; 
 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of 
the present resolution. 
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Source: General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX), Observer status for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, A/RES/ 3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974 
 
Appendix XIV: Resolution 3379 (XXX) 
 
The General Assembly, 
 
Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in 
particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is 
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its 
expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in 
some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of 
legislative, administrative or other measures", 
 
Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General 
Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and 
zionism, 
 
Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their 
Contribution to Development and Peace, 1/ proclaimed by the World Conference of the 
International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which 
promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the 
achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all 
its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-
determination", 
 
Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session,2/ hold at 
Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist regime in 
occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common 
imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being 
organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the 
human being", 
 
Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International 
Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-
Aligned Countries,3/ adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-
Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely 
condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries 
to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology, 
 
Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. 
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Source: General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX), Elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination, A/RES/ 3379 (XXX), 10 November 1975. 
  
Appendix XV: US-USSR Joint Communique 
 
The text of the joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the Middle East, as released here yesterday 
by the State Department, declares: 
 
Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation which remains in the Middle 
East, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance of the United States and Andrei A. Gromyko, 
member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, have the following statement to 
make on behalf of their countries, which are the co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace 
Conference on the Middle East: 
 
1. Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area as well 
as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general urgently 
dictate the necessity of achieving as soon as possible a just and lasting settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties 
concerned and all questions. 
 
The United States and the Soviet Union believe that within the framework of a 
comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the 
settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian 
question including insuring the legitimate rights of the Pal- estinian people; termination 
of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual 
recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence. 
The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for insuring the security 
of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as the establishment of 
demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of United Nations troops or 
observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the 
terms of the settlement can also be established, should the contracting parties so desire. 
The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees, 
subject to their constitutional processes. 
 
2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that the only right and effective way 
for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its 
entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, specially 
convened for these purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all 
the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people, and legal 
and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference. 
 
In their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the U.S. and the USSR affirm 
their intention through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned to 
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facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the Conference not later than 
December 1977. The co-chairmen note that there still exist several questions of a 
procedural and organizational nature which remain to be agreed upon by the participants 
to the Conference. 
 
3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political settlement in the Middle East and of 
eliminating the explosive situation in this area of the world, the U.S. and the USSR 
appeal to all the parties in the conflict to understand the necessity for careful 
consideration of each other’s legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual 
readiness to act accordingly. 
 
Source: "Text of U.S.-Ussr Mideast Statement." Jewish Telegraphic Agency. N.p., 03 Oct. 
1977. Web. 
 
Appendix XVI: UNSC Resolution 425/426 
 
Resolution 425 (1978) 
Of March 1978 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon 1/ and from the 
Permanent Representative of Israel, 2/ 
 
Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, 3/ 
 
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its 
consequences to the maintenance of international peace, 
 
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the 
Middle East, 
 
1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; 
 
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial 
integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory; 
 
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish 
immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for 
the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace 
and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its 
effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from 
Member States; 
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4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on 
the implementation of the present resolution. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 425, Resolution 425 (1978), S/RES/425 (1978), 19 March 
1978. 
 
Resolution 426 (1978) 
Of March 1978 
 
The Security Council, 
 
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978, 1/ 
 
2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in 
accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that 
it shall continue in operation thereafter if required, provided the Security Council so 
decides. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 426, Resolution 426 (1978), S/RES/426 (1978), 19 March 
1978. 
 
Appendix XVII: Resolution 508 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and the ensuing 
resolutions, and more particularly, Security Council resolution 501 (1982), 
 
Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982 
(S/15161 and S/15162),  
 
Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the 
Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region, 
 
Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence, and 
sovereignty of Lebanon, 
 
Reaffirming and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the 
Security Council on 4 June 1982 (S/15163), as well as the urgent appeal issued by the 
Secretary-General on 4 June 1982, 
 
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 
 
1. Calls upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all 
military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later 
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than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982; 
 
2. Requests all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to 
bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security 
Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected; 
 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the 
implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report to the Security 
Council as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of this 
resolution. 
 
Source: Security Council Resolution 508, Resolution 508 (1982), S/RES/508 (1982), 5 June 1982. 
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Interviews 
Abu Sharif, Bassam, Phone Interview, Toronto, Canada. August 25th, 2017. 
 
To start, how would you generally define the Palestinian identity? 
 
The theme here is the identity, okay, so let’s talk about the Palestinian identity. In fact, 
the identity of the Palestinians can be defined in a very accurate way, the same way we 
define all people of the Arab nation, they are Arabs. In fact, all the Arab nations were 
under ottoman occupation, it abused the flag of Islam to put all these nations under an 
occupation that was very despotic, very brutal and kept all other nations underdeveloped. 
Even those who were developed were forced to retreat back to dark ages with regards 
culture, progress, production and construction. The Palestinians, simply put, happened to 
live in Palestine and Palestine was not defined by the ottoman occupation, in fact, 
Palestine has been a subject of invasion so many times through history and it has 
remained Palestine. That doesn’t mean Palestine was a separate entity with a separate 
identity, Palestinians were Arabs and I refer you to the brilliant historian who was born in 
Akka, Nicola Ziadeh. He has a book, written about Arabs in Palestine and to use a very 
useful brief sentence he wrote; “Arabs were in Palestine long before Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam.” This gave the inhabitants of Palestine a very clear identity since 
they were there before any of the monotheistic religions. So the identity is Arab, no doubt 
about that and the links are so clear though not according to the map designed Mr. Sykes 
and Monsieur Picot, who redefined the middle east by separating countries calling this 
Lebanon, calling that Syria, calling this Iraq and calling that Palestine. No, this is a 
colonial definition and the colonial division of the Arab identity.  
 
Anyway, if we want don’t want to deal with the roots, in the sense Nicola Ziadeh did, if 
we want to take modern history. If we want to start with the Arab renaissance, the 
Palestinians, together with other Arabs, started a revolt, I don’t want to talk about their 
revolt, continuous revolt against the strangers. I won’t call them crusades, this is a 
western term, to give it a Christian flag, in fact it was an invasion by savages who didn’t 
even know what a bath was. People from France and England at the time used to have 
one bath per year, it was a celebration when they took a bath. When they came to occupy 
our areas they started to learn the meaning of hygiene. Anyways, to talk about the revolt 
of Arabs against ottoman occupation, Palestine was particularly distinguished due to the 
holy sites, Christians, Muslims, Jews considered Jerusalem a sacred area where they 
invested a lot of money to ensure the upkeep of their holy sites.  
 
Arabs under ottomans were not allowed to express themselves politically, were not 
allowed to have institutes, were not allowed to have universities, were not allowed to 
have their own schools.). Najah school was a prime example of how the Palestinians had 
to struggle to remain educated when they were living under Turkish rule, the Turks 
refused to allow the Palestinians to open a school where they would teach Arabic and 
would shut down institutes that advanced any modes of education, of which were some of 
the top institutes in the region.  
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Due to this special religious connection to Palestine, it was distinguished, but it did not 
waver its identity as an Arab country. Excuse me, it was not a country, it was never a 
separate country because it was never separated into different countries until Sykes and 
Picot decided to separate them. Giving the mandate of Palestine to the British 
colonialists, which was just that, a colony, even though they called it a mandatory area. 
 
All these conditions, the strangers, then the Turks, then the British, then the Zionists did 
not touch the identity of the Palestinian, but it was brutal colonization, whether they were 
settlers, armies or occupiers like the Turks or strangers. They remained part of an Arab 
movement to rid themselves of the Turkish occupation. 
 
Since the Arab’s were not allowed to establish any political party or movement, nor to 
express themselves or call for their freedoms, they were forced to create societies. It was 
a popular movement around the region to develop Arab societies, who were recruiting, 
organizing, and calling for the freedom and unity of the Arab nation. These were the 
slogans that were picked by Sharif Hussain of Mecca, who was in contact with 
McMahon, the British representative controlling the middle east from Cairo. Who 
promised him that if the Arabs would fight the Turks and kick them out, the British 
would help them create a united Arab nation, with the king of Arabs being Hussain and 
his sons distributed as the governors of the liberated areas. At one point, that was the 
agreement, and that point covered the first bullet shot by Hussain who was not leading his 
family or the people of the Hijaz but all the Arabic societies who gathered with recruits, 
volunteers, fighters, and leaders to form one united Arab army.  
 
In the meantime, the British decided that this Arab unity would not be in the best interests 
of the British. Anyway, the British, when they decided that Arab unity would not be in 
their best interests, they betrayed Sharif Hussain. One of the painful points, one night 
they were sipping wine and became tipsy, and the map which they were studying was left 
with two lines to mark the borders between Lebanon and Syria. There was a part of the 
map undefined, until now the part of the map, called Wadi Khaled, has 400,000 Arabs 
who up until 1994 were not recognized as Lebanese or Syrians. No identity, they are 
Arabs, but no passports.  
 
My thesis focuses more on the identity as it resurged after the Nakba, do you feel that 
the identity changed after this catastrophe? 
 
Now we are moving to another angle, when you talk about 1948 this is another angle of 
looking at the term identity. In this case the identity is not the identity which is defined by 
Webster’s. In this case it has a certain political meaning, not a meaning driven by roots, 
the political meaning is that the Palestinians have never enjoyed independence as 
promised by the victors of the world war and the mandatory part of the UN which Great 
Britain represented. In other words, all the promises that the Palestinians would have 
their independence were not met and were conspired against. The mandatory idea was 
created to wipe out the creation of an independent Palestine and to allow the Jews to send 
immigrants to become colonialist settlers in Palestine. 
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Also that, when the time comes, Israel will be created, as Lord Balfour has promised. A 
land with no people for a people with no land, or as I like to call it; a land Lord Balfour 
did not possess for a people that do not possess the land. So now, when you talk about 
identity in this case you have to talk about Lord Balfour’s decision, and then it becomes 
political. Although the Palestinians were treated in a very savage, brutal, and racist way. 
Although they were subject to a large plot drawn by Zionists and supported by 
colonialists to create Israel on their land, although they were driven by force out of 
Palestine, they did not lose their identity as Palestinians, they lost their political identity. 
They suffered, and are still suffering from this brutal conspiracy waged against them by 
the Western colonial powers and the Zionist gangs (Stern, Irgun, Hagenah). They became 
victims, their freedom was denied, their independence was denied and they were expelled 
from their lands, their villages and towns were occupied, as they are until now. Even the 
1947 partition plan, which was passed by force through the US coercing the banana 
republics of Central and Latin America to support it, passed by a slim margin, and was 
not actually upheld as the Zionists took more land than they were promised.   
 
This led to a catastrophe to the Palestinians on all levels, political, human, social, they 
turned the Palestinians into refugees and put them into refugee camps. Since then, 
UNRWA is trying to help these refugees by spending 90% of their budget on foreign 
employees who take large salaries while the 10% is spent on schools and camps, 
anyways, that is another catastrophe.  
 
With all these catastrophes, and all this suffering, the Palestinians did not lose their 
identity. What happened in 1948 did not erase the identity of the Palestinians, not at all, it 
actually concentrated their identity more than anything. Arabs of Palestine, the identity is 
Arabs of Palestine.  
 
Well that’s an important issue as it pertains to my thesis, the refugees, as we know were 
treated poorly by the Arab regimes and the Palestinians were forced to see themselves 
as different than their Arab neighbours.  
 
They were treated as slaves in the camps by Arab regimes. They were put under 
intelligence control, army control, security control, prevented from any political action, 
from any political expression, from any political organization, though this was happening 
to the Palestinians it has never touched their determination to return to their homeland in 
Palestine of liberating their homes again, of going back to Palestine in order to bring 
Palestine back to the Arab world. Now, the situation, losing the political identity, was not 
only done by the colonialists of the west and the Zionist movement but also Arab rulers 
who were appointed by the colonialists in the major Arab countries in order to allow the 
colonialists to keep controlling the wealth of the Arab nations, oil and gas and minerals. 
Also to keep Israel strong enough not to be beaten or defeated allowing the Palestinians 
to return home. 
 
Since 1948, the catastrophe was not only felt by Palestinians, it was all over the Arab 
world due to 1948 and the conspiracy which was implemented not only by the Zionist 
gangs who were not strong enough to beat all the Arab armies, but the Arab armies that 
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pretended to go into Palestine to in order to prevent the creation of Israel and keep the 
1947 agreed upon borders. I refer you here to a book written by a Jordanian officer who 
was in charge of Jerusalem, Abdullah al-Tel’s; The Hashemite’s. He was talking about 
the battle of Jerusalem and how the Jordanian army was prevented from defeating the 
Israeli army.  
 
Anyways, due to 1948 there were repercussions in several Arab countries. In Egypt, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and the group of officers had their revolution and started a 
completely different line which is the Pan-Arab line calling for the liberation of Palestine, 
in Syria too, in Iraq too. In these countries the change was due to the realization of certain 
officers who participated in the so-called Arab experience in 1948 and saw with their 
own eyes the treason of their kings and rulers of the time. They revolted in order to 
change the political line and liberate Palestine. Once more, even though there were 
political repercussions and repercussions on the identity, here, it was the dislodging of the 
Palestinians and turning them into refugees in Arab countries. It never wavered the fact 
that we are Palestinian Arabs.  
 
The Palestinians themselves who were in their camps as refugees, under military rule of 
the Arab regimes started their own organizations secretly in order to fight back and resist 
the efforts to scratch their political identity as Palestinians who own Palestine, to have 
rights, to fight the colonization of their homeland. In Lebanon particularly, in the camps 
of Lebanon, the Arab nationalist movement was created raising the slogan that Arab unity 
is the way to liberate Palestine and return to Palestine while Fatah started al-Asifa in 
order to start their own military resistance to their colonisers. Certain Arab regimes, the 
West in general, and Israel in particular were trying to wipe out the belonging of the 
Palestinians, this adhering of the Palestinians to their identity, the strong belief of the 
Palestinians roots in the Palestinian soil, these deep roots that have confronted all 
invasions of their land through history, as Nicola said Arabs were there before 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam and remained there even after they were invaded by the 
Mongols, the Romans, the strangers, the Turks, the British and now the Zionists. 
 
So, understanding that, the idea that Palestinians are Arabs of Palestine and will 
always will be, how do you view the Arab response to the Palestinian political identity? 
 
Okay this is a very important question, because it will confirm and reaffirm my definition 
of the word identity and my definition to what you mean of identity in your thesis, 
focusing on the political identity of the Palestinian people. Now, Palestinians after 1948 
suffered from being thrown out by force from their land, not according to the partition 
plan but much more than the partition. Although the partition plan doesn’t say kick them 
out, the Zionists kicked them out. Although the partition plan says that the property of 
Jews or Arabs in the areas made for Jews or Arabs must be protected, they were never 
kept. So hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees in Lebanon, the West 
Bank, Gaza, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. It is important to note that, to many it might be a new 
piece of information, but the number of refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank is far 
more than the number of refugee camps in the Arab countries. 
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Now, the West Bank and Jordan, the situation was different because immediately the 
West Bank became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and I believe this was the 
agreement and this was the prize given to Abdallah, in return for accepting the creation of 
the Zionist state. They promised Abdallah a Kingdom, uniting the West and East Bank of 
the River Jordan and the price was Palestine.  
 
Never throughout history was there something called Jordan, as a state or a province or 
whatever, it was created by the British colonialists and was called Transjordan. It was 
created as a buffer in order to support the British who were fighting the resistance in 
Palestine and the French who were fighting against the resistance in Syria. Also this 
buffer acted as a way to prevent Arab resistance in Palestine and in Syria from 
cooperating and meeting in order to help each other in resisting European colonization. 
Transjordan was a very poor colony that the British and others used as a smuggling area 
for their illegal trade.  
 
So Palestinians Arabs became citizens of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, including 
the refugees that, since 1948 were pushed to the Jordanian area and the refugees that are 
in the West Bank, Gaza was under the Egyptian administration. Palestinians in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem were Jordanian, so the conditions they faced were different 
from those who seeked refuge in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and so on. In Iraq, they were 
given houses and citizenship and were considered Iraqis out of Arab comradery. So this 
means that each Arab country tried to influence the Palestinians the organizations the 
Palestinians established secretly or privately in their own way. Each Arab country tried to 
control such societies, and if they didn’t manage to, they would create a similar rival 
organization.  
 
How did the 1967 war impact this Arab control? 
 
There was a turning point long before 1967, let’s say 1962-63, the Palestinians started 
secret organizations to resist the Israelis and liberate Palestine. All were secret 
organizations and very minute in size because all regimes were fighting these 
organizations for many reasons, one of them was that certain Arab regimes were scared 
that if they were to carryout armed struggle they would incur a certain reprisal from the 
Israelis which they were not ready for, a war for example.  
 
The war of 1967 was its own turning point, in the sense that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan 
were defeated, all their institutions, armies, intelligence, security, et cetera were crushed 
in six days. That was an opportunity for the Palestinian to start the really quick work to 
train and start their resistance of the Israelis. Since all the institutions that prevented such 
work were crushed, they became absent, creating space for the revolution. 
 
You should add here that in 1964, Egypt was careful, they told the Palestinians that Egypt 
is not ready for war at the moment and that they should start preparing themselves in 
order to be ready for the time to carry out their duty of fighting to liberate Palestine. So 
Egypt pushed for the establishment of the PLO in 1964, the PLO was created along with 
the PLA and he PLA played a major role of graduating hundreds of thousands of 
		
			 327	
Palestinians from military academies, whether pilots, tank commanders or infantry which 
gave the Palestinians the opportunity, for the first time to have real trained, military 
options. The PLA was established in Syria, in Iraq, in Egypt, and in Jordan all according 
to the Arab league decision. But as I said before, all these armies were kept under the 
auspices and control of the Arab armies. 
 
So nonetheless, what the Palestinians benefitted from this experience was to train a 
massive number of Palestinians who graduated from military academies. At the same 
time political parties also established secret organizations, the Arab National Movement 
and Fatah their secret military organizations and in 1967 they were all ready to start 
armed struggle at the time when darkness of defeat prevailed in the Arab world. All 
Arabs were in pain, were in grief, they had no trust or confidence in anything Arab 
anymore. So the Palestinians started. 
 
Now, to start the resistance against the Israeli occupation was the main road to regroup 
the Palestinians and to erase, gradually, the trauma that had been inflicted on Palestinians 
in every Arab country from every Arab regime and to be Palestinians again, publicly and 
overtly.   
 
I was a student in the early 60’s at AUB and we used to go and visit camps and we used 
to see that Palestinians in the camps were treated like animals from the Lebanese DB. 
They were not allowed to build, also, Palestinians were not allowed to leave the camps 
without permission even to visit their families in another camp. No demonstration was 
allowed, no newspapers, no political meetings, to mentioning of Palestine or the 
liberation of Palestine. For years this has been imposed on Palestinians so the Palestinians 
resorted to a certain status of fear and in 1967 they removed these burdens to join the 
Palestinian organizations that were publicly calling for the liberation of Palestine and to 
fight without fear from any Arab. 
 
This did not change the attitude of Arab regimes, in the sense when the regimes that were 
defeated woke up and saw that these organizations had their grip on the Palestinian cause 
and the Palestinian people and that this a very dangerous thing, they started conspiring 
against the revolution or crating their own off shoots inside the Palestinian fighting body. 
 
Ill give you an example, Iraq established the Arab Liberation Army, a Palestinian 
offshoot to fight for the liberation of Palestine from the Baath party in Iraq. The same 
was done in Egypt and Syria. Even intelligence services here and there began establishing 
small organizations like that. 
 
They were trying to disturb this effort to unite the different Palestinian organizations. The 
opportunity that was created for the Palestinians to pick up their own arms and start their 
own fight against this occupation in 1967 and to liberate Palestine was very rare and it 
took place for the first time since 1948. As I said before, the Arab institutions, military, 
security, and intelligence of the Arab regimes surrounding Palestine were no longer 
capable of controlling the Palestinians providing for an opportunity for the Palestinians to 
start moving back and to fight the Israeli occupation.  
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What role did Yasser Arafat, or the PLO, play in this concept of Palestinian unity? 
 
Though the Arab regimes would attempt to control these organizations, due to the 
growth, they could not. So most Arab regimes took another alternative, which was to 
create their own organizations in order to have a finger in centre of the resistance. The 
situation has become very clear to certain Arab regimes, who were not against the 
resistance, on the contrary Abdul Nasser was a big supporter of the Palestinian revolution 
and that is why he pushed for the PLO to be reshaped in order for it to be controlled by 
the fighting organizations rather than Palestinians who were not members of the fighting 
organizations. In 1968 I believe a new kind of struggle started internally, and this struggle 
was led by Arafat to unite the Palestinians.  
 
There is a difference between uniting them and creating an identity. If the meaning of 
identity here can be defined as unifying the Palestinians under common grounds 
politically and revolutionary speaking, yes, it was a creation of a unified identity for the 
Palestinians. But I repeat, we should not create a misunderstanding of the two identities.  
When defined by Webster’s the identity is; Palestinians are Arabs who belong to 
Palestine, which is part of the Arab world, which was the victim of a large conspiracy of 
colonialism and Zionism. Now, the political identity is another thing, creating by uniting 
the different Palestinian organizations under one flag, the PLO.   
 
Now Arafat has led this battle through the PLO, of course, other Palestinians who are 
genuinely nationalists, revolutionaries, where not against his efforts of having the 
Palestinians under the flag of the PLO but other elements have intervened, elements like 
the political programme. It was wrong that Fatah had excellent relations with reactionary 
regimes that were viewed by the PFLP, for example, as tools of the United States like the 
Arab Reactionary Regime, especially the regimes like Saudi Arabia and others in the 
Gulf. The PFLP also considered the Jordanian regime as that, especially after 1970, when 
the battles were waged against the Palestinian resistance and revolution in Amman and 
Jordan. So, others had their own ideologies and ideas like the Baathists of Syria and Iraq, 
but they were never a real problem when it came to national identity and unity. That 
depended quite a lot on how big the ground of alliance with Arafat and Fatah was, at one 
point the Iraqis had a battle with Fatah and Yasser Arafat and then became one of their 
closest allies, creating a ground so large allowing both Iraq and Fatah to share it while 
fighting the same enemies.  
 
With Syria, Fatah also had excellent relations at one time then battled with Syria and the 
Syrian army at another. So it was the political programme that was the base for 
reunification of the Palestinians who always had different points of views, with different 
ideologies, but never had a different view in relation to the liberation of Palestine, the 
return to Palestine, the independence of Palestine. So the programme of liberation of 
Palestine, fighting to return home was big enough to allow all these organizations join, 
but Arafat realized that unless Fatah leads this organization, they would try to impose 
another programme or ideology, or insert a programme or ideology of another Arab 
regime. That’s why Arafat remained very close allies, despite of fights and disputes and 
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contradictions, with the PFLP, he always considered the PFLP the closest ally of Fatah 
because they were not influenced by any regimes. They had differences in the way the 
PFLP considered and defined Arab regimes in the gulf or the alliance with Egypt, 
Syria… Yet he always considered that when things come to things, when the PLO would 
confront serious danger his closest ally would be the PFLP. That’s why the PFLP helped 
him in the reunification of the Palestinians who were dispersed in the countries 
surrounding Palestine and those who were dispersed in the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
He had unified them under a political programme, when I say he I mean the PLO, the 
national council of the PLO, I mean the leadership of the PLO which basically revolved 
around a pivotal crux of Fatah and the PFLP. Of course you can add other organizations 
but this is crux where Palestinian unity was built.  
 
My view, I have to insert here that whatever I say pertains to certain era, period of time, 
period of struggle and the conditions surrounding that period. For example, if you 
analyze and look carefully into the language used by Fatah in Jordan during the Karameh 
battle until 1971, when the PLO had to leave Jordan. The language was different than the 
language used in Lebanon when the PLO was centered in Beirut versus the language used 
when they left Beirut in 1982 and the language used when they were in exile in Tunisia. 
Now this is very important because this is the relativity of the political line of the 
conditions, this is the relativity of how a revolutionary can stick to his cause and remain 
steadfast to his ideas.  
 
When I say reuniting the Palestinians I meant, with the loosening of the grip of the Arab 
regimes on the Palestinian refugee camps in the surrounding Arab countries the 
Palestinians found, in the PLO, their representative. This is new, all of a sudden the 
refugees who were treated as slaves, as tenth grade citizens who were not allowed even to 
work to earn a living, these refugees found themselves free to join the PLO and finally be 
proud to say that they are Palestinian and fight to liberate Palestine.  
 
Though this worked initially, it became a lot more difficult as time went on, what were 
the difficulties the PLO faced in ensuring the viability of this unity? 
 
The situation has become difficult for the Palestinian revolution because the forces 
against the Palestinians; Israel, Zionism, United States, the West, Arab regimes, united 
their efforts to crush the revolution because it was becoming a real danger to the interests 
of the West, Israel and certain Arab regimes.  
 
The first war that was waged was in Jordan after the PLO’s victory in Karameh, forcing 
the Palestinians to go to Lebanon, but they remained strong and united under a political 
platform to liberate Palestine, all the while creating hell for Israel. The enemy tried to 
take out the PLO in Lebanon early, they found that the regime of the time and the army in 
Lebanon couldn’t do it so they created a civil war in Lebanon and then finally had to 
invade Lebanon in 1982. They invaded Lebanon with the aim of killing the leadership of 
the PLO or taking them prisoner. Though they ultimately failed, the PLO left the war in 
Lebanon weak and more importantly, far away from Palestine. No borders for their 
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forces, and they had to retreat and abide by the rules and regulations of Arab regimes that 
are friendly, but would not induce war at a time where they were not ready for it.  
 
Then the differences started again, as I said, unity had one vase, one pillar, the 
programme of liberation, independence and the return to the homeland. Now even that 
platform dwindled in the mind of those who considered that we should become more 
tactful, the idea of a settlement started and it was at this point the platform was no longer 
enough to keep the organizations united. One should differentiate here between two 
things, unification of the Palestinian organizations under the PLO flag is one thing, and 
the unification of Palestinians everywhere is another. In the sense, you might have 
organizations that differ, contradict, boycott each other upstairs in the leadership level of 
the PLO but that will never carry itself to the streets between members of the 
organizations who would remain Palestinians, brothers, ready to fight.  
 
But that was a political necessity, certain people believed that the best tactic would be 
one way while others would believe, no, we should take another route. Anyways. The 
entering a settlement like the two state solution was a breaking point in the platform, the 
PFLP rejected that, in spite of the rejection by the PFLP to join the settlement and to go 
into a deal the PFLP remained inside the PLO, this is the difference, it didn’t flip on the 
PLO, which remains as the unifying flag of the Palestinian identity. 
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Safieh, Afif, Phone Interview, Toronto, Canada. August 15th, 2017. 
 
My thesis, in short, is attempting to define the Palestinian national identity through 
Western national theory. The Palestinian identity is generally defined in romantic 
terms, focusing on culture and arts.  
 
You’re addressing a very important topic, though I wouldn’t say that the Palestinian 
identity has been perceived only in romantic terms. The Palestinians played an integral 
role in the Arab Nahba of the late 19th century during the ottoman era, and the emergence 
of the specific Palestinian identity emerged after the Sykes-Picot agreement and the 
partition of the Arab world by spheres of influence. We were part of the Arab world, and 
an important part of the Arab world, as many Palestinians played a role in the Arab 
renaissance. Forget not, the centrality of Palestine and the cross-section of three 
continents, Asia, Africa and Europe, which was the world until the discovery of the 
Americas, Australia and the easier access of China, Japan and the rest which happened 
after the 17th century. Palestine has been central; Palestine was also seen as indispensable 
by any emerging power in the world.  Because of its geo-centrality it was the arena of 
dispute for Babylonia and Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt and the emergence of the 
Greek nation represented by Alexander the great, needed a foothold in Palestine, the 
Roman empire as well. 
 
Palestinians also have this curious feeling that they are the inheritors of the monotheistic 
religions and that prophets and gods needed to express themselves directly or through 
envoys in Palestine. Palestinians feel that they are the custodians of all those messages 
that took birth in our land. If you ask me that’s a hell of a burden. On that, I like to quote 
the Swiss proverb during the Napoleonic era which said “happy people have no history”, 
we on the other hand are burdened with thousands of years of history so that I wouldn’t 
wave away by saying that it is a romantic feeling, but it is part of the memory.  
 
Well, the Palestinians, as you and others have noted have impacted many generations 
of history. But for the purpose of my thesis, I want to focus on the Palestinians after 
1948, highlighting the impact of events such as the 1967 war and the stand at Karameh 
in 1968. 
 
Now, Karameh was an important moment in contemporary Palestinian history in the 
sense that it occurred after the humiliating, surprising and intriguing defeat in 1967. Here 
was a group of guerrilla fighters who violated the principles of guerilla warfare, which 
was to always avoid confrontation at the moment of choice of your superior enemy and 
choose the moment of harassment at your own timing. The guerillas of Fatah decided to 
violate these rules and make a stand, and the contribution of the Jordanian army in that 
battle was of immense important but that too is due to the fact that the Fatah movement 
opted to make a stand. Had they not made a stand, had they vanished into thin air and no 
confrontation had occurred the Jordanian army would not have joined the battle and the 
Israeli army would not have had as many casualties as they did.  
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So yes the I always refer to Karameh as the moment when the masses joined the 
vanguard. There was there the Fatah movement as the vanguard of a few hundred and the 
heroic stand they took, defying the laws of guerilla warfare making them extremely 
popular among an Arab public opinion that needed a morale boost after the humiliating 
defeat of 1967. So I wouldn’t fall into the trap of those who try to ridicule or penalize, 
just as I would put in prominence the contribution of the Jordanian army. 
 
One of the principles of Fatah in ’65, when they started, was the idea that the Arabs 
lacked the will for confrontation and had they had the will they would be militarily 
superior to the Zionist Israeli challenge. Fatah decided that they would provoke the 
situation of revolution so the Arabs would decide to engage in the battle. In a way 
Karameh was a successful model for that ideology although you can go a little bit earlier 
and say that their provocations of the Israeli state in ’65, ’66 and ‘67 provoked the 
escalation that led to the ‘67 war and the defeat that followed but in Karameh it was a 
success.  
 
I focus a lot on the refugees, and the oppression of said refugee by host Arab states. 
Would you agree with the idea that the treatment of the refugees by the Arabs played 
an integral role in the construction of the Palestinian identity? 
 
In several recent interventions, I said that the Jewish experiences was very interesting for 
several theorists, philosophers and so on. People would wonder what maintained and 
preserved the communities, while certain historians attribute that to religion, the reality 
was that half of them were not believers and those who undertook the initial phases of 
Zionism were shrewdly non-believers. Others attributed to the fact that the Jews were a 
race and a nation and others would respond that they are technicolor, that they have no 
genetic similarities. 
 
Jean Paul Sartre, in his reflection of the Jewish question says that it is the anti-Semite that 
created the Jews and anti-Semitism that preserved those communities throughout 
centuries giving them the cohesion and drive. I believe that, yes persecution and 
oppression is a cementing factor driving communities and helps define the identity 
through the suffering while giving birth to aspirations that are born through said suffering 
and oppression. I always say we Palestinians have become the Jews of the Jews and we 
never wanted them to become the Palestinians of the Palestinians. Hence our generous 
offer of the late 60’s of one democratic state where everyone enjoys equal rights and 
obligations. 
 
I wouldn’t restrict Palestinian experiences to one segment of Palestinian society. The 
oppression was a result of the uprooting of a nation and the diasporisation of that society 
and one of its tragedies was they did not live in the same environment. Some lived in the 
orbit of Egypt in the Gaza strip, some were annexed by Jordan and some were in refugee 
camps in the periphery of the homeland, others moved to more hospitable shores abroad 
and on an individual basis were more successful. I wouldn’t restrict identity to refugee 
camps only, even though the reemergence of Palestinian nationalism in the early 60’s was 
mainly based on the refugee community. I always say, what would the national 
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movement been without Edward said as our spokesperson although he lived in New York 
teaching at Colombia university. What would have been Palestinian cultural identity 
without Palestinian intellectuals who lived within Israeli society who used to operate 
through the Rafah communist party, not because they were all communists, but because 
that was the only platform that allowed their political expression without being 
persecuted by the Israeli state.  
 
So Palestinian identity has always had the challenge of reconciling the modes of 
expression of a variety of individuals and social groups that did not necessarily live in the 
same objectives and conditions. The People of Gaza between 1948 and 1967 were in a 
different political environment from those who lived in Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, et 
cetera.  
 
So I wouldn’t adopt this straight jacket definition the refugees only, it is amongst others. 
For example, in Palestinian nationalism what happened with Oslo and after Oslo is that 
the central gravity of the Palestinian nationalism moved from outside to inside. Now you 
have different schools of thought about what happened post-Oslo and the birth of the 
Palestinian National Authority. Was it a historic achievement or was it a national 
capitulation? I for one, supported Oslo without any illusion and I’m speaking about 1993, 
as in political science as you know a state is defined as an authority on a demography on 
a geography; to summarize a one year course in one sentence. 
 
We had our leadership abroad, our demography dispersed and our geography occupied, 
the birth of the PNA was the beginning of the beginning of a return towards a normality. 
We knew the challenges, we had our Palestinian agenda but the Israelis had their own 
attitudes. The Israelis wanted to have as much of our geography as possible with as little 
of our demography as possible. They relied on a sort of self-inflicted impotence of the 
international community leaving us tete a tete in our confrontation with a stubborn 
occupier that didn’t feel the need to withdraw significantly. Always bear in mind that 
there is a wide spectrum of opinion. 
 
Pluralism is at the core of democracy, and though the Palestinians have enjoyed 
positive and negative debate, do you think the PLO allowed this pluralism to strengthen 
the Palestinian cause during the initial revolution?  
 
You have to give prominence to the birth of the PLO, which is the umbrella, and since its 
inception was a pluralistic movement, which we were always proud of. Yet the short 
comings today are monumental and all factions need to do some soul searching as they 
are all in trouble.  
 
You have two sentences that you have run into 
 
I define the PLO as an idea and institution, the idea being our sense of identity and our 
quest for independence and sovereignty with the idea being stronger than the institution. I 
always joke by saying that I’m more comfortable representing the idea rather than the 
institution. That’s one, when Madrid occurred and there were questions as to how the 
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Palestinians would be represented, and you must remember that we were half the 
delegation representing half the people, representing half a solution in Madrid. We were 
part of the Jordanian delegation and the Palestinian delegation must have only been from 
Gaza or the West Bank, not from East Jerusalem or the diaspora, and they were seeking 
an interim solution of five years before looking for final status. I said then, up until now 
the PLO represented the Palestinian people and its high time now that the Palestinian 
people represent the PLO. As you remember, all the delegates were necessarily, due to 
the restrictions of Madrid and Washington, not PLO officials. We grew accustomed to 
have the PLO represent the Palestinians and now the Palestinians represent the PLO 
because if a few thousand work in the PLO as an institution the 12 million Palestinians 
were the vehicle of the PLO idea which is the sense of our identity and our seamless 
quest for independence and sovereignty.  
 
I believe both those quotations for you to embroider around.  
 
Pluralism has been a characteristic of the Palestinian national movement, I always said 
that I disagree with the theory that the Arabs have agreed to disagree. My answer to this 
theory is that disagreement is natural, normal and I don’t like the work in Arabic; sahi 
(healthy) that it is a healthy sign, no they are natural. We the Arabs still need to learn how 
to disagree, and we haven’t learnt how to, leading to our pluralism being chaotic. Yet, 
during the Arafat era pre or post Oslo, he always tried to be inclusive and seek a 
consensus, sometimes that consensus was of a paralytic nature, but Arafat was all-
inclusive always attempting to seek consensus, but our pluralism is often chaotic and 
today we suffer from poverty in our political thought. And the crisis is not only in Fatah 
circles, which usually is the target of criticism and cynicism by the new intellect elite in 
Palestinian society all over the world. The political intellectual bankruptcy is shared 
across the board effecting not only the Islamist factions but the left-wing factions as well, 
which have monumentally failed renewing themselves post-Soviet collapse on the 
ideological level and the failed to coalesce, since there is no longer a raison detre for 
independent existence of the DFLP, the PFLP and the People’s Party. They were utter 
failures in having a coalition of left-wing factions that could propel themselves as an 
indispensable coalition partner of Fatah allowing them to inject their input and be the 
agitators of ideas as minorities can play a very important role in contributing to the 
national debates. So I believe we are at a crucial point where everyone needs to look in 
the mirror, I always say, that we suffer from the following phenomenon: we don’t have 
the authority or the institution that we deserve, we deserve better, nor do we have the 
opposition we need, we have a lot of opposition but we need better opposition. I joked 
painfully when we had the split with Hamas that the Palestinian people are plagued with 
an authority that has two heads and no brain.  
 
National theory predicates identity on many factors, but mainly having socio-economic 
stability as a people. Do you agree with that idea? 
 
I think one is mistaken if one has an economic approach for the emergence of Palestinian 
nationalism, au contraire, it was never the driving force. It was the feeling of injustice 
inflicted and the aspirations for liberation. For example, the first intifada occurred not 
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during a moment of impoverishment of society, on the contrary, it occurred at the 
moment of rising economic expectations. So all those traditional approaches seeking 
economic reasons or driving forces do not apply. 
 
It wasn’t freedom of movement, it wasn’t impoverishment, it wasn’t he pauperization of 
society; up to the late 60s it was liberation that was the target, not necessarily statehood. I 
would attribute a few passages to the war of 1973, where the Palestinians and the Arabs 
realized that there was no military solution to the problem that America would not allow 
Israel to be defeated and that we should seek a diplomatic outcome and then move 
gradually towards accepting Palestinian statehood on parts of Palestine. It was at this 
point we no longer asked for absolute justice but possible justice, its then we gradually 
moved from the dialogue by arms to using the arms of dialogue. I was working on 
Arafat’s teams and lived beside him in the 1981 two-week war with the Israelis, which 
was the rehearsal for the war of 82, it was then I discovered that in Arafat’s military 
thinking, he knew that we are not going to liberate Palestine militarily, all he wanted was 
the we remain a military actor so that we get recognized as a diplomatic factor. In the 
absence of an Arab military option, there is no credible Palestinian military option, Faisal 
Husseini used to say If I need to defeat Mike Tyson I must not keep inviting him to the 
boxing ring, I need to invite him to another game.  
 
Arms of criticism, criticism by arms.   
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Atwan, Abdel Bari, Phone Interview, Toronto, Canada. July 13th, 2017. 
 
May you provide your initial thoughts on the Palestinian identity? 
 
I believe that the Palestinian identity is getting stronger and stronger, contradicting the 
Israeli conception. The Israeli conception, was that the new generations of Palestinians 
would be different than the older generations, in the sense that it would be weaker. 
Through my own experiences, I am seeing that the Palestinian identity is really stronger. I 
am looking at my children for example, third generation, their Palestinian identity is 
deeply rooted and they are possibly more radical when it comes to the identity than me or 
my parents.  
 
Israelis always thought that the 3rd or 4th generation would forget the Palestinian identity, 
and through my travelling I feel that the identity is deeply rooted.  
 
I was born in 1950, from 1948 until 1967, the Palestinian identity was not as strong as it 
was after 1967. Palestinian people, that generation, who were dismissed form their land, 
were shocked and they just wanted to live. They were horrified by the Israelis, in that 
period the identity was not as strong, they just wanted to live in peace, not talk politics, 
they wanted to survive and live in peace, with hope.  
 
What impact did Pan-Arabism and then the war in 1967 have on the Palestinian 
identity? 
 
After 1967, and a little before, though Nasser revived the ideas and hope of liberation, it 
was not until 1967 when the feda’yeen, the guerillas, when they realised that the 
Palestinian identity started to get stronger and stronger, deeper and deeper, they gained 
more confidence and more hope. They were living in an era of depression between 1948-
1967 due to the shock that the Arab community never actually helped them, they were 
further shocked because the international community never sided with them and never 
brought them justice. They lost faith in the international community and they lost faith in 
the Arab armies and when the PLO started, the PLO was a classical army, similar to the 
Arab armies so it did not actually revive their hope. It was the fighting identity that 
started after 1967, the real identity started to grow after the guerilla movements, the Fatah 
movement, the PFLP movement, those young feda’yeen sacrificed their lives allowing 
the identity to begin to regain its strength once again. 
 
The worst thing that happened to the Palestinian movement and the Palestinian identity 
was when the Arabs began to interfere in Palestinian affairs, both financially and 
politically. This was a strong turning point, Fatah for example were given a lot of money, 
thus spoiling Fatah and the PLO pushing them more and more towards the American and 
Israeli solutions. I would not be surprised if Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were 
initiated by the United States and Europe to, in one way or another, drown the Palestinian 
movement with a sea of money. I think this was deliberate.  
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When we had David Petraeus, CIA chief and ex-military leader in Iraq, say that we told 
the Qataris to take Hamas in Doha, we asked Qatar to take the Taliban to Doha and open 
them an embassy. It seems that were similar plans in the past, with regards to the 
Palestinians, that we do not know that ultimately hindered the Palestinian movement. I 
believe that they succeeded in showering the PLO and Fatah with money thus turning it 
into a paid staff, like any company. This actually affected, not only the identity, but the 
strength and the roots of the identity. They convinced the PLO that the only way to 
survive was to take an installment and have their own state in the West Bank and Gaza, 
started the trend in 1974 in the PNC when they adopted the Ten Points that they would 
establish a Palestinian state on one kilometer of territory liberated from the Israelis, thus 
starting the trend of concessions.  
  
This will lead us to the Oslo agreement, this was a huge political and national setback, 
but not an identity setback. They identity remained steadfast, you had the first intifada in 
1987 then the second intifada in 2000 and now you have the intifada in Jerusalem driven 
by the 4th generation. Those living in 1948 who are living luxuriously in comparison to 
the other Palestinians in the region, are the ones leading the charge.  
 
National theory predicates identity on many factors, but mainly having socio-economic 
stability as a people. Do you agree with that idea, or would you focus more on cultural 
identity?  
 
They came with a lot of theories, Tony Blair introduced the theory of the economic peace 
based on the good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland. They applied the experiences of 
Northern Ireland to the west bank. They convinced Salam Fayyad that if he were to fix 
the infrastructure and provide economic prosperity, would create an economic peace. 
Though some benefitted, they began giving a misleading account of the Palestinian 
identity, the idea that we should not fight or apply the military struggle. That the 
Palestinians should use arts, and speeches. Those ideas were encouraged by the west, that 
the true Palestinian identity is a peaceful one motivated by arts and lectures. 
 
It doesn’t enhance the identity, when we see those teenagers from Nazareth coming to 
Jerusalem to fight it proves that the economic peace will not enhance, or derail, the 
identity. It is a very shallow viewpoint, but they strive because they have the money, they 
can control media and messaging, they also believe that to preserve our identity we have 
to prove to the Israelis that we are tolerant and civilized, that we can live aside them, 
though they never would live alongside the Palestinians. 
 
The reality though, is that the majority of the Palestinian people are actually opposed to 
this idea of “imperfect peace”. What you are seeing in Jerusalem shows that this strategy 
would actually strengthen the identity due to the failures of these “peace plans”. If 5% of 
the population wants to enhance the identity through the arts and through singing or 
dancing that’s fine, but the majority believe that the true identity is through intifada, 
fighting the occupation by all means. It is a fighting identity, and you are seeing that 
being passed on through generations.  
 
		
			 338	
So, theory aside, what is, in your opinion, the driving force of the Palestinian identity? 
 
Listen to me, the Palestinian identity is based on fighting against occupation and 
continuous struggle, it is not based on peace. The definition here is important, the 
Palestinian identity actually became stronger when the Palestinians started fighting and 
the Palestinian national cause faded or weakened when the Palestinians moved towards 
peace. You cannot separate the impact of the fighting spirit from the Palestinian identity, 
the fight is an integral part of the Palestinian story, you cannot separate the identity from 
the revolution and the idea of fighting for your most basic human rights by any means 
necessary. You cannot say that we are Palestinian and support Oslo, very few 
Palestinians support the Oslo agreement, when you compare the amount of people who 
support Oslo versus the amount of people who support the resistance, you will see where 
the identity lies. 
 
The Palestinian identity is based on the intifada, it is based on struggle, any other identity 
you want to develop based on dancing and art, that’s fine, you want to live in peace and 
be different from the norm that is fine but here is no denying that the basis of being 
Palestinian was developed when the feda’yeen began fighting for our freedom. 
 
We have a writer in our paper who argues that we should not love death, we should love 
life. Our identity should be based on love and survival and living a good life, we should 
not base it on death or adore and accept death and martyrdom, we should present 
ourselves as people who love peace and those who love to live. But if the Israelis don’t 
love to live and they continue to kill and occupy, why should we or how can we, the 
victim, adopt this idea? 
 
Identity based on struggle, based on intifada, any identity not based on the struggle, the 
intifada, is fake and not genuine. While there are people who believe this, they are a 
small percentage, that of course should be acknowledged but the real identity should be 
on opposing the occupation. 
 
This is how I see it and how that is the conclusion I came through a number of meetings, 
lectures, articles and reactions to my articles. 
 
The Gandhi type Palestinians will always be there, but you wouldn’t find a successful 
Palestinian Gandhi, many people tried to be the Palestinian Gandhi but, unfortunately, 
they never triumphed.  
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Shami, Yusri, Personal Interview, London, England. December 7th, 2015 
 
Tell me a little about Katibe 5. 
 
It was musical, drum and snare, but the hip-hop identity was very applicable to 
Palestinians. The main topic of Arab rap was all related to Palestine.  
 
Rap allowed me to carve out my place in the Palestinian struggle. Through rap, I 
identified myself as a part of the revolution.  
 
The main reason why Katibe 5 exists was to connect the Palestinian refugees with the 
cause. 
 
In the refugee camps, when did you begin to understand you’re Palestinian, and what 
drove this understanding? 
 
I started my schooling in a Lebanese school and lived a “regular” life in Lebanon; after 
we couldn’t afford it any longer I was moved to an UNRWA school. This is when I 
started to understand what it means to be Palestinian, and it was not until I got more 
accustomed to life in the camps that I began to realize that I connect with the Palestinians 
and that I am in fact also a Palestinian.   
 
While in the Lebanese school I was always in solitude and silence, from home to school 
and school to home. My younger years in the camp were simply fun, but you also notice 
how horrible it can be. For example, one day outside my friends house, I saw someone 
get electrocuted, he died right in front of me, this only happens in the camps, not in 
Lebanon.  
 
On identity? 
 
I am not officially a Palestinian; I am not welcome in Palestine. I was always asked 
where I’m from; when I say I am Palestinian people will ask me where I am born. When I 
tell them I was born in Lebanon they tell me, then I am not Palestinian, I am actually 
Lebanese. I am not Lebanese; I hate Lebanon and for the most part the Lebanese people.  
 
I am a Palestinian refugee, and more so a refugee than a Palestinian.  
 
Not being accepted, by the State of Palestine, or the government, does that not more 
define your identity as a Palestinian? 
 
I feel first and foremost as a Palestinian due to family. I feel Palestinian because I feel I 
did something for the cause, I am being punished for being Palestinian why not act like 
one and embrace it? 
 
The whole idea of being a refugee is to not forget Palestine. 
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In the camps themselves, outside of the concept of the “refugee camp”, what makes it 
Palestinian? 
 
The accent is different than the Lebanese, there are Palestinian flags everywhere, all 
discussions are about being Palestinian and the different problems faced because they are 
Palestinian.  
 
The people there, like “Handala” still act like they are children, that they are waiting to 
go back to Palestine. Even the camp is set up similar to old Palestine; there is the 
Tulkarem neighbourhood, the Tarshiha neighbourhood, the Safoura neighbourhood. They 
named the schools Akka school, Jaffa School, Khalili School and the hospitals in Burj 
camp are name Haifa and Jaffa. People try to recreate Palestine in each camp, from the 
way they talk to the names of the areas to the food.   
 
What is the basis of the Palestinian identity? 
 
It starts with the Refugee and the need of the revolution to create the Fida’i. Without the 
fighter there is no revolution, and without the revolution there is no need for fighters. 
Without both the fighters and the revolution though, leaves the refugees, alone with no 
hope.  
 
The refugees were the basis of the Fida’i, without the refugees there was no Fida’i and 
without the Fida’i there was no hope. As long as the refugees exist, they will provide 
reason for the Fida’i. When the Fida’i left Lebanon, lost was the sense of identity and 
hope.  
 
Yasser Arafat 
 
Yasser Arafat, for me personally, any time that I open a discussion with another 
Palestinian they bring up Oslo. Until today, there is no one and will e no one that will 
match Abu Ammar; who will be able to motivate the Palestinians to be as active as 
before. He created the Fida’i, he created the revolution, and he created a cause to protect 
all his people. He gave his people hope. More than that, what can a leader do?  
 
PLO 
 
The PLO was the hand that pulled out of the dark. Giving hope. We were simple, we 
were peasants, and we did not understand politics. A hand reached down and raised us up 
and gave us hope. They gave us education, they allowed us to travel and most 
importantly they gave us hope to the revolution and the struggle itself.  
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Yamani, Issam, Personal Interview, Toronto, Canada. September 13th, 2015. 
 
Being that the PFLP was born out of the Arab National Movement, what forced 
Habash and others to separate themselves from the pan-Arab movement and call for a 
Palestinian revolutionary uprising?  
 
The PFLP did not give up on the idea of pan-Arabism, it was initially the Palestinian 
branch of the Arab National Movement. They had a different ideology and organizational 
structure providing each branch the autonomy to deduce what the best tactics and policies 
based on the social, economic and political circumstances of each country. When the 
PFLP established it cancelled the central decision making process which was necessary to 
for the movement to make the Palestinian identity bold amongst the Arab National 
Movement in the struggle against Israel.  
 
Understanding that UNRWA has played a role in sheltering Palestinian refugees, do 
you feel that the manner in which the camps are set up may actually suppress the 
Palestinians and the Palestinian identity? 
 
The sheltering of the Palestinian refugees by UNRWA has contributed to strengthening 
the Palestinian Identity due to the fact that the Palestinian refugees in the camps were put 
together in isolation. They were cut off from all social surroundings, forcing them to 
depend on one another. The camps also succeeded in creating a Palestinian identity, 
bringing together Palestinians who used to identify themselves by their towns and 
villages, forming a unified Palestinian identity. 
 
To what extent did the treatment of the refugees in the countries neighbouring 
Palestine/Israel hinder the motivations of Pan-Arabism? 
 
It was the services provided by UNRWA (Separate schools, health system and aid) forced 
the Palestinians to view themselves as different from the other Arabs. The differences 
between the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians were strengthened by the isolation of the 
Palestinians and the services provided to them by UNRWA. In short, the establishment of 
UNRWA contributed in developing and strengthening a Palestinian identity separate 
from their Arab neighbors.   
 
 
Although there was/is a clear ideological divide between Fateh and the PFLP, was 
there a sense of a unified Palestinian identity amongst Palestinians?  
 
In their early days, the leadership of Yasser Arafat and George Habash influenced the 
relationship between Fateh and the PFLP. They took a firm stance of national alliance in 
the struggle against Israel, irrespective of the different perspectives of each leader. On a 
personal basis, they were very close, sharing a mutual respect.  
 
What does the right of return mean to you and to the Palestinian identity as whole? 
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The right of returns legalizes my identity as a Palestinian and attaches it to a physical 
space where I will have my civil, human and political rights. The right of return will 
transform my identity from an abstract, complex one, to a reality. There will be no need 
to hyphenate it; I will be a Palestinian, not a Palestinian refugee, Canadian-Palestinian 
and so on. 
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Kubursi, Atif. Personal interview, Hamilton, Canada. 14 Aug. 2015. 
 
Pan Arabism: Logic and Basis 
Pan Arabism is based on shared cultural, historical, and political values and imperatives. 
There is no region that shares as much as the Arabs share among themselves. They share 
the same language, the same dominant religion, the same history and a contiguous 
geography. Yet the strategic and economic interests are perhaps the real glue that can 
cement these countries together. Few regions share the same threats and the same 
advantages as the Arabs. From the Crusaders to the four hundred years of subjugation by 
the Ottomans that robed them their freedom, kept them in bondage and forfeited their 
progress and future. Their fragmentation in disparate states continued during the western 
colonial era and was intensified as Sykes-Picot saw their continued suppression, 
emasculation, fragmentation and dis-integration. Pan Arabism coincided with liberation 
and independence from colonial powers and their awakening to their state of destitute and 
fragmentation. 
The call for Pan Arabism is motivated by the desire for modernity, secularism, unity and 
progress. The Arab intellectuals that started the Arab Unity movement saw in it the 
solidification of Arab independence,  strength in unity, more viable economies, solid 
progress, and unshackling the past of tribalism, ethnic divisions and dependency. 
The Arab economies are relatively small, disarticulated, and traditional; they depend 
heavily on the production of one or two products that are based on non-renewable natural 
resources and where production is primarily based on monetization of these natural 
assets. Arab economies are excessively undiversified, modern sectors are small and 
almost non-existent, and most of these economies depend heavily on importing food and 
technology. 
Arab Unity promises more viable economies based on more efficient scales, larger 
markets, more diversified economic bases and greater chances for diversification and 
sharing. Under Pan Arabism the cultural and linguistic commonalities will be anchored 
on solid economic basis and greater potentials for trade and investment. Arab Unity will 
bring advantages for the common man and will provide the necessary strength to protect 
identity and resources. 
 
Success Stories 
The real moment of truth of Arab coordinated action came with the OPEC decision to 
quadruple oil prices following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  This was the moment 
where the Arabs demonstrated, albeit for a very short period, that they can use the “oil 
Weapon” to pressure the west to support reversing of the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza and Syrian Golan Heights. Against all odds the Arabs coupled their 
control of the largest share of world proven reserves of oil (75%) with political demands 
and coordinated their allocation policies with their demands for political influence 
commensurate with their economic influence. American quarrel with the Arabs then, as 
Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy revealed, was not with OPEC's quadrupling of oil 
price; it was pointedly with the idea that the Arabs with their new found diplomatic 
weapon could change the political status quo in the region, [that it could form the basis of 
Arab power against the West and Israel]. Unfortunately this glorious moment of Arab 
solidarity did not last ling. Absolutely crucial in mitigating this threat was the strategic 
		
			 344	
alliance formed with Saudi Arabia which opened a wedge between Saudi Arabia and 
other Arab producers within OPEC. It is believed that an agreement was reached on a 
"special relationship" between Riyadh and Washington based on the understanding that 
the Saudis would place their immense assets at the disposal of the Americans, and 
through the kingdom's position as the swing producer within OPEC assures "moderate" 
prices and a constant supply of oil to the industrial world.  The Saudis also promised the 
Americans that the kingdom would use its economic influence to moderate Arab politics.  
In return, the Americans assured the Saudis of providing security to the kingdom and 
assistance in its techno-industrial development.  
Another moment of success is the Arab Boycott of Israel. Until it was shelved following 
the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Arab League built a very efficient and effective boycott 
structure that cost Israel by its own admission over $70 billion in lost investment and 
trade opportunities. The Arab League drew a list of commodities and companies that 
Arab countries black listed and prevented them from trading in or with the. The sheathing 
of the Boycott before realizing its full potential in persuading Israel to unravel its 
occupation of Arab lands following the Oslo Accords in 1993 sheds sufficient light on a 
successful coordinated programme and its hasty dismantling. 
In both of these cases the Arabs had proven that they can work together, establish 
effective institution that can implement their collective agreement and that they can wield 
enormous economic clout when they choose to work jointly.    
The Major Failure 
The struggle over the waters of the Jordan River cannot be understood in isolation of the 
Arab struggle against colonial domination of the region and the establishment of Israel in 
the heart of the Arab World. The Zionist project has been perceived by the Arabs from its 
outset as a continuation of the colonial era and as an attempt to distort and derail Arab 
independence and control over their own rich oil and scarce water resources.  
Thwarting Israeli plans became the focus of Arab debates and a rallying cause for Arab 
joint action and solidarity. These debates culminated in crystallizing for the first time a 
long-term Arab strategy to confront Israel and to draw credible military plans to put an 
end to its expansionism. The water struggle was transformed into a much larger struggle 
for reversing the defeat and humiliation of the Nakbah. 
The Arabs believed, particularly President Nasir of Egypt, that 1963 would be the Year of 
Decision in the Arab Israeli conflict. This belief was based on the premise that once Israel 
completes its NWC it would be in a stronger position economically and militarily and 
would have a greater advantage vis-a-vis the Arab World, which facts would entice Israel 
into further expansions and aggressions. The Syrians actually listed six strategic threats 
that the NWC would pose for the Arabs in a declaration on December 15, 1963 (Rose Al 
Yusif 1963).  
As the implementation of the NWC proceeded and came closer to initiation, the Arab 
leaders responded with convening urgent Summits. Actually three major Arab Summits 
were held in January 1964, in March 1964 and a third in September 1965. All three were 
devoted to organize the Arab response to the successful Israeli diversion. These Summits 
were preceded by many inter-Arab forums and planning sessions. There is no question 
that the period from 1953 to the 1964 Summits was characterized by a series of planning 
sessions and the successful drafting of elaborate strategic plans formulated by the Arab 
		
			 345	
Defense Council (ADC) and the Arab Joint Command (AJC). But these carefully set 
plans fell victims to Arab squabbling and inter-regimes rivalry. The favorable conditions 
of unquestionable Arab solidarity and material and financial support for coordinated and 
joint, even military, actions, the formulation of carefully set up Arab military plans, an 
internationally accommodating circumstances (the US administration then was not as 
biased in favor of Israel as is today, if anything the US tried initially to tame Israeli 
aggressive behavior) and a narrower gap between Israel’s and Arabs’ military capacities 
were not exploited to redress the damage Israel inflicted on the Arab riprians by the 
diversion scheme. At that time the Israeli air force had an obvious advantage over Arab 
air forces and proved decisive in upsetting Arab diversion plans.  
Israel diverted the Jordan River and the Arabs responded with a Summit Meeting in 
January 1964 in which the Arab leaders faced two difficult options. The first option 
involved the use of military force to prevent Israel from expropriating the Jordan River’s 
waters by means of an Arab initiated military strike. The second option involved carrying 
out the Arab Plan for diverting the Jordan River and its tributaries in Arab land (Lebanon 
would construct a tunnel that links the Hasbani to the Litani and diverts the spillovers of 
the upper Hasbani to the Banias River; Syria would divert the Banias River to the 
Yarmuk and Jordan would divert the Yarmuk to Jordanian uses). At the same time 
military preparations would start in earnest to develop the capacity to safeguard the Arab 
diversions from Israeli attacks. 
If the Arab diversion plans were implemented they would have reduced Israel’s share of 
the the Hasbani and Banias by over ¾ (including the entire waters of the Wazani), and 
reduced water by 1/3 for the NWC. A loss of this magnitude would have also raised the 
salinity of Lake Tiberius to levels that would render a good part of it useless. This, the 
Arabs figured would be sufficient to dissuade Israel from operating the NWC. 
But what explains the Arabs’ failure to act on their plans and Israeli success. There are a 
number of complex factors that might shed some light on these two questions. 
First, the dissolution of the UAR unraveled a unique opportunity and critical juncture for 
Arab cooperation and collective will to challenge Israeli expropriation of the Jordan 
River and expansionary designs. Syria and Egypt squabbled about the appropriate 
response to Israeli provocations and blamed each other for failure and inaction. Two 
Baathist revolutions one in Syria in February 1963 and another in Iraq in March of the 
same year heightened Egyptian fears that the Syrians and Iraqis would undo Nasir’s pan-
Arab plans and subvert his leadership. Egypt accused the Syrians and the Iraqis in 
attempting to embroil Egypt in a war with Israel it would not win and the Syrians accused 
Egypt of lack of will to stop Israel from completing its plans. This squabble, at the midst 
of the existential threat that Israel presented with its diversion plan, derailed and 
undermined collective action and a much needed focus on Israeli challenges.  
Second, while it is correct to situate the struggle for water in the Jordan basin within the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, it may be argued that the Arab strategy to confront Israel suffered 
from mixing too many objectives at the same time.  The confounding of the objective to 
thwart Israeli diversion of the Jordan River with the liberation of Palestine and the 
political unification of the Arabs proved to be too ambitious and unrealistic for the 
window that Israel’s diversion plan opened for the Arabs to act. 
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Third, Israeli air superiority proved decisive on the battle field and rigged the outcome in 
their favor. 
Fourth, while Syria and Egypt and a few Arab states were serious about their 
commitments, a few countries wavered and hesitated to deliver on their obligations and 
commitments. It is not fruitful at this time to go beyond this claim. 
Fifth, the state of fragmentation that characterizes the Arabs from Sykes-Picot onward 
has been and continues to be a major obstacle in coalescing a credible Arab strategy to 
deal with Israel. 
Sixth, there are many technical, legal, environmental and strategic factors and aspects 
that the Arabs can exploit to bolster their positions vis-a vis Israeli asymmetrical 
exploitation of their shared resources that have not been used to advantage by the Arabs 
neither then or now. 
Seventh, there exists innumerable links between water and oil. These two resources are 
connected in a strong strategic web that had not been exploited by the Arabs. 
Eighth, a number of military assumptions had been made that proved disastrous. The 
expectation that Israel would attack the diversion sites on their completion instead of 
their initiation was wrong and costly. Arab military intelligence was quite deficient. 
Ninth, Israel baited the Syrians and other riparians into skirmishes and actions that were 
part of an elaborate Israeli strategy to justify their “reprisal” attacks, the lack of 
compliance of the Syrians with agreed upon courses of actions proved very costly.      
The fact that there are many technical, economic and environmental considerations that 
bolster Arab arguments and positions are grounded in the parameters of the existing 
situation of unbalanced, unjust and irrational Israeli water practices. The NWC has been 
recognized as an “environmental crime” perpetrated by Israel against nature and natural 
endowments and conditions in the Basin. In the next section an attempt will be made to 
elaborate on these factors.   
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Ayad, Farid, Personal Interview, Mississauga, Canada. September 21st, 2015 
 
Comment on the Arab-Israeli War. 
 
The involvement of the Arab states in the 1948 war was quite superficial, not only was 
the country lost when they joined. To give one example, the weapons used by the 
Egyptian soldiers would not only get ruined when they were used in difficult weather 
conditions but they would actually backfire exploding in the faces of the young men.  
 
Growing up in the refugee camps. 
 
I did not live in the camps, I lived just adjacent to it, but as a child but would wake up 
every morning and head over to Burj el Barajneh camp. My first memory of the camps 
was early one morning when I was quite young, around the age of Amal (his eldest 
grand-daughter), and I saw people lined up, so I got in line with them. I thought at the 
end of this line I would receive some sort of food. When I got to the front I realized that 
all these people were lined up in the morning to use the washroom! 
 
Being a young Palestinian. 
 
What you must understand first is that there were many poor Lebanese people as well, 
but I did not see a difference amongst us and our Lebanese neighbours. Not until I was 
about six years old and about to start school. We were forced to shave our heads due to 
fear of lice. So while the Lebanese students would have long hair, we would all be bald. 
This was my first idea that something about us was different.  
 
Involvement in politics. 
 
I got involved in politics soon after Karameh. I can remember Abu Ammar and Abu 
Jihad coming to Beirut to recruit, Arafat would sit under one tree and Abu Jihad under 
another on different sides of a field and there would be hundreds of young men lining up 
to fight. When I joined, I joined to fight, but being that I was very young, both my mother 
and the PLO would not allow me to. Two reasons, first because they already had enough 
fighters and that they were also focusing on developing political and professional minds.  
 
On Nasser. 
 
From the moment he became President of Egypt he made it his job to rid the Arab world 
from European colonization. He drove the British backed King Faruq from Egypt then 
supported the Algerians in their revolution against the French occupiers. But it was when 
Nasser drove the British troops out of Egypt and nationalized (sic) the Suez Canal that 
the Arab dream began to come into fruition. 
 
On Arafat. 
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I remember when I was a teenager, I played for the Palestinian team in an Arab volleyball 
tournament. We were all young athletes who were growing and thus always hungry, but 
we continued to eat on a poor diet. One day, Arafat came to meet with us, I asked him 
two questions, first was about Black September, which he didn’t answer, so I asked him 
another question. I asked about the food, why is it that the other teams like the Egyptians 
and the Saudis eating foods like pasta and meat while we were given small portions of 
unhealthy foods. He listened attentively, and told the coach that each player would be 
given 5000 Lebanese Liras (Same purchasing power of $5 in the 1970’s) a day for food. 
Of course by the time every level of the bureaucracy took their cut we were left with 
1000 Lira a day. Nonetheless, a number of years later when I was studying in Egypt, my 
sister who I was living with told me that her neighbour needed to go to the hospital and 
he so happened to be one of the PLO figureheads. So we are at the hospital and I noticed 
a group of bodyguards walking in and as they opened up Arafat was standing at the 
middle, he went first to his comrade to greet him and when thanking me for bringing him 
he looked me right in the eyes and asked if I ever got my pasta. He was a true, thoughtful 
leader who cared about his people and showed it, not only on a grand scale but on an 
individual level.   
 
  
 
 
